Growth, Poverty and Inequality Dynamics by Weisbrod, Julian
Growth, Poverty and 
Inequality Dynamics
Four Empirical Essays at the Macro and Micro 
Level
G Ö T T I N G E R  S T U D I E N  Z U R  E N T W I C K LU N G S Ö KO N O M I K  / 
G Ö T T I N G E N  S T U D I E S  I N  D E V E L O P M E N T  E C O N O M I C S
Julian Weisbrod
Julian Weisbrod - 978-3-631-75361-3
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:55:15AM
via free access
Since the Second World War the world has seen an economic growth spurt 
unprecedented in history. Economic growth is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for improving human development, or in other words, economic growth 
is an important pre-requisite for the ultimate goal of human well-being. The four 
empirical essays of this book add to the general debate concerning dynamics 
of growth, poverty and inequality over the past 40 years from four different 
dimensions. The first chapter analyses the dynamics of the cross-country per 
capita income distribution and the existence of convergence clubs. The second 
chapter focuses on the dynamic development of the global income distribution 
and resulting implications for global income convergence, poverty reduction, pro-
poor growth and the evolution of global inequality within and between countries. 
The third chapter investigates the deterministic relationship between ethnic 
fractionalisation and growth in a macro cross-country regression framework. 
Finally, the fourth chapter adds to the understanding of micro determinants of 
growth and poverty in the context of Indonesia.
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Editor's Preface 
Economic growth remains the most important driver of human development. However, it has 
become increasingly clear that economic growth in and of itself is not a sufficient condition per 
se to change human wellbeing. Thus, recent research has not only focused on the determinants 
of economic growth, but increasingly also on its distributional nature, which is of utmost im-
portance to effectively reduce poverty and inequality. The four essays of this thesis contribute 
to the ongoing academic debate concerning income, poverty and inequality dynamics, or the 
drivers and pro-poorness of economic growth, by empirically investigating four panel data sets 
on selected issues at the macro and micro level. 
In the first essay, Julian Weisbrod analyses the cross-country per capita income convergence 
and the emergence of difference convergence clubs generated by the past growth record. In partic-
ular, he shows that any such analysis should focus on the number of distinct components in order 
to identify convergence clubs rather than modes, as the number of modes in non-parametric es-
timated cross-country per capita income models strongly depend on the scale chosen. Hence the 
essay demonstrates, by applying a likelihood ratio test and other model selection criterion, the in-
creased divergence of the cross-country per capita income distribution towards three components 
after I 976. Furthermore, the method used allows for the calculation of posterior probabilities 
using the fitted model and thus for a detailed picture of the intra-distributional dynamics of the 
cross-country per capita income distribution. Hence, the essay is the first to suggest that the 
cross-national per capita income distribution is not strictly polarising towards "twin peaks", but 
that there are rather three distinct different components or income "clubs" evolving from 1976 
onwards. 
In the second essay, Weisbrod focuses on a related, but fundamentally different question, 
namely the evolution and distributional change of the global income distribution. Unlike other 
studies, it models the global income distribution as a parametric mix of lognormal distributions 
combining national account income data and national measures of inequality. This methodology 
allows for an unprecedented detail by generating growth incidence curves to semi-decade and re-
gional specific income data which allows identifying the pro-poorness of past growth. Moreover, 
it finds that overall the past years have seen a convergence of the global income distribution, 
as the bottom-middle part of the distribution grew the fastest. These findings go hand in hand 
with declining poverty rates and absolute numbers of poor in most regions of the world, with 
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VI EDITOR'S PREFACE 
the most dramatic decline taking place during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Most notably 
are the significant positive changes in the regional distributions of South East Asia and South 
Asia which include the two population heavy weights China and India. Overall global inequality 
declined slightly, due to a decrease in between country inequality, which is however, counteracted 
by a slight increase of within country income inequality. 
The third essay applies a cross-country growth regression framework to a cross-national panel 
dataset and contributes to the wider growth regression literature by enhancing the understanding 
concerning the interaction between ethnic fractionalisation and growth. In particular, Weisbrod 
shows that ethnic fractionalisation remains a growth hampering factor in post 1990 Sub-Saharan 
Africa, even after controlling for a wide policy framework or good governance. Furthermore, the 
essay empirically investigates, if there is a possibly counteracting positive effect of high ethnic 
fractionalisations in countries which are ethnically diverse due to past immigration, and are thus 
capable to benefit from co-ethnic trading networks. The fourth essay is a detailed household 
panel data study concerning the development and sectoral drivers of income and poverty in In-
donesia over the 1990s. In particular, Weisbrod analyzes which pathways out of poverty have 
been most successful and promising in the Indonesian context. Most of the literature suggests 
that productivity gains in agriculture and non-farm activities as well as intersectoral shifts can 
play a large role, and thus an answer to this question ultimately necessitates an empirical ap-
proach. The essay demonstrates that while the non-farm sector plays an important and dynamic 
role in facilitating growth, urbanisation and alleviating poverty, it is equally important to foster 
agriculture productivity increases as most of the poor are living from agriculture and managed 
to leave poverty while remaining in agriculture. Moreover, the essay confirms the importance 
of education or human capital in poverty reduction as it allows the poor to participate in high 
productivity activities in general and increases the chance of a successful change of sector or 
location. 
The four empirical essays of this dissertation thus add significantly to the debates about the 
dynamics of growth, poverty and inequality over the past 40 years in different dimensions. 
Prof. Stephan Klasen, PhD. 
Giittingen, April 2008 
Julian Weisbrod - 978-3-631-75361-3
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:55:15AM
via free access
Acknowledgment 
I am indebted and grateful to my advisor, Stephan Klasen, for his support and helpful comments. 
Without him this work would not have been possible. I would also like to thank the members 
of my committee, Michael Grimm and Walter Zucchini for their advice and time. Furthermore, 
I owe a debt of gratitude to Neil McCulloch who incorporated me into ongoing work during my 
three months stay at the World Bank Office in Jakarta. My special thanks also go to numerous 
colleagues at the University of Giittingen for their advice, practical help and friendship. Lastly, 
I would like to thank my family and close friends for their invaluable support during my work 
on this thesis. 
Julian Weisbrod 
Giittingen, November 2007 
Julian Weisbrod - 978-3-631-75361-3
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:55:15AM
via free access
Julian Weisbrod - 978-3-631-75361-3
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:55:15AM
via free access
Contents 
List of Figures 
List of Tables 
Introduction and Overview 
1 Twin Peaks or Three Components? 
1. 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1.2 Statistical Methodology and Data . 
1.2.1 Data ............ . 








Likelihood Ratio Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ll 
1.2.3 Discriminant Analysis via Posterior Probabilities 15 
1.2.4 Nonparametric Kernel Density Estimation and Mode Testing 16 
1.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 
1.3.l Selecting the Number of Components. 
1.3.2 Evolution of the Cross-Country Distribution of Income 
1.3.3 Intra-Distributional Dynamics Based on Posterior Probabilities 
1.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1.5 Extension: Mixtures with Distinct Variances . 
2 Global Income Distribution Dynamics and Pro-Poor Growth 
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . 
2.2 Methodology and Data . 
2.2.l Data ...... . 
2.2.2 Mixtures of Log-normal Distributions 
2.3 The Global Income Distribution . 
2.3. l Inequality and Poverty . . 
2.3.2 Growth Incidence Curves and Pro-Poor Growth . 
2.4 Regional Distributions, Inequality, Poverty and Growth Incidence Curves . 
















Julian Weisbrod - 978-3-631-75361-3
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:55:15AM
via free access
X CONTENTS 
2.4.2 Regional Poverty and Inequality Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 
2.4.3 Regional Semi-Decade Specific Growth Rates, Rates of Pro-poor Growth 
and Growth Incidence Curves 
2.5 Conclusion .............. . 
3 Ethnic Fractionalisation, Migration and Growth 
3.1 Introduction ...... . 
3.2 Theoretical Framework . 
3.3 Existing Empirical Investigations 
3.4 Data and Methodology . . . . . 
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
3.5.1 Extending the Data Set 
3.5.2 Migration and Ethnic Fractionalisation . 
3.6 Conclusion and Future Research Questions . 





4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . 




Conceptualisation and the "Naive" Model 
Data ..... 
Poverty Line 
4.3 Descriptive Analysis, Income & Poverty Transition Matrices 
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics . 
4.3.2 Income Growth . . . 
4.3.3 Poverty Transitions . 
4.4 Micro Determinants of Income and Poverty Transitions . 
4.4.1 The Determinants of Income and Poverty Levels 
4.4.2 The Determinants of Income Change 
4.4.3 Poverty Dynamics 





































Julian Weisbrod - 978-3-631-75361-3
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:55:15AM
via free access
List of Figures 
1.1 Three-Component Mixture Density and Kernel Density. . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
1.2 Kernel Density Estimates and Transformed Kernel Density Estimates, 2003 17 
1.3 Kernel Density Estimates Normal and Log-Scale 18 
1.4 Weights of Components . . . 22 
1.5 Means of the Distinct Groups 23 
1.6 Density Estimates for 1970 27 
1. 7 Density Estimates for 2003 28 
2.1 Global and Regional Distribution of Income 
2.2 Global and Regional Distribution of Log-Income 
2.3 Global and Regional Cumulative Distribution of Log-Income . 
2.4 Global Semi-Decade specific Growth Incidence Curves .. 
2.5 Global and Regional Growth Incidence Curves 1970-2003 . 
2.6 Growth Incidence Curves of Various Years . . . . . . . . . 
4.1 Pathways out of Poverty .......................... . 
4.2 Poverty Transition Matrix, 1993 to 2000, IFLS Panel Data, Unweighted. 










B.2 Semi-Decade specific Growth Incidence Curves, East Asia and the Pacific 105 
B.3 Semi-Decade specific Growth Incidence Curves, Latin America and the Caribbean 106 
B.4 Semi-Decade specific Growth Incidence Curves, Middle East and North Africa . . 107 
B.5 Semi-Decade specific Growth Incidence Curves, Eastern Europe and Central Asia 108 
B.6 Semi-Decade specific Growth Incidence Curves, South Asia ..... 
B.7 Semi-Decade specific Growth Incidence Curves, Sub-Saharan Africa . 




Julian Weisbrod - 978-3-631-75361-3
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:55:15AM
via free access
Julian Weisbrod - 978-3-631-75361-3
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:55:15AM
via free access
List of Tables 
1. 1 Model Selection Criteria for Mixture Models Fitted to Log Cross-Country Income 
Distribution 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
1.2 Results of Silverman's Test for 2003, 124 Countries 18 
1.3 Component Test and Goodness of Fit, 1970-2003 . 20 
1.4 Fit of the Three Component Model . . . . . . . . . 21 
1.5 Model Selection Criteria for Mixture Models Fitted to Log Cross-Country Income 
Distribution 1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
1.6 Model Selection Criteria for Mixture Models Fitted to Log Cross-Country Income 
Distribution 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
2.1 Global and Regional Gini, Theils' Inequality Measure and Theil's Decomposition 34 
2.2 Global and Regional $1 and $2 per day Poverty Headcount and Poverty Gap Measure 36 
2.3 Global and Regional Population and Absolute Number of $1 and $2 per day Poor 38 
2.4 Global and Regional Semi-Decade specific Growth Rates 1970-2003. . . . . . . . . 42 
3.1 Sample Means of Fractionalisation Indices by Region 
3.2 Baseline Regression. . . . . . . . . . 
3.3 1990s Effect. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
3.4 Decade Specific Growth Regression .. 
3.5 Sub-Saharan African and Latin American Results. 
3.6 1990s and SSA Effect. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
3.7 SSA Effect including Investment and the Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton-
Index ........................... . 
3.8 Past Settlement, Ethnic Fractionalisation and Growth. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics for IFLS 1993 and 2000 ........... . 
4.2 Income Growth Transitions by Rural, Urban and Sector 1993-2000 
4.3 Poverty Transition Matrix, 1993 to 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
4.4 Simple Logit Regression of Poverty Exit and Entry (1993-2000) 
A. l Results Posterior Estimation . . . . 















Julian Weisbrod - 978-3-631-75361-3
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:55:15AM
via free access
XIV LIST OF TABLES 
C.1 Unrestricted SUR Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 
C.2 Unrestricted SUR Model including Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton Index. . 115 
C.3 Immigration Country Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 
C.4 Comparison Alesina et al. with our Results . . . . . . . 118 
C.5 Indirect Effect of Fractionalisation on Good Governance. 119 
D.l True Rural-Urban Migration, 1990-1995 ........ . 
D.2 Employment in Agriculture and Non Agriculture .... . 
D.3 The Determinants of Log Real Income in 1993 and 2000 
D.4 Cross Sectional Poverty Logit Regression in 1993 and 2000 . 
D.5 Income Difference Regression 1993-2000 .......... . 
D.6 Geographic and Absolute Convergence ........... . 








Julian Weisbrod - 978-3-631-75361-3
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:55:15AM
via free access
Introduction and Overview 
Since the Second World War the world has seen an economic growth spurt unprecedented in 
history. This accelerated growth was combined with a process of ever-increasing globalisation. 
Despite various problems associated with this process, it appears beyond contestation that con-
siderable progress in material well-being and life expectancy has been achieved. Most people 
would agree that most of these gains were only achievable in a framework of strong economic 
performance. However, to consider economic growth as a goal in itself is misleading as it fails to 
capture the multidimensional nature of human development. Thus, economic growth is a neces-
sary but not sufficient condition for improving human development, or in other words, economic 
growth is an important prerequisite for the ultimate goal of human well-being. 
Therefore, it is not only important to analyse and understand economic growth per se, but 
rather the welfare impact or pro-poorness of economic growth. In particular, the past record 
shows that economic growth has been highly uneven between regions, countries and citizens. 
While some of the more fortunate managed to escape material poverty and low life expectancy, 
others remain in a devastating welfare situation even today. This is not only a tragedy for the 
individuals concerned, but also increasingly constitutes a global problem in an ever-more glob-
alised world. In other words, in times of global communication and mass media, poverty is not 
only a socially unbearable situation, but fosters favourable conditions for environmental neglect, 
increased violence, including terrorism, and/or poverty-driven mass migration. Hence, a deeper 
understanding concerning the determinants, impact and distributive pattern of growth and its 
subsequent welfare implications, with respect to citizens, regions and/or countries, is of utmost 
importance in order to overcome some of globalisation's challenges and poverty in general. This 
dissertation contributes four empirical essays, analyzing growth, poverty and inequality dynam-
ics at the macro and micro level. 
On a purely quantitative note, if anything, economic growth is a rough guide for the dy-
namic development of an economy and its well-being. Hence, it is unsurprising that, starting 
from the early 1990s, with increasing data availability and processing power, economists turned 
towards analysing countries' growth records and cross-country growth regressions. From basic 
visual inspection alone it is apparent that, firstly, South East Asia has been growing remarkably 
fast, closing the income gap to the rich countries and, secondly, that Sub-Saharan Africa has 
mostly been economically stagnating over the past decades. Hence, the first impression is that 
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2 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
most Sub-Saharan African nations' economic growth record is characterised by the persistence of 
low income and low growth equilibria, which implies a relative economic retardation in relation 
to the OECD countries. In contrast, most South East Asian nations' economic growth record 
was sufficiently good to facilitate an income catch-up towards the rich countries' high income 
and medium growth equilibria. However, whether this is the case, the global cross-national 
distribution of income should display at least two, or even more, distinct components. This in 
turn would imply the need for policy intervention to move nations from a low income and low 
growth equilibrium towards a self-sustaining fast growth trajectory, allowing an income catch-up 
to the richer countries. Hence, the question, whether past economic growth has led to an income 
per capita convergence among all countries has received much attention in the recent literature. 
Several recent papers (Jones, 1997; Quah, 1996a, b; Sala-i-Martin, 1996; Beaudry et al., 2005) 
have this debate at heart and discuss which type of convergence governs the development of the 
cross-national per capita income distribution and what is to be expected in the future. Bianchi 
( 1997) is the first to formally test for multimodality of the cross-national income distribution 
based on Kernel density estimates and finds increasing evidence of bimodality implying a polar-
isation of the global cross-national income distribution. 
The first essay of this dissertation, based on joint work with Hajo Holzmann and Sebastian 
Vollmer, adds to this debate. One major limitation of the previous academic papers is that the 
income data is analysed non-parametrically and based on a logarithmic scale which entails the 
problem that the number of modes of a density strongly depends on the scale chosen. Hence, our 
paper models the cross-national income distribution as a mixture in which the number of com-
ponents is independent of the scale chosen, as it is not the number of modes in the cross-national 
income density which contains the most relevant information, but rather the number of compo-
nents or "convergence clubs". Thus, speaking in statistical terms, the number of components 
in a mixture model provides key information on convergence. In order to identify the number 
of components, we applied the recently developed modified likelihood ratio test methodology 
(cf. Chen et al. 2001, 2004, and Chen and Kalbfleisch, 2005) on the cross-national per capita 
income distribution and find the emergence and divergence of a third clearly distinct component 
by the mid 1970s. This allows us to contribute to the convergence debate by extensively inves-
tigating the evolution and, in particular, the intra-distributional dynamics of the cross-country 
income distribution by using posterior probability estimates from our fitted model. We find intra-
distributional dynamics in particular for the Asian (upward mobility) and the Latin-American 
(downward mobility) countries, while most Sub-Saharan African countries remain stuck in the 
lowest component. The overall picture that we obtain is that of three diverging groups in the 
cross-national income distribution. Hence, we must strongly reject the notion that the cross-
national per capita income distribution is converging. Moreover, we are the first to suggest that 
the cross-national per capita income distribution is not strictly polarising ( the alleged "twin 
peaks" Quah, 1996; Bianchi, 1997), but that there are three distinct different "clubs" from 1976 
onwards. 
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 3 
However, our cross-country income per capita analysis also shows very clearly that partic-
ular populous countries managed to grow fast enough to facilitate an income catch-up to the 
richest countries over the past 40 years. This leads to an equally interesting question, from a 
global welfare point of view. Namely: Is the global income distribution converging and what 
was the global participatory and distributional impact of past growth on global poverty rates 
and inequality measures? 1 Current research is focusing ever more closely on the participatory 
and distributive nature of growth. Furthermore, a better understanding of the participatory 
nature of growth, as well as its determinants, is also clearly important if the world is to meet 
its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of halving global poverty and hunger by 2015. A 
number of recent papers (Dowrick & Akmal, 2005; Milanovic, 2002; Chen & Ravallion, 2004; 
Chotikapanich, Valenzuela & Rao, 1997; Bourguignon & Morrisson, 2002; Quah 2002; Bhalla, 
2002; Sala-i-Martin, 2002a, 2006) used two basic methodological approaches to model a global 
income distribution in order to draw conclusions concerning the development of global poverty 
and inequality. Both combine population weighted national average income and distribution 
estimates in order to derive a global income distribution. 
The second essay, based also on joint work with Hajo Holzmann and Sebastian Vollmer, 
contributes to the existing and ongoing research. We implement the method of a paramet-
ric mixed lognormal distribution on national account income data and household-based income 
distribution measures. In particular, the paper highlights the fact that this parametric mixed 
lognormal approach has many statistically desirable properties and displays practical advantages 
to analyse the question at hand. Furthermore, we introduce recently developed methodologies 
and concepts such as growth incidence curves and rates of pro-poor growth (Ravallion and Chen, 
2003; Ravallion, 2004) on a global scale to analyse the participatory and distributional impact 
of past global growth on the global poverty headcount and inequality via semi-decade and re-
gion specific growth incidence curves. Moreover, we calculate a decomposed Theil's measure 
of inequality, which allows for a decomposition of global income inequality into a between and 
within country component. Our results indicate that even though the cross-national income per 
capita distribution is not converging as concluded in the first essay, it is clearly the case that the 
global income distribution is indeed converging. This global income convergence is characterised 
by a rapid and dramatic decline in poverty headcount rates, not only reducing the relative but 
also the absolute number of people globally living below the poverty line. Moreover, our Theil's 
inequality decomposition shows that, while global income inequality is declining, this reduction 
is due to the decrease of between country inequality, which is counteracted by a slight increase 
of within country income inequality. Furthermore, the analysis of growth incidence curves shows 
the bottom-middle part of the income distribution experienced above average percentile growth 
rates, which explains the occurring global income convergence. In particular, the late 1970s and 
Note: The global income distribution is the distribution of every persons' income on this planet and thus the 
suitable measure to answer questions concerning global welfare. Moreover, it is not equal to the distribution 
of cross-country income per capita which models the distribution of average per capita income in which the 
observation of Luxemburg is treated equally to China's. 
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early 1980s are characterised by high global rates of pro-poor growth, initiating the rapid decline 
of global poverty rates. 
Unsurprisingly, it is mostly the success of the East Asian region with the population heavy 
weight China, and to a lesser extent the success of South Asia, which includes India, that drives 
these remarkable results and high rates of pro-poor growth. In comparison, the initially rather 
wealthy regions of Latin America and the Caribbean and the Middle East and North Africa 
remained rather stagnant on a high level contributing only very modestly to the global poverty 
dynamics. Lastly, Sub-Saharan Africa has remained virtually stagnant and has become the poor-
est region in relative and absolute terms, implying a steady divergence and disconnection from 
the global growth process. Thus, despite the fact that our results indicate a tremendous success 
in economic growth and connected social welfare gains on a global scale over the past decades, 
the remaining very lowest percentiles also experienced the lowest percentile income growth rates, 
such that the remaining extreme poor might be particularly hard to reach. This is likely due to 
the fact that those remaining poor are mostly citizens of countries whose economies are stuck in 
a low level income equilibrium and thus fail to connect to the global growth process. However, 
poverty also remains a pressing issue in many countries which managed to launch their economies 
on a successful growth trajectory, but which have remaining pockets of poverty, in particular in 
rural areas, within their national boundaries. Thus, any attempt to reduce global poverty even 
further must focus on those countries stuck in general national poverty traps and on remaining, 
in particular rural, national pockets of poverty. The regional decomposition of growth suggest 
that countries and regions which managed to participate the most in the process of globalisa-
tion, managed to reduce poverty the fastest, despite the considerable problems inherent in such 
a process. 
Given the stylised fact of a diverging cross-national per capita income distribution, as anal-
ysed in detail in the first essay, the question remains: what determines different income per 
capita growth rates that enable some countries to thrive, while others remain economically stag-
nant? Following pioneering work by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and Barro (1991), many 
different growth regressions with multiple specifications and covariates in a cross-country de-
terministic neo-classical growth framework were formulated in order to explain this diverging 
growth experience. The main initial findings are, firstly, that much of the world-wide growth 
variation can be explained remarkably well by the variables specified in the theoretical Solow 
growth model. Secondly, however, it became equally clear that there is a sizeable unexplained 
residual accounting for a wide heterogeneous experience between different countries and regions. 
In particular, Sub-Saharan Africa's growth tragedy could be hardly explained by the plain cu-
mulative parameters of the Solow growth model alone. Hence, main "groups" of determinants 
are identified in the literature which account for, or are associated with, factor accumulation 
and/or differences in productivity levels. One set of growth determinants stress the unfavourable 
geographic conditions (e.g. Sachs and Warner 1994) such as tropical climate, and the implied 
endemic disease environment, or the lack of access to the sea, and the implied higher cost of 
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trade participation. Closely connected are determinants which measure the impact of openness 
and/or trade on growth (Frankie and Romer, 1999). This in turn is also closely associated with 
the institutionalists' point of view that highlights more the importance of historical development 
trajectories, man made institutions, human capital accumulation and good governance as pre-
requisite for efficient resource allocation and public good provision ( e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2001, 
Englebert, 2000). More recently the debate has shifted beyond the mere accumulation of factors 
of production towards determinants of different productivity levels (e.g. Feyrer, 2007). 
The paper by Easterly and Levine (1997) argues that Sub-Saharan Africa's worse than aver-
age growth performance is mainly due to a high degree of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation and a 
resulting adverse policy climate. The paper concludes that "the results lend support to theories 
that interest group polarisation leads to rent-seeking behavior and reduces the consensus for pub-
lic goods, creating long-run growth tragedies" .2 The paper by Alesina et al. (2003) improves the 
argument by creating and testing three new indices of ethnic fractionalisation, namely linguistic, 
religious and ethnic fragmentation. It shows that the linguistic and ethnic indices have a simi-
larly negative impact on the policy environment and subsequently on growth in a cross-country 
growth regression. Furthermore, Easterly (2001a) showed that the negative effect of ethnic frac-
tionalisation is mitigated by institutional quality. Moreover, in a second paper Easterly (2001b) 
argues that the "middle class consensus", or the lack of strong ethnic or class differences, results 
in the highest growth rates. However, the channels through which ethnic fractionalisation has 
a negative impact on growth have been analysed only partially by these studies. Furthermore, 
the impact of ethnic fractionalisation on economic progress might be far more complex than the 
existing empirical studies would suggest. For this reason the third essay intends to extend the 
existing analyses. 
The third essay, based on joint work with Dana Schiiler, adds to this large growth determin-
istic research by firstly updating the regression framework data set used by Alesina et al.(2003) 
into the 1990s in order to analyse the robustness of their results in a wider time range. The results 
indicate that their initial model specification yields different results once the 1990s are included, 
as the negative effect of ethnic fractionalisation remains substantial and statistically significant 
even after the inclusion of policy variables. Hence, we apply region specific regressions, as well as 
a region and decade specific ethnic fractionalisation interaction term, in order to identify whether 
this result is driven by a decade or region-specific effect. Our results indicate that the model 
specifications, accounting for the impact of ethnic fractionalisation on growth via policy variables 
alone, as in the Alesina et al. (2003) model, are incomplete, as they fail to fully account for the 
recent Sub-Saharan growth experience. One plausible reason would be the increased frequency 
and severity of ethnic conflicts, in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa, after the collapse of the 
balance of superpowers. Another reason might be the increased importance of good governance 
which is not captured sufficiently in the policy variables used so far. A further different reason 
Easterly, W. and Levine, R. Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 112, No. 4, 1997, p. 1241. 
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would be that the implied channels of ethnic fractionalisation on growth cannot be completely 
confirmed, suggesting that other channels which have not yet been accounted for are equally or 
more important. We find that the growth-hampering impact of ethnic fractionalisation remains 
only in the 1990s and in Sub-Saharan Africa once the policy framework is controlled for. In 
the end our results show that this Sub-Saharan 1990s effect can be explained by different lev-
els of governance in the 1990s, if we implement the Kaufman-Kraay-Zoido-Lobaton-Indicator as 
measurement for governance. However, we cannot confirm the hypothesis that the remaining 
negative impact of ethnic fractionalisation is due to violent conflict. 
In addition, it might be the case that the alleged negative effect of ethnic fractionalisation on 
growth described above is mitigated by possible positive effect prevailing in multi-ethnic societies. 
In particular, there is a large body of literature which suggests that the existence of co-ethnic 
networks has a large positive impact on trade and thus growth. The theoretical argument is, 
that immigrants have an informational and trust advantage in arranging trade with their home 
countries over their local counterparts (Epstein and Gang (2004), Casella and Rauch (1997), 
Rauch (2001)). Hence, we empirically investigate, if ethnic fractionalisation might be positive in 
a nation which is ethnically diverse, partially due to past immigration. We find some indication 
that countries which are ethnically diverse due to past immigration can mitigate the negative 
impact of ethnic fractionalisation on growth. We distinguish between these two different kinds 
of ethnic fractionalisation in order to determine if the result empirically indicates this multidi-
mensionality of ethnic diversity. 
In summary, this third essay shows that ethnic divide remains an explanatory factor for di-
verging growth records in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America even after the inclusion of the 
1990s data and policy control variables. Furthermore, it demonstrates that ethnic diversity is 
not necessarily growth hampering, but contrarily can be growth enhancing if ethnic diversity 
today is the result of free past immigration and subsequent resulting trade networks. However, 
this kind of ethnic diversity is not currently present in most developing countries. Hence, in 
particular nations in Sub-Saharan Africa seem to be trapped in a situation of low income, low 
growth and high ethnic divide. However, it is highly likely that the ethnic divide often goes 
along with high inequality and interest group polarisation; the implication would be to improve 
equal access to resources, political participation and, in particular, human capital. This situation 
might indeed characterise one of multiple possible low income and low growth, high poverty equi-
libria mentioned above. High income and human capital inequality can have two consequences. 
Firstly, it could have a direct negative effect on growth. Secondly, it could prevent the poor from 
participating in the growth process. Thus, a strand of research, including the second essay of 
this dissertation, has concentrated more strongly on the participatory and distributive nature of 
growth on various levels ranging from micro household community to global data analysis. The 
second essay argues that the largest part of the remaining poor of the global income distribu-
tion are to be found either in poor countries or in the poorest percentiles or national pockets of 
poverty in the intermediate, particular populous and regionally diverse income countries. In fact, 
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as mentioned above, it might be the case that certain, mainly rural, provinces in intermediate 
countries suffer from very similar growth hampering factors as economically poor performing 
developing countries. 
More specifically, it is very clear that the vast majority of the world's poor remain in the 
countryside engaged in low productivity, mainly agricultural activities. Hence, recent and cur-
rent research is aiming to identify and understand the determinants of rural income growth and 
poverty reduction from a regional to micro level. One theme of recent and past literature argues 
that from an empirical point of view growth originating in the agricultural sector has tended 
to be more "pro-poor" than growth originating from the industrial or service sectors (Mellor, 
1976; Ravallion and Datt, 1996; Ravallion and Chen, 2004; Timmer, 2002). Indeed, agricultural 
growth has often been an important ingredient in the formula that connects economic growth 
to the poor (Ravallion and Huppi, 1991; Ravallion and Datt, 1996; Ravallion and Chen, 2004; 
Sumarto and Suryahadi, 2003; Fan, Zhang and Zhang, 2004; Fan, Thorat and Rao, 2004; Tim-
mer, 1997, 2004) and separate reviews by Thirtle, et al. (2003) and by Majid (2004) confirm the 
strong empirical link between higher agricultural productivity and poverty reduction. Moreover, 
the current interest in this topic is well documented by the forthcoming World Development 
Report "Agriculture for Development" (2008). 
However, an equally important and connected debate is concerned with the role of rural non-
farm activities in rural income growth and rapid poverty alleviation. This is particularly true, 
as in most developing countries rural non-farm output accounts for roughly half of rural income. 
Non-farm activities can be most conducive towards poverty reduction, especially in the absence 
of physical infrastructure and human capital constraints (Datt and Ravallion, 1996, 1998a&b, 
2002a). Moreover, rural non-farm enterprises are likely to be pro-poor, as they tend to use factors 
of production at their real opportunity costs to the economy, so they are often labour-intensive 
in nature, reducing underemployment, help smooth income seasonally and bid up local wages 
(Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 2001). 
These literatures on rural poverty reduction are bridged in a broader literature which at-
tempts to understand the nature of pro-poor growth, which inevitably must encompass the rural 
poor and their potential pathways out of poverty (Ravallion 2004, World Bank, 2004a, 21)06b). 
In other words, is agriculture productivity the main driver behind rural poverty alleviation? 
Moreover, do non-farm enterprises encompass predominantly low productivity, supplementary 
and insurance activities or are they a potential source of dynamic growth and poverty alleviation 
in rural areas? Most of the literature suggests that productivity gains in both, agriculture and 
non-farm activities, matter and that non-farm activities fulfil both important functions. How-
ever, to answer these questions ultimately necessitates an empirical approach. 
The last paper of this dissertation adds to this debate by utilising, among other things, 
micro-growth regressions on Indonesian household survey panel data (IFLS 1993, 2002) in order 
to identify the determinants of growth and poverty reduction, or pathways out of poverty, in In-
donesia. This detailed micro-study is based on work with Neil McCulloch and Peter Timmer, and 
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was conceived as an academic background paper to the World Bank's rural investment climate 
assessment in Indonesia in 2005. The main findings are that urbanisation has been rapid, but 
only a small part is due to actual physical migration of workers and households while most is due 
to local economic agglomeration and subsequent re-classification of former rural areas. Further-
more, while the non-farm sector plays an important and dynamic role in facilitating growth and 
alleviating poverty, it is equally important to foster agriculture productivity increases as most of 
the poor are living from agriculture and managed to leave poverty while remaining in agriculture. 
Moreover, we confirm the importance of education or human capital in poverty reduction as it 
allows the poor to participate in high productivity activities in general and increases the chance 
of a successful sectoral or locational change. The absence of human capital endowment might 
indeed constitute an individual poverty trap or low income, low growth equilibrium. Hence, 
the persistence of low income and low growth equilibria or poverty traps might again be due to 
limiting geographic, institutional and/or educational factors. 
This, in turn connects to the three essays before, as it shows how the global analysis and 
conclusions of growth, poverty and inequality patterns might be also applicable and even deter-
mined on a micro-level. As it might well be the case that rural poor regions, just like countries 
stuck in poverty traps, suffer from very similar structural weaknesses, which hamper their growth 
potential and disconnect them from the global growth process. In simplified words, an individ-
ual who lacks crucial factor endowments might find it particularly hard to shift occupation or to 
profit from specialisation and thus to improve his productivity and income. The same argument 
can be made for national economies. Thus, fair integration into the global economy and equi-
table human capital accumulation should be the best guarantee to strengthen pro-poor growth of 
structurally weak economies, national pockets of poverty and individuals. This will reduce global 
poverty and inequality even further, assuring that the global community reaches the targeted 
MDGs. 
The four empirical essays of this dissertation add to the general debate about this dynam-
ics of growth, poverty and inequality over the past 40 years in four different dimensions. The 
first paper analyses the dynamics of the cross-country per capita income distribution and the 
existence of convergence clubs. Moreover, the second paper analyses the dynamic development 
of the global income distribution and the implications for global income convergence, poverty 
reduction and the evolution of global inequality within and between countries. Furthermore, the 
third essay contributes to the understanding of growth determinants in a macro cross-country 
regression framework. Finally, the fourth paper adds to the understanding of micro determi-
nants of growth and poverty in a national setting, among others, in a micro growth regression 
framework. 
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Twin Peaks or Three Components? 
1. 1 Introduction 
The behaviour of the cross-national income distribution is for many reasons of great interest. 
In particular, the development of twin or even more peaks would indicate a world of growing 
cross-country average income polarisation and suggest the existence of multiple equilibria. Nu-
merous papers (Barro, 1991; Jones, 1997; Quah, 1996a, b; Sala-i-Martin, 1996; Beaudry et al., 
2005; Durlauf and Quah, 1999) have this debate at heart and discuss which type of convergence 
governs the development of the cross-national income distribution and what is to be expected 
in the future. In particular, they show that a focus on ;3-convergence1 is informative regard-
ing the nature of intra-distributional dynamics but cannot provide information concerning the 
development of the entire distribution, which appears to be polarising. In order to overcome 
this traditional shortcoming of the ;3-convergence debate, probabilistic income mobility models 
are used to estimate likelihoods of convergence groups. Hence, there is a discussion on whether 
the twin peak phenomenon is either persistent as probabilities of switching are too low (Quah, 
1996a,b) or is only a temporary occurrence due to increasing frequencies of growth miracles 
(Jones, 1997). Thus, the existing literature either gives a descriptive picture of the cross-national 
income distribution by observing the development of two or "twin" income per capita peaks in 
the cross-national income distribution, or, alternatively, is concerned with /3-convergence in cross-
national income growth regressions. Bianchi (1997) employed a non-parametric test for multi-
modality based on kernel density estimation to the cross-country income distribution. Further 
non-parametric approaches include those by Anderson (2004), who used stochastic dominance 
techniques, and by Maasoumi et al. (2007), who analysed the cross-sectional distribution of 
growth rates. Regarding parametric modelling of the cross-country income distribution, Paap 
based on joint work with Hajo Holzmann and Sebastian Vollmer 
By definition ,8-convergence occurs, if the coefficient on initial income is negative when regressed on the change 
of log real income, or, in other words, if initially poorer economies grow on average faster than the initially 
rich. Moreover, a-convergence is defined as the decrease of the dispersion of the entire income distribution. 
If there are no other control variable; in the growth regression, we speak of absolute ,B-convergence, which 
would be a necessary but not sufficient condition for a-convergence. 
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and Dijk (1998) used a two-component mixture, consisting of a truncated normal distribution 
and a Weibull distribution. 
Using nonparametric density estimates, several authors find a twin-peaked cross-country in-
come distribution (Quah, 1996b; Bianchi, 1997). In particular, Bianchi (1997) observes increasing 
evidence of bimodality in the GDP per capita distribution across countries over the period from 
1970 to 1989 indicating global divergence rather than convergence. However, income data is often 
analysed on a logarithmic scale, and the number of modes of the log-income distribution may 
differ substantially from the number of modes of the income distribution itself. In contrast, when 
modelling a density as a finite mixture, the number of components of this mixture is independent 
of the chosen scale. Furthermore, if one wishes to address convergence one can argue that it is 
not the number of modes in the cross-national income density which contains the most relevant 
information, but rather the number of convergence clubs, which correspond to the components 
in the finite mixture. 
When modelling the cross-national income distribution by a finite mixture, determining its 
number of components is an essential step in the analysis. In their model, Paap and Dijk (1998) 
use a mixture with two distinct components, which resembles the fit of a histogram of the cross-
national income distribution. Thus, the "stylised fact" of a distinction between poor and rich 
countries is already integrated into their model. We argue that via a statistical inference proce-
dure, the data itself should determine the number of components and to this end a finite mixture 
with normal components of the log-income distribution (or log-normal components of the income 
distribution itself) is the appropriate tool. We shall apply the recently developed modified like-
lihood ratio test methodology (cf. Chen et al. 2001, 2004, and Chen and Kalbfleisch, 2005) for 
the number of components in a finite mixture to the cross-national income distribution. 
In contrast to the twin-peaks literature and also to Paap and Dijk (1998), we find evidence 
of two components only at the beginnings of the 1970s, whereas in the mid-70s, a third inter-
mediate component emerges, which tends to separate itself ever more clearly from the poorest 
component. Thus, we find statistical evidence for three components rather than for "twin peaks" 
in the cross-country income distribution. 
Moreover, besides determining the number of components (three components from 1976 on-
ward), we contribute to the convergence debate by extensively investigating the evolution and 
the inter-distributional dynamics of the cross-country income distribution by using the posterior 
probability estimates from our fitted model. In particular, we find intra-distributional dynamics 
for Asian (upward mobility) and Latin American (downward mobility) countries. The overall 
picture which we obtain is that of three diverging groups in the cross-national income distribu-
tion. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 1.2 introduces the statistical methodology and 
highlights the differences (and advantages) of our approach compared with those taken in previ-
ous studies. Section 1.3 discusses our results, before we conclude. 
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1.2 Statistical Methodology and Data 
1.2.1 Data 
Following most other papers, our analysis is based on income data from the Penn World Tables 
Version 6.2 (Summer, Heston & Aten, 2006), from which we extract the real PPP GDP /per 
capita series of all years and countries available (chain series, base year 2000 in international $). 
In order to compare our observations over time, we restrict ourselves to those countries having 
more than half a million inhabitants, of which complete income data for the whole time period is 
available. This restriction leaves 124 countries for the period from 1970 to 2003 in our analysis. 
These countries represent about 95 percent of the world population. 
1.2.2 Testing for the Number of Components in a Finite Mixture - the Mod-
ified Likelihood Ratio Test 
Let Ix denote the density of the cross-country income distribution of a fixed year, and let IY be 
the corresponding density of the log-incomes, so that IY(Y) = lx(eY)eY. Multimodality of Ix 
can arise by Ix being a finite mixture of other (unimodal) densities, so that 
lx(x) = P1g(x; µ1, <11) + • • • + Pm9(X; µm, <1m), X > 0, (1.1) 
where the weights Pi ~ 0, Li Pi = 1 and g(x; µ, u) is a parametric family of densities, e.g. the 
log-normal distribution. 
If Ix is a finite mixture of densities g(·;µ,u), there is no general simple connection between 
the number of modes of Ix and the number of components m. Typically, for unimodal g, the 
number of modes of I will be at most m, but often will be less than m. Furthermore, one is more 
interested in the number of components m of the finite mixture than in the number of modes. 
For example, in the cross-country income distribution the components correspond to groups with 
different income level. Therefore, if we model the cross-country distribution of income by a finite 
mixture, determining its number of components statistically is a task of major importance, since 
this number will have essential economic consequences. 
Note that the number of components is preserved if the data are transformed via a strictly 
monotonic transformation. In fact, if the x; have density of form (1.1), the log-data Yi= log(x;) 
have the transformed density 
Thus, the number of components is preserved, while the number of modes evidently may not. 
Therefore, in this paper we model Ix (and hence IY) as a finite mixture and then determine 
its number of components, mainly via hypothesis testing, but also by the use of model selection 
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criteria. We model fy as a finite mixture of normal distributions, so that fx is a finite mixture 
of log-normal distributions. 
Estimation in finite mixture models (with a fixed number of components) typically proceeds 
by maximum likelihood. However, as already discussed in Pittau (2005), the likelihood function 
in a finite normal mixture with different variances is unbounded, thus, a global maximiser of the 
likelihood function does not exist. There are some solutions to this problem. One is to look for 
the largest local maximum. Another is to the variances by restrictions of the form u; s c uJ for 
all i,j = 1, ... m and some c > 1 (cf. Hathaway 1985), which again leads to the existence of a 
global maximum and, if the true parameters satisfy the restriction, consistency. However, these 
solutions have practical problems, and therefore, here and regarding the analysis in section 1.3 
we shall use finite mixtures with equal variances. For further discussion see section 1.5. 
Testing in parametric models is often accomplished by using the Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT). 
However, in order to test for the number of components in finite mixture models, it has long 
been known that the standard theory of the LRT does not apply. This is due to a lack of iden-
tifiability under the null hypothesis: The null can be realised either by a weight zero for one of 
the components, or by equal parameters of two component distributions. Recently, it has been 
discovered that the asymptotic distribution of the LRT concerning the testing for the number 
of components in finite mixtures is superior to a truncated Gaussian process (Chen and Chen, 
2001; Dacunha-Castelle and Gassiat, 1999). The covariance of this process depends on the un-
known true parameter, thus, the asymptotic distribution is too complicated and the LRT loses 
its practical appeal. 
In methodologically related studies, Pittau and Zelli (2005, 2006) fitted finite normal mix-
tures to the per-capita log GDP distribution across European regions in the years 1977-1996. 
They used a bootstrap version of the likelihood ratio test suggested by McLachlan ( 1987) to 
determine the number of components. However, this approach is computationally expensive and 
typically has low power properties, since under an alternative, the parameters from which resam-
ples are obtained, are not correctly estimated ( cf. Chen, Chen and Kalbfleisch, 2004, for related 
simulation results). 
Recently, Chen et al. (2001, 2004) and Chen and Kalbfleisch (2005) suggested modified LRTs 
to solve these problems, which retain a comparatively simple limit theory as well as the good 
power properties of the LRT. We shall apply these tests to our problem concerning the number 
of groups in the income distribution. At this point, we want to mention that the LRT and also 
the modified LRT are invariant under strictly monotonic transformation of the data (if candidate 
densities are correspondingly transformed). Thus, no matter whether we test on the level of the 
Xi or on the level of the Yi, the results are (in contrast to Silverman's test) completely consistent. 
We first of all consider testing one against two components in a mixture. Suppose that 
cp(y; µ, u) is the normal distribution with mean µ and standard deviation a, and consider the 
two-component mixture 
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fy(y;p, µ1, µ2, a) = pcf>(y; µ1,a) + {l - p)cf>(y; µ2, a) 
with equal standard deviation a. The testing problem is 
H1 : fy is normally distributed against K1 : fy is of the form {1.2). 
The modified likelihood function is given by 
n 
ln(P, µ1,µ2, a)= L log (P<l>(y;; µ1,a) + {l - p)cf>(y;; µ2, a)) + Clog (4p{l - p)), 
i=l 
where C is a fixed constant (we set C = 2). Let (p, P,1, P,2, 6-) maximise 
ln(P,µ1,µ2,a) over the full parameter space, and let (ji,,6-) maximise 
13 
{1.2) 
ln{l/2,ji,,ji,,6-). The hypothesis H1 is rejected for large values of the modified LRT statistic 
More precisely, Chen, Chen and Kalbfleisch (2001) show that for known a, Mn asymptotically 
follows the distribution 1/2x5 + l/2Xi, where X5 is the point mass at zero. For unknown a, 
as formulated above, the precise asymptotic distribution of Mn is unknown, however, Chen and 
Kalbfleisch (2007) show that the x~ distribution is an upper bound to the asymptotic distribution 
of Mn. 
Chen, Chen and Kalbfleisch (2004) also consider the problem of testing for two against more 
components of a mixture distribution. More precisely, the problem is to test 
H2 : fy is of the form (1.2) against K2 : fy has more than two components. 
Here, we again assume equal variances for all components, also under the alternative. Fur-
thermore, one fixes a maximal number of components under the alternative ( which can also be 
estimated, e.g. m = 4). For a mixture with m components, slightly changing the notation, the 
modified maximum likelihood estimators (MLEs) are defined as the maximiser of 
n m 
ln(µ1, . .. ,µm,a) = Llog(p1cf>(y1;µ1,a) + ... +Pmcf>(ym;µm,a)) + Clog (Ilp;). {1.3) 
i=l i=l 
These estimates are then inserted into the LRT statistic. Chen, Chen and Kalbfleisch {2004) 
showed that given a known a, this modified LRT is asymptotically distributed as qx5+ ½xi +(1-
q)x~, where the proportion q depends on the mixing distributions. For unknown a, Chen and 
Kalbfleisch indicate that the x~ distribution is an upper bound of the asymptotic distribution. 
As an illustration, we give the results of the analysis of the year 1976. The complete results are 
discussed in section 1.3.l. First we fit a single normal distribution to the log-income distribution 
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Figure 1.1: Three-Component Mixture Density and Kernel Density 
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Left: Three-component mixture density with modified MLEs (solid line) and Kernel density estimate based on hc(3) 
(dashed line) for the log-data (logarithm to the base 10) for 1976. Right: Corresponding three-component log-normal fit 
(solid line) and transformation Kernel density estimate based on hc(3). Scale: x-axis 103 , y-axis 10-3 . 
(log to the base 10). Doing so, we obtain the following parameters: µ = 3.52 and a-= 0.46. The 
modified MLEs of the two-component mixture with equal variances and penalisation parameter 
C = 2 are calculated asp= 0.51, P,1 = 3.15, P,2 = 3.89 and a-= 0.26. The resulting value of the 
modified likelihood ratio function is equal to Tn = 14.00, which based on the upper bound of the 
x~-distribution yields a p-value of 0.0009. Thus, the hypothesis of a single component is clearly 
rejected. 
Next we consider testing two against three (or more) components. Concerning the fit using 
three components and equal variances, the parameter estimates based on penalised maximum 
likelihood are given by 
Pl = 0.38, P2 = 0.34, /J,l = 3.04, /J,2 = 3.58, /J,3 = 4.07, 8- = 0.18. (1.4) 
The resulting value of the modified LR statistic is Tn = 7.91. Based on the upper bound by ax~-
distribution, this gives a p-value of 0.048, in favour of three components. The three-component 
fit based on the modified MLEs, both for the y;'s as well as for the x;'s, are displayed in Figure 
1.1. 
Apart from testing the number of components, we also compare the mixture models via 
two popular model selection criteria, namely the Akaike information criterion (AIC, c.f. Akaike, 
1978) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC, Schwarz, 1978), given by -21 + 2k and 
-21 + k logn, respectively, where I is the log-likelihood, k the number of parameters and n the 
number of observations. The results are displayed in Table 1.1. Here, the model selected by 
AIC is the model with three components, while BIC is slightly in favour of a model with only 
two components. Although it is theoretically known that the BIC is consistent in finite mixtures 
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Table 1.1: Model Selection Criteria for Mixture Models Fitted to Log Cross-Country Income 
Distribution 1976 
no. components - loglike. no. param. AIC BIC 
1 77.86 2 159.72 165.41 
2 70.86 4 149.72 161.10 
3 66.90 6 145.80 162.87 
(Kerebin, 2000), in finite samples it often selects too few components. Finally, in Fig. 1.1 we 
compare the fitted three-component density with a nonparametric density estimate with band-
width hc(3) (cf. Section 1.2.4). Such a comparison could also be used for a formal goodness 
of fit test for our mixture model, cf. e.g. Fan (1994). The nonparametric and our parametric 
estimate are quite close, thus, our model of the data is appropriate. The whole picture that we 
get from our analysis of the log cross-country income distribution in 1976, taking into account 
the modified likelihood ratio tests and the model selection criteria AIC and BIC as well as the 
shape of non-parametric density estimates, is clearly in favour of three components rather then 
two components or "twin peaks". 
1.2.3 Discriminant Analysis via Posterior Probabilities 
Mixture models are usually used for discriminant analysis, see e.g. Fraley and Raftery (2002). In 
our analysis of the cross-country income distribution via mixtures, once we have a mixture fitted 
to the cross-country income distribution, each observation can be assigned posterior probabilities 
which give the probability of the observation to belong to each of the components in the mixture 
model. 
Consider the log-income distribution in 1976. In section 1.2.2, we fitted a three-component 
normal mixture 
where the parameter estimates are given in (1.4). This yields three levels of income which we 
label poor, middle and rich, with indices 1, 2, 3. The posterior probability of an observation y to 
belong to group j, j = 1,2, is equal to 
and p(3; y) = 1 - p(l; y) - p(2; y). Therefore, we do not merely assign an income level to each 
country, but rather a probability distribution, which makes transitions from one group to the 
other much more transparent. 
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If one wishes to assign a single number to each country y, one has several possibilities. One 
is the Maximum a-Posterior Estimate (MPE), which assigns to observation y the j, j E {l, 2, 3}, 
such that p(j;y) is maximal. One can also determine the thresholds tj.j+I, j = 1,2, for the 
values of y at which the MPE changes between the state j and j + 1, by solving the equations 
p(j, tj.j+I) = p(j + 1, tj.j+J), j = 1, 2, yielding the (in model (1.5)) unique solutions 
j = 1,2. 
If the weights p1 and 'P2 are sufficiently close, the values t1.1+1 will indeed be between µ1 and 
P,j+ 1 , in which case they may be properly interpreted. For example, for the year 1976 we get 
t1,2 = 3.32 and t2,a = 3.83, which on the original scale correspond to the values 2089.30 and 
6760.83 respectively. In 1976, by maximum a-posterior estimation there are 46 countries in the 
poor group, 42 countries in the middle group and 36 countries in the rich group. 
Another, more informative, possibility is the posterior mean of y, which is defined as p(l; y)+ 
2p(2; y) + 3p(3; y), a number between one and three. In our situation, since the choice of the 
values 1, 2, 3 is arbitrary, this should not be interpreted as a mean but rather as a refined one-
number summary of the posterior distribution. For example, if the posterior mean of y is 1.3, 
then the country will belong to group 1, but will have a tendency towards group 2. A tedious 
but straightforward computation shows that the posterior mean in model (1.5) with equal o-2 is 
a monotonically increasing function of y. Thus, one can uniquely determine thresholds Bj,i+I, 
j = 1, 2, for which the posterior mean is equal to i + 1/2. Solving these equations numerically 
for the parameters in 1976 yields the values 3.32 and 3.84. 
1.2.4 Nonparametric Kernel Density Estimation and Mode Testing 
In this section we draw attention to possible shortcomings of previous approaches based on non-
parametric kernel density estimation. Specifically, we show that the "twin peak" phenomenon 
in the cross-country income distribution is not a structural feature, but rather an artifact from 
improper use of non-parametric kernel density estimates. 
Indeed, the cross-country income distribution is concentrated in lower regions, and then has 
a rather long, small tail at the upper end. For example, in 2003 most values are < 104 , but 
there is a tail up to 4 · 104 ( cf. Fig. 1.2). Such a shape can lead to a very poor performance 
of kernel estimates with a global bandwidth (cf. Wand and Jones 1995, p. 36). Therefore, to 
illustrate this, we also fitted a transformation kernel density estimate (Wand and Jones, 1995, 
p. 43) based on the log-transform to the data ( cf. Fig. 1.2). Evidently, the estimates differ 
strongly, as the usual kernel density estimator puts too much mass to the tails. This leads to 
the emergence of the second peak in the "twin peaks" phenomenon of the cross-country income 
distribution, which is just an artefact of direct kernel density estimation with global bandwidth 
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Note: Kernel denisity estimate (solid line) and transformation kernel density estimate (dashed line) with log-transform, 
both with bandwidth estimated by direct plug-in, for 2003. Scale: x-axis 103 , y-axis 10-3 . 
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of heavy-tailed data. Also note that the usual kernel estimator has a boundary problem at 0 ( cf. 
Wand and Jones 1995, p. 46). 
In summary, for the cross-country income distribution itself, simple nonparametric kernel 
density estimation and related inference techniques such as Silverman's (1981) test should not 
be used. It is also important to realise that Paap and Dijk (1998) choose their two-component 
mixture with distinct components to resemble the histogram of the cross-country income distri-
bution, which is just a simple kernel estimator. Thus, their model (and in particular the number 
of components) is motivated by an inappropriate preliminary estimate. 
The situation is different in the case of log-incomes (which are no longer heavy-tailed), for 
which kernel density estimates and Silverman's (1981) test are valid tools. In order to illustrate 
this issue, let us first briefly recall Silverman's test. Formally, a mode of Ix (and similarly of the 
kernel estimator/) is a local maximum of Ix (or/). Silverman (1981) showed that the number 
of modes of / is a right-continuous, monotonically decreasing function of the bandwidth h if 
the normal kernel is employed for K: K(x) = (211")- 1 exp(-x2 /2). This allowed him to define 
the k-critical bandwidth hc(k) as the minimal h for which I(·; h) still just has k modes and not 
yet k + 1 modes. Based on the notion of the k-critical bandwidth, Silverman (1981) proposed a 
bootstrap test for the hypothesis 
ih : I has at most k modes against f<k : I has more than k modes, 
where in our context, I= Ix (or I= IY, the density of logarithms Yi= log(x;)). 
The results of Silverman's test for the year 2003 are displayed in Table 1.2. Here one typically 
proceeds iteratively by testing ih for increasing k, starting with k = 1, until one finds k such 
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Table 1.2: Results of Silverman's Test for 2003, 124 Countries 
hc(l) Pl hc(2) P2 hc(3) P3 
y,'s 0.27 0.11 0.23 0.00 0.07 0.91 
Xi's 5.72 O.Ql 2. 14 0.44 1.83 0.24 
that fh cannot be rejected with a given level o (e.g. o = 0.05). Concerning the log-incomes and 
their density fy, the hypothesis fl1 cannot be rejected at a 5% (or even 10%) level. However, the 
corresponding p-value is still comparatively small. Note that this result does not mean that fl1 
is true, only that there is not enough evidence to reject it on a level of 5% (or 10%). However, 
if one continues the analysis, one can clearly reject fl2 (p-value < 0.001), but fI3 has a high 
p-value of 0.45. Thus, there is some evidence of three modes in fy, but none of only two modes. 
The associated density estimates with the critical bandwidths are displayed in Fig. 1.3 (right). 
As an illustration we also applied Silverman's (1981) test to the original income data x;. The 
hypothesis fl1 is clearly rejected with a p-value of< 0.001, and the hypothesis H2 is not rejected 
with a high p-value. Thus, the procedure stops at k = 2, strongly indicating two modes. However, 
observe Figure 1.3 (left). It shows (boundary corrected) plots of the densities with bandwidths 
hc(l) and hc(2). For hc(2), the third mode (which is not statistically significant according to 
Silverman's test) is about to occur in the two highest observations of the distribution (at about 
35 • 103 ). Thus, the kernel density estimator is about to put a spurious mode into the tail, and 
all that Silverman's test tells us is that this mode is indeed spurious. Thus, kernel estimation 
and Silverman's (1981) test are inappropriate on the level of the x;. 
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Left: Kernel density estimates with boundary correction at zero with bandwidths hc(l) {80lid line) and hc(2) (dashed 
line) for the cross-country income distribution in 2003. Scale: x-axis 103 , y-axis: 10-3 . Right: Kernel density estimates 
with bandwidths h,(l) (solid line) and h,(3) (dashed line) for the log-income distribution in 2003. For conveniently 
interpreting the figure, we here use the logarithm to the base 10. 
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1.3.1 Selecting the Number of Components 
Applying the methodology above to the time range from 1970 to 2003, and to the 124 coun-
tries for which we have consistent GDP data, yields some surprising and telling insights into 
the evolution of the cross-country distribution of income. Table 1.3 displays the results of the 
modified likelihood ratio test for one versus two components and two versus three components 
as well as the AIC and BIC model selection criteria for the respective fitted models ranging 
from 1 to 4 component mixtures (all having equal variances). First of all, we note that two 
components are always preferable to one. In 1970 we cannot reject the hypothesis of two versus 
three components, however, over the first years of the 1970s the p-values are decreasing and by 
1976 the modified likelihood ratio test rejects a two component model at a level of 5%. This 
is also supported by the values of the model selection criteria AIC and BIC, which initially are 
in favour of a two component model, but over time switch towards the three component mix-
ture model.2 In summary, our analysis shows that starting with a two-component (twin-peak) 
mixture distribution in 1970, in between the "rich" and "poor" components, in the middle of the 
1970s a third component evolves in the cross-national distribution of income, thus resulting in 
a three-component mixture model. All subsequent distributional analysis is based on the three 
component mixture model from 1976 to 2003. 
1.3.2 Evolution of the Cross-Country Distribution of Income 
Table 1.4 summarises the main distributional characteristics of the three-component mixture 
model after 1976. The first three columns display the weights Pl, P2 and p3 of the three com-
ponents in the mixture model, which can be directly interpreted as the percentage of data, i.e. 
the relative number of countries, ascribed to a certain component. As can be seen in Figure 1.4, 
the percentage of data ascribed to the first "poor" component, despite small variation, dropped 
slightly over time from initially 37.9 percent in 1976 to 35.7 percent in 2003. In comparison, the 
second component weight gained slightly over time from 33.8 percent to 35.3 percent, leaving the 
third component weight largely unaltered (28.4 percent in 1970 and 29 percent in 2003). Hence, 
the relative number of countries ascribed to each component is fairly stable over the given ob-
servational period. 
Regarding the log-income data, it can be observed that the mean of the first component did 
not grow, but rather experienced stagnation and even a slight decline. In comparison, the mean 
of the second and third components clearly increased over the given time period from 3.59 to 
3.73 and 4.08 to 4.33 respectively. The standard deviation parameter u of the three components 
remains also rather stable over the given time period. However, these model parameters are 
harder to interpret on the logarithmic scale. Therefore, we also computed the mean and the 
There are two small exceptions. The AIC is only slightly in favour of four components in 1976 and 1980. 
However, the BIC is always robustly in favour of the three component model. 
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Table 1.3: Component Test and Goodness of Fit, 1970-2003 
One Component Two Components Three Components 
Year AIC BIC poflvs2 AIC BIC pof2vs3 AIC BIC 
1970 152.47 158.12 0.001 142.64 153.92 0.868 145.88 162.81 
1974 159.30 164.94 0.001 149.64 160.92 0.243 149.45 166.37 
1975 157.47 163.11 0.001 147.49 158.77 0.171 146.47 163.39 
1976 159.72 165.36 0.001 149.72 161.00 0.048 145.80 162.73 
1980 167.20 172.84 0.000 155.68 166.96 0.037 151.21 168.14 
1985 173.07 178.71 0.001 162.51 173.79 0.023 156.95 173.87 
1990 183.20 188.84 0.001 172.40 183.68 0.006 163.84 180.77 
1995 200.08 205.72 0.001 189.17 200.46 0.004 179.83 196.75 
2000 204.57 210.21 0.000 192.40 203.68 0.000 173.05 189.97 
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Year Pl P2 P3 
1976 0.379 0.338 0.284 
1980 0.366 0.351 0.282 
1985 0.358 0.372 0.270 
1990 0.357 0.367 0.276 
1995 0.355 0.364 0.281 
2000 0.345 0.371 0.284 
2003 0.357 0.353 0.290 
Table 1.4: Fit of the Three Component Model 
µ1 M µ3 O' Meanl Mean2 Mean3 
3.044 3.587 4.076 0.175 1147 3998 12335 
3.041 3.622 4.115 0.177 1141 4342 13526 
3.035 3.639 4.154 0.181 1126 4524 14806 
3.041 3.649 4.211 0.182 1140 4628 16887 
2.996 3.665 4.247 0.189 1032 4813 18396 
3.017 3.698 4.313 0.177 1079 5174 21312 
3.037 3.725 4.326 0.176 1128 5504 21938 
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1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Note: Poor (solid line), intermediate (dashed line) and rich component (dotted line). 
standard deviation of the log-normally distributed components for the original income data to 
get more interpretable results. 
Observing Table 1.4 and Figure 1.5 we can see that the mean GDP per capita of the countries 
belonging to the first component decreased slightly over time from $1147 to $1128. The countries 
belonging to the second component saw a strongly increasing income from on average $3998 to 
$5504 which corresponds to an overall 37 percent increase between 1976 and 2003. However, 
over the same period the countries in the third ( the richest) component experienced an increase 
of mean income from $12335 to $21938 (increase of 77 percent). Hence, from 1976 onward the 
countries in the poorest component experienced stagnant or even slightly declining average in-
come. Moreover, despite the clear emergence of a third "transitional" component in the middle of 
the 1970s, the mean income gain experienced in this component is not sufficient to facilitate any 
catch-up to the third "rich" component, which in turn improves both its absolute and relative 
position. Thus, the three components of our model of the cross-national distribution of income 
per capita actually diverge over time. This leaves slightly over 1 /3 of the poor economies in 
a poverty trap, whereas slightly over 1/3 of the 124 countries, "the middle group", experience 
growth, but not fast enough to catch-up with the rich countries club, which consists of little less 
than 1/3 and which improved its absolute and relative position. Thus, one may claim that the 
cross-national distribution of income is not converging. 
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Figure 1.5: Means of the Distinct Groups 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Note: Means of distinct groups (solid lines). Income levels where the maximum 
a-posterior estimates switch from one group to the other (dashed lines). 
1.3.3 Intra-Distributional Dynamics Based on Posterior Probabilities 
23 
As mentioned in section 1.2.3, one major advantage of a mixture model with equal variances 
for the components is that it makes accessible consistent posterior analysis. In the following, 
we shall mainly use the posterior mean. In Table A.1 all countries are ranked by their change 
in posterior mean. The biggest winner is China, which increased its posterior probability mean 
from 1 to 2 and is one of 14 countries which managed to move up by one component. Out of 
these 14 countries, half moved from the 1st component to the 2nd component, leaving the other 
half to move from the 2nd component to the 3rd component. Of the 12 countries which dropped 
by one component 5 countries dropped from the 2nd to the 1st and 7 countries dropped from 
the 3rd to the 2nd component. The average posterior probability mean increased slightly from 
1.91 in 1976 to 1.93 in 2003, which implies a slight increase in the size of the second and/ or 
third components. Comparing results in 1976 and 2003, we find that 26 out of 124 countries, 
about 21 percent, changed the component of the cross-national income distribution ( although 
a few further temporary changes might have taken place in between). This implies a relatively 
low mobility of countries as, comparing 1976 and 2003, only one out of five countries changed 
its component position or group affiliation. 
An even closer look at Table A.1 tells a more detailed story for selected countries belonging 
to different regions. Most notably Asia composes half of the 14 countries which improved by one 
component and none of the South East Asian, East Asian or South Asian Countries experienced 
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a deterioration of their posterior mean. Thus, the Far East is generally the most upwardly mo-
bile region, of which most countries belong to the second component and experienced on average 
higher growth rates than the other countries belonging to this component. In particular, China's 
extraordinary growth is mirrored in the jump from the very bottom to a median position of 
the cross-country mean income distribution. Obviously, it is these countries in particular which 
account for the rising mean of the second component over time. In fact, the average growth rate 
of these countries is more than sufficient for a catch-up in mean income to the richer group of 
countries. 
However, a second region is also very prominent in the second group which lowers the average 
growth rate of this component, namely Latin America. While only one country, Chile, managed 
to improve by one component, Latin America accounts for one third of the countries which 
moved down by one component. In particular, richer countries, like Argentina and Venezuela 
lost relatively and were assigned to the second component in 2003. This sub-average performance 
of Latin America in general, of which most countries belong to the second component, helps to 
explain why the growth rate in the mean is not sufficient to facilitate any catch-up of the entire 
component to the third component. 
The worst performing region by far is Sub-Saharan Africa, which accounts for 32 of the 46 
countries, about 70 percent, belonging to the "poor" first component in 1976 and 32 of 44 coun-
tries, about 73 percent in 2003 respectively. It is mostly the 11on-existing growth record of these 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa which accounts for the stagnant and even declining mean of the 
first poor component. Moreover, not only did the poorest countries remain extremely poor, but 
those countries which were relatively well-off in 1976, namely South Africa, and to a lesser ex-
tent Zimbabwe, belong to the group of countries, whose posterior mean decreased most. Despite 
the overall bleak record of Sub-Saharan Africa, there are a few examples which also show quite 
remarkable improvement, in particular Botswana and Lesotho. Moreover, Cameroon, Mauritius 
and Equatorial New Guinea even improve by one component and are the only three Sub-Saharan 
African Countries that display upward mobility.3 However, these few encouraging examples are 
not enough to change the Sub-Saharan stagnant and very poor growth record. 
Unsurprisingly, most OECD countries belong firmly to the third component displaying hardly 
any change in their posterior probability mean. It is mainly their growth record which accounts 
for the increase in the third component mean. Eastern Europe lost in particular after the break-
down of the Iron Curtain, but had resurging growth, which lead to a rather stable position in 
between the second and the third components over time. Morocco and Egypt show the success 
of some Arabic countries, while Iraq is the extreme opposite and is the country which lost most 
over the time period 1976 to 2003. 
Overall, the country specific data and posterior mean helps to explain the development of the 
cross-national distribution of income from 1976 to 2003. The following general picture emerges: 
However, Mauritius is an island and Equatorial New Guinea a small oil exporting economy and are arguably 
two special cases in Sub-Saharan Africa that belonged already to the second component in 1976. 
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First, Sub-Saharan Africa accounts mostly for the lowest component which remains stagnant 
and "poor". Second, the emergence of the "transition" component is mostly due to the growth 
spurt of the Far East and the relative decline of Latin America. The contrary growth experience 
accounts mainly for the relatively slow growing mean of the second component. While most Far 
Eastern countries grow fast enough to catch up with the richer countries of the third component, 
this is not the case for most of Latin America, which experienced disappointing growth records 
in particular in the 1980s. Thus, the overall cross-national income distribution does not display 
absolute cross-national average income convergence, but rather divergence over time, despite the 
fact that some countries, in particular in the Far East, are rapidly catching-up. However, in the 
global picture this is counteracted by the relatively poor growth rncord of Latin America and 
the average income stagnation in most parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, almost all of 
Sub-Saharan Africa seems to be stuck in a poverty trap in which the unit under scrutiny, the 
national economy, is not capable to deliver any form of sustained per capita growth. However, 
our data also shows that some of the most populous countries, in particular India and China, are 
doing extraordinarily well. Thus, the global (and not cross-national) income distribution, which 
takes into account the distribution of the income within countries as well as the sizes of their 
populations, might indeed be converging. 4 
1.4 Conclusion 
Previous investigations on the twin-peak phenomenon in the world ·s cross-country distribution 
of income were mostly based on non-parametric kernel density estimates, in particular concerning 
the number of modes of such estimates. 
In this paper we use finite mixtures in order to investigate the cross-country income distri-
bution since a.) the number of modes depends on the scale ( original or logarithmic) whereas the 
number of components in the mixture does not; b.) finite mixtures allow for an accurate analysis 
of the intra-distributional dynamics by using posterior probability estimates; c.) components 
in the mixture arguably correspond better to income clubs in the distribution than its modes; 
and d.) the heavy tail of the cross-country income distribution on the original scale can cause 
poor performance of nonparametric density estimates. Furthermore, we argue that, in contrast 
to Paap and Dijk (1998), who simply use a fixed two-component model obtained by comparison 
with a histogram, the number of components in the mixture model should be determined by 
statistical inference. 
In contrast to the twin peaks literature, we find evidence for an emerging intermediate com-
ponent in the 70s, resulting in a three-component distribution from 1976 onwards. This alone is a 
strong indication of divergence within the distribution and might be an indicator of convergence 
within groups. Diverging estimates of the three group means and very different growth rates 
As shown in the second essay. 
Julian Weisbrod - 978-3-631-75361-3
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:55:15AM
via free access
26 TWIN PEAKS OR THREE COMPONENTS? 
between the groups support this conclusion. While the mean of the third (richest) component 
almost doubled from 1976 to 2003, the mean of the second (intermediate) component only in-
creased by 40 percent ( corresponding to a very low annual growth rate), and the first (poor) 
component even stagnated. One should mention that up- and downward movements of countries 
affect these growth rates. The growth of the third component is slowed down by countries moving 
up from the second component. Regarding the second component there are positive and negative 
effects, in which the negative effects outweigh the positive effects, since only a few countries move 
from the third to the second component. In the first component there should be positive effects 
from countries coming from the second group, which however are counterbalanced by the poor 
overall growth record within this component. 
The regional differences are remarkable. While many Asian countries managed to catch up to 
the third component, the opposite holds true for Latin American countries. Sub-Saharan Africa 
seems to be stuck in the first component and looses more and more contact with the other groups. 
The very populous countries China and India on the other hand performed extremely well. This 
fact would foster convergence in a global distribution of income which takes population size and 
within country inequality into account (i.e. Sala-I-Martin, 2006). 
A possible application of our methodology, beyond the conclusions already drawn in this 
paper, would be a classification of countries according to their mean income, as an alternative 
concept to the most prevalent "poor, middle and rich" classification of the World Bank. Indeed, 
the maximum posterior estimates can be used to assign countries to certain groups. Due to its 
statistical nature, this approach would be less policy dependent than current approaches. The 
boundary points of income, separating the three groups, from our point of view currently some-
what arbitrarily obtained, could be replaced by the incomes where the maximum a-posterior 
estimate switches. For the year 2003 these are $2405 and $10859, respectively (PPP, base year 
2000). However, our main aim was not to suggest a new system of classification of countries, but 
rather to obtain a better understanding of the cross-national distribution of income, its develop-
ment, number of components and its intra-distributional dynamics over the past decades. 
1.5 Extension: Mixtures with Distinct Variances 
In Sections 1.2.2 and 1.3.1 we restricted the model class of finite normal mixtures to have equal 
variances. There were several reasons for this restriction. First, maximum likelihood inference 
in mixtures of normal distributions with distinct variances becomes technically difficult since 
the likelihood function is unbounded. Moreover, the number of parameters increases drastically 
(up to 8 in a three-component mixture), which increases the risk of overfitting the data (in 
a sample of merely 124 observations). Second, as regards the economic content, we wanted a 
model class which is adequate for the whole period 1976-2003 in order to draw conclusions about 
the evolution of the groups in the income distribution, in particular concerning their number. 
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Table 1.5: Model Selection Criteria for Mixture Models Fitted to Log Cross-Country Income 
Distribution 1970 
no. components no. variances no. param. AIC BIC 
1 1 2 152.47 158.16 
2 1 4 142.64 154.01 
2 5 142.81 157.03 
3 1 6 145.88 162.95 
2 7 139.73 159.64 
3 8 141.51 164.27 
Figure 1.6: Density Estimates for 1970 
2.0 3.0 4.0 
Kernel density estimate with hc(3) (solid line), twercomponent normal mixture with equal variances (dashed line) and 
three-component mixture with two distinct variances (dotted line). 
Furthermore, equal variances guarantee that groups are equally wide, i.e. that no components 
are fitted to a very small, selective group. Third, if distinct variances are allowed, the posterior 
analysis is no longer consistent. In fact, higher observations can have smaller MPE or posterior 
mean than smaller observations, if the variance of components with smaller mean are much larger 
than those with higher mean. Thus, a posterior analysis does not make sense for such general 
models. 
Nevertheless, in this section we briefly investigate the consequences if one allows the general 
model class (1.1) for the world's cross-country income distribution, in particular if one allows for 
some or even all variances to be distinct. We start the analysis with the year 1970. Table 1.5 
gives the values of the model selection criteria AIC and BIC for distinct mixture models with up 
to three components. 
The AIC selects a model with three components and equal variances for the first two 
components (with small means), while the BIC selects the model with two components and 
equal variances (which would also be selected by the AIC3 as used in Pittau, 2005). These two 
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Table 1.6: Model Selection Criteria for Mixture Models Fitted to Log Cross-Country Income 
Distribution 2003 
no. components no. variances no. param. AIC BIC 
1 1 2 206.50 212.19 
2 1 4 191.62 203.00 
2 5 189.90 204.12 
3 1 6 173.58 190.65 
2 7 162.13 182.03 
3 8 163.83 186.58 
Figure 1.7: Density Estimates for 2003 
2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 
Kernel density estimate with hc(3) (solid line) and three-component mixture with two distinct variances (dotted line). 
competing "best" models are rather incomparable. Observing in addition the plots in Figure 
1.6, of the income distribution in 1970, one would decide for the two-component model with 
equal variances, since the third component in the three-component model, when compared to 
the nonparametric density estimate, looks much like fitting an artifact. 
The picture changes over time, and in 2003 is rather in favour of the three-component model 
with two distinct variances, as can be observed from Table 1.6. The resulting fit is visualised 
in Figure 1. 7. However, the standard deviation a of the third component is about twenty times 
smaller than the sigmas of the other two components. This makes the model inaccessible to 
posterior analysis. For example, posterior analysis would assign the USA to the second group. 
This is caused by the fact that mean income in the USA is much higher than the mean of the 
third component, and is thus not captured in this component. Hence, we find that the model 
with equal variances discussed in Section 1.3.1 is most adequate to describe and analyse the data 
at hand. 
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Chapter 2 
Global Income Distribution Dynamics 
and Pro-Poor Growth 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the past decade attention has increasingly been given to the evolution of global income 
inequality and the connected questions of global welfare and poverty development. In the light 
of an ever intensifying globalisation of the world economy, a rising concern is to identify global 
and regional winners and losers of this process. From a welfare point of view, the question might 
not be whether globalisation generated economic growth per se, but rather how pro-poor this 
growth was or, in other words, which section of the global income distribution benefited most 
from the relatively successful global growth record of the past decades. 
Recent papers model the global income distribution, or a distribution limited to major eco-
nomic players, by taking into account the underlying national income distributions (Dowrick & 
Akmal, 2005; Milanovic, 2002; Chen & Ravallion, 2004; Chotikapanich, Valenzuela & Rao, 1997; 
Bourguignon & Morrisson, 2002; Quah 2002; Bhalla, 2002; Sala-i-Martin, 2002a, 2006). In fact, 
an objective way to construct the global income distribution from the distinct national income 
distributions is as a population-weighted finite mixture of the national income distributions. In-
tuitively, if one picks at random an individual with a certain income from this global income 
distribution, one first randomly draws the country they come from (with probability equal to 
that countries proportion in the world population), and then obtains their income from the cor-
responding country income distribution. The main task in this approach is to determine the 
national income distributions. 
A debate continues concerning the data sources on which estimates of the income distribu-
tions should be obtained. Two main concepts have been used so far. The first approach, labelled 
concept 2 by Milanovic (2006), combines national accounts income data with household survey 
inequality data to derive a global income distribution. The second approach (labelled concept 3 
based on joint work with Hajo Holzmann and Sebastian Vollmer 
Julian Weisbrod - 978-3-631-75361-3
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:55:15AM
via free access
30 GLOBAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION DYNAMICS AND PPG 
by Milanovic 2006) is purely based on income and inequality data from household surveys. Both 
approaches have their associated merits and serious caveats, which have been discussed exten-
sively in the literature (Milanovic, 2006; Sala-i-Martin, 2006; Ravallion, 2003; Deaton, 2005). 
As far as the poverty headcount is concerned, the headcount for the $2 per day poverty line of 
studies based on concept 2 (Sala-I-Martin, 2002a, 2006) roughly corresponds to the headcount of 
the $1 poverty line estimated under concept 3 (Chen & Ravallion, 2004). A simple reason is that 
the ratio of household level income to national account is about 1/2 (cf. Deaton, 2005). However, 
it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the advantages or disadvantages of certain poverty 
lines. We decided to stick to the $1 and $2 US (PPP) poverty lines applied to income as it makes 
our results comparable to those by Chen and Ravallion (2004) and Sala-i-Martin (2006). 1 
Sala-i-Martin (2006) argues that from the methodological point of view, one should use non-
parametric kernel estimates instead of parametric models for the country income distributions, 
since these do not assume any specific shape for the income distributions. While we agree with it 
on a methodological basis, in our opinion non-parametric modelling would require actual income 
data for all countries under consideration, and on a comparable basis. We therefore prefer to 
model the national income distributions parametrically as log-normally distributed. The pa-
rameters of each country's log-normal income distribution can be determined from its real PPP 
GDP /per capita and its Gini coefficient (cf. section 2.2.2). Hence, the data required for this 
approach is much more readily available than for nonparametric estimation. Our approach also 
has some methodological merits, which allow us to obtain new insights into the income distri-
bution dynamics. In particular, the resulting global income distribution (a finite mixture of 
log-normal distributions) is much easier to handle than a non-parametric analogue. A number 
of measures, such as poverty rates, percentile specific growth rates and rates of pro-poor growth, 
can be determined directly from the distribution without sampling and without loss in accuracy, 
moreover, it is a simple matter to sample from the distribution as well. It is this advantage 
which allows us to construct growth incidence curves of the world income distribution for several 
semi-decades and for different regions as well as a decomposition of inequality into between and 
within country income inequality. Thus, we obtain a broad and detailed picture of global and 
regional inequality, poverty and pro-poor growth, which extends and refines previous studies. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data and our methodology. 
Section 2.3 presents our results of the global income distribution. We give estimates of the 
evolution of global poverty and inequality over time and compare them with previous research 
(Milanovic 2002; Chen & Ravallion 2001, Sala-i-Martin, 2006). In particular, our findings con-
cerning between and within country income inequality based on Theil's measure appear to be 
novel. Moreover, we discuss semi-decade specific global growth incidence curves, and therefore 
can give a precise description of pro-poor growth. In Section 2.4, we decompose the world into 
Furthermore, we show in Figure 2.3 that any reasonably selected monetary poverty line would show a decline 
in the poverty headcount ratio as the cumulative distribution function of global income of subsequent time 
periods dominates over the cumulative distribution function of the prior time period. 
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seven main regions and investigate the regional variation in poverty and inequality develop-
ment. We also analyse the underlying regional growth incidence curves, which yield a regionally 
comprehensive picture of pro-poor growth and of the intra-distributional dynamics, before we 
conclude. 
2.2 Methodology and Data 
2.2.1 Data 
The subsequent analysis is based on two main data sources. Income data are drawn from the 
Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2006), which report the real GDP per capita 
in constant international dollars ( chain series, base year 2000), available for most countries. 
However, for three particularly populous countries, namely Bangladesh, Russia and Ukraine we 
estimated the initially missing values.2 Our second data source is the inequality dataset by Griin 
and Klasen (2007) based on the WIDER database.3 Their adjusted Gini dataset derived by 
estimation techniques has substantive advantages in terms of comparability, as the raw Ginis 
in the WIDER database are not fully comparable over time and countries.4 Furthermore, as 
inequality does not change too dramatically over time, we assume the first real observation of 
the Gini in any given country to be equal to its initial level of inequality. Starting from this 
initial level we used a moving average to catch changes in trends of inequality. 5 
2.2.2 Mixtures of Log-normal Distributions 
As stated in section 2.2, the national income distributions will be modeled by a log-normal 
distribution. Formally, the log-normal distribution LN(µ, a) is defined as the distribution of the 
random variable Y = exp(X), where X ~ N(µ,a) has a normal distribution with meanµ and 
standard deviation a. It can be shown that the density of LN(µ,a) is 
f(x; µ,a)= __ l_. e-(log(x)-µ;)2/2,,2' 
xa./2-ir 
and its mean and variance are given respectively by 
X > 0, 
Var(Y) = (e"2 - l)e21-'+"2 • (2.1) 
For Bangladesh we calculated the values for the two initial years 1970-1971 using the average income per 
capita growth rate of the rest of the decade. For Russia and Ukraine we used the derived (Penn World Tables 
5.6) USSR growth rates to estimate the average income for the years before 1990. 
We would like to thank Griin and Klasen for providing their dataset. 
This is mainly due to different methodological approaches and measurement units. The adjustement by 
Klasen and Griin takes these methodological differences into account. 
Unfortunately, there is no reliable inequality data for the populous Democratic Republic of Congo, hence we 
used the neighbouring Central African Republic's Gini as a substitute. 
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We should briefly discuss the interpretation of the parameters µ and a, which is different 
from that of the normal distribution. In fact, from (2.1) one sees that logµ is proportional to the 
expectation and (log µ)2 is proportional to the variance, and in fact, logµ is the scale parameter 
of the Jog-normal distribution, whereas u is a shape parameter. Since the Gini coefficient is 
invariant under changes of scale (it does not matter whether income is measured in Euro or in 
Dollar), it should be independent ofµ and only depend on a. This is indeed the case: The Gini 
coefficient G of LN(µ,a) is given by 
G = 2<1>(a/\1'2) - 1, 
where <I> is the distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Therefore, the param-
etersµ and u of LN(µ,u) can be determined from the mean EY and the Gini coefficient Gas 
follows. 
µ = log(E(Y)) - a2 /2. 
In summary, the parameters µ and u of each country's log-normal income distribution are easily 
determined from the real PPP GDP / per capita (EY) and its Gini G. 
To conclude this section, we formalise how the density of the world income distribution fw is 
obtained as a mixture of national (log-normal) distributions. Assuming that there are n countries 
under investigation and that the (log-normal) density of the distribution of country i is given by 
f(x; µ;, a;), then 
n 
fw(x;µ1,- .. ,µn,UJ, ... ,crn,PI,··· ,Pn) = LPd(x;µ;,u;), 
i=l 
where p; is equal to the proportion of country i 's population in the whole population of these n 
countries. 
It has to be stressed that although the density fw is a simple finite mixture of the component 
country densities f(x; µ;, er;), this does not transfer to relevant quantities such as the Gini or other 
inequality or poverty measures: the world Gini Gw is not simply the corresponding finite mixture 
of the country Ginis G;. Nevertheless, once the parameters of the density fw are estimated, it is 
not difficult to compute the poverty rates as well as percentile specific growth rates numerically 
from the distribution for any given level of accuracy without sampling. Furthermore, we obtained 
a number of other inequality and poverty measures by Monte Carlo simulation from fw. To this 
end we used a random sample of size 106 to obtain the desired accuracy. Since there are no 
substantial differences between the results of different poverty or inequality measures, we will 
only discuss the poverty measures by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke as well as the Gini and Theil's 
measure of inequality. Theil's measure is especially informative since it can be decomposed into 
separate measures for inequality between and within countries. Our poverty line is set at $469.9 
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US (PPP) and $935.45 US (PPP) a year, which corresponds to the World Bank 1993 poverty 
line of $1.08 US and $2.15 US per day adjusted to our income baseline year 2000 respectively.6 
Finally, let us remark that, if the world income Y is distributed as fw, then the log world income 
log Y has density 
n 
lfw(x;µ1,--- ,~,a1,--- ,an,PI,··· ,Pn) = LP;¢(x;µ;,a;), 
i=l 
where .p(x; µ, a) is the density of N(µ,a). Thus lfw is simply a finite mixture of normal densities. 
2.3 The Global Income Distribution 
2.3.1 Inequality and Poverty 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show estimates of the global income distribution as well as of the log-income 
distribution, determined as discussed in Section 2.2.1, for selected years. Two striking features 
are apparent: First, the average global income increased drastically over the given time period, 
and second, the world income distribution has become less dispersed. Interestingly, the 1970s and 
1980s still seem to display two distinct modes in the global log-income distribution. However, 
these "twin peaks" disappear over the years and in particular between 1990 and 2003. Thus, the 
results clearly show global income expansion and convergence of real global individual income 
in $US (PPP).7 The Gini and Theils' inequality measures reported in Table 2.1 confirm this 
first impression as both measures decline over the given time period, from 0.68 to 0.64 and 
from 0.88 to 0.80 respectively.8 The decomposition of Theil's measure shows that this decline in 
inequality was mainly due to a strong decline in inequality between countries, while inequality 
within countries even increased. This observation is consistent with a first impression of the 
biggest countries China and India where inequality increased over time. 
Table 2.2 shows the results of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty measures for the 
poverty headcount and the poverty gap ratio. Furthermore, the absolute number of people below 
the two poverty lines is reported in Table 2.3. It is apparent that from 1970 to 2003 all measures 
of poverty, absolute and relative, declined strongly. The percentage of the world population living 
below $1 a day declined drastically from 21 percent in 1970 to 6 percent in 2003. The reduction 
of this measure of extreme poverty was particularly rapid in the 1970s and early 1980s as the 
headcount ratio dropped from 21 percent in 1970 to 8 percent in 1985 which corresponds to a 
decline of the absolute number of people living with less than $469.9 (PPP, 2000) per year from 
slightly over 785 million in 1970 to roughly 400 million in 1985. From 1985 to 2003 the headcount 
fell further to 6 percent which corresponds to about 365 million people living below $469.9 (PPP, 
Adjusted to our 2000 base year $1.08 (1993) per day = $ 1.287 (2000) per day = $469.9 per year. In the case 
of the $2 line $2.15 (1993) per day= $2.562 (2000) per day= $935.45 per year. 
Contrarily to the cross-national income distribution which is diverging as shown in paper 1. 
We calculated a number of other inequality measures. However, they all show more or less the same overall 
picture, so we only report Gini and Theil. 
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Table 2.1: Global and Regional Gini, Theils' Inequality Measure and Theil's Decomposition 
Year Gini Theil Theil Theil Gini Theil Theil Theil 
Be- Within Be- Within 
tween tween 
World OECD Countries 
1970 0.682 0.881 0.615 0.266 0.385 0.251 0.020 0.231 
1975 0.684 0.887 0.612 0.275 0.377 0.240 0.015 0.225 
1980 0.679 0.875 0.608 0.267 0.378 0.244 0.015 0.229 
1985 0.669 0.859 0.592 0.267 0.387 0.259 0.019 0.240 
1990 0.662 0.848 0.571 0.277 0.387 0.259 0.014 0.244 
1995 0.655 0.845 0.531 0.314 0.404 0.284 0.016 0.269 
2000 0.646 0.816 0.502 0.314 0.404 0.285 0.019 0.267 
2003 0.640 0.796 0.468 0.328 0.407 0.290 0.018 0.272 
East Asia Pacific Latin America Caribbean 
1970 0.497 0.522 0.269 0.253 0.573 0.620 0.072 0.547 
1975 0.509 0.551 0.307 0.244 0.591 0.686 0.048 0.639 
1980 0.524 0.583 0.334 0.249 0.540 0.541 0.040 0.501 
1985 0.475 0.484 0.257 0.227 0.544 0.558 0.031 0.527 
1990 0.495 0.501 0.248 0.253 0.567 0.619 0.034 0.585 
1995 0.491 0.482 0.196 0.285 0.582 0.654 0.042 0.612 
2000 0.477 0.436 0.150 0.286 0.590 0.677 0.050 0.627 
2003 0.504 0.473 0.124 0.350 0.583 0.657 0.048 0.609 
Middle East North Africa Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
1970 0.551 0.570 0.144 0.426 0.362 0.221 0.048 0.172 
1975 0.555 0.572 0.190 0.382 0.357 0.214 0.045 0.169 
1980 0.513 0.484 0.089 0.395 0.360 0.220 0.052 0.168 
1985 0.505 0.468 0.087 0.382 0.367 0.226 0.062 0.164 
1990 0.489 0.439 0.077 0.363 0.368 0.226 0.063 0.163 
1995 0.491 0.450 0.116 0.333 0.448 0.356 0.027 0.328 
2000 0.506 0.474 0.100 0.374 0.436 0.334 0.034 0.300 
2003 0.512 0.480 0.114 0.366 0.441 0.345 0.049 0.296 
South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa 
1970 0.351 0.207 0.001 0.206 0.637 0.879 0.347 0.532 
1975 0.413 0.295 0.002 0.292 0.638 0.859 0.349 0.509 
1980 0.375 0.239 0.004 0.235 0.660 0.948 0.411 0.537 
1985 0.373 0.238 0.005 0.232 0.666 0.968 0.452 0.516 
1990 0.366 0.229 0.006 0.223 0.677 1.027 0.432 0.595 
1995 0.396 0.269 0.008 0.261 0.666 1.040 0.442 0.599 
2000 0.412 0.295 0.009 0.286 0.663 1.049 0.448 0.601 
2003 0.412 0.295 0.009 0.286 0.659 1.033 0.442 0.590 
2000) per year. Moreover, the poverty gap ratio also displays a constant decline over the given 
time period, hence, not only did the absolute number of people living in extreme poverty fall, 
but those which remained poor saw their income improved toward the poverty line. The halving 
of the number of people living in poverty is especially impressive since the world's population 
almost doubled in the given time period. The results of the $2 poverty line follow a very similar 
pattern. The headcount declined strongly from 43 percent, almost half the world's population, 
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in 1970 to 14 percent in 2003. The most dramatic decline of the $2 headcount was in the late 
1970s and the 1980s from 42 percent in 1975 to 21 percent in 1990. Overall, the absolute number 
of people who lived below $935.45 (PPP, 2000) per year declined from 1,571 million in 1970 
to 893 million, in 2003. Furthermore, the poverty gap or "distance" of those people below the 
poverty line to the poverty line also declined considerably. Thus, all conceivable measures show a 
dramatic decline of global poverty in relative and even in absolute terms, although clearly some 
decades experienced more pro-poor progress than others. In order to get a more refined picture 
of pro-poor growth we now investigate the global growth incident curves and corresponding rates 
of pro-poor growth. 
2.3.2 Growth Incidence Curves and Pro-Poor Growth 
In Figure 2.4 global growth incidence curves for different time periods are displayed, which show 
the percentile specific growth rates over the global income distribution.9 The main results are also 
summarised in Table 2.4 below. If one considers the entire observational period, it is apparent 
that the middle percentiles of the global income distribution experienced the highest growth 
rates. In fact, the growth rate from the 8.5th to the 63.5th percentile of the global population 
experienced income growth rates above the mean of growth rates of all percentiles, which is 
equal to 2.3 percent per annum. Thus, the bottom-middle of the global income distribution 
experienced the fastest income growth, which also explains the declining income inequality and 
global income convergence. This effect is slightly counteracted by the less than average growth 
performance of the bottom percentiles (up to the 8.5 percentile), with the poorest percentiles 
experiencing the lowest income growth overall. Furthermore, the global average income grew by 
1.8 percent per annum, whereas the median global individual experienced a per annum income 
increase of 3.0 percent. The rate of pro-poor growth 10 for the $1 per day poverty line exceeds 
with 2.2 percent per annum the growth rate of the mean by about 0.4 percentage points per 
annum. Hence, the 34 years from 1970 to 2003 can be termed pro-poor in the relative sense, 
as the poor experienced higher income growth rates than the average income. 11 For the $2 per 
day poverty line the period was even more pro-poor as the rate of pro-poor growth with 2.7 
percent per annum exceededs the growth rate of the mean with almost 0.9 percentage points 
per annum and is even greater than the mean percentile growth rate. Hence, the global growth 
incidence curves over the period from 1970 to 2003 confirm and strengthen our inequality and 
poverty results above, as they show that over the 34 years the incomes of the poor have grown 
much faster than the average income. In fact, the bottom-middle income percentiles experienced 
the highest income growth rates explaining global income convergence, declining inequality and 
falling poverty headcounts. In order to understand in which era growth was particularly pro-
10 
II 
For a methodological discussion of growth incidence curves see Ravallion & Chen {2003). 
The rate of pro-poor growth is defined as the average growth rate of the percentiles below the poverty line. 
Note: a time span is considered to have been relatively pro-poor if the mean growth rates of the percentiles 
below the poverty line is larger than the growth rate in mean. 
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Table 2.2: Global and Regional $1 and $2 per day Poverty Headcount and Poverty Gap Measure 
Year Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty 
Head- Head- Gap Gap Head- Head- Gap Gap 
count count ($1) ($2) count count ($1) ($2) 
($1) ($2) ($1) ($2) 
World OECD Countries 
1970 0.212 0.425 0.073 0.202 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
1975 0.192 0.415 0.062 0.190 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1980 0.137 0.355 0.045 0.149 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1985 0.083 0.272 0.029 0.102 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1990 0.071 0.209 0.028 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1995 0.068 0.178 0.028 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2000 0.059 0.148 0.025 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2003 0.058 0.142 0.025 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
East Asia Pacific Latin America Caribbean 
1970 0.454 0.782 0.153 0.403 0.073 0.191 0.026 0.079 
1975 0.346 0.724 0.102 0.335 0.067 0.170 0.025 0.071 
1980 0.235 0.612 0.067 0.255 0.026 0.092 0.008 0.033 
1985 0.082 0.392 0.022 0.126 0.032 0.104 0.010 0.038 
1990 0.057 0.250 0.017 0.082 0.040 0.121 0.013 0.046 
1995 0.030 0.129 0.011 0.042 0.045 0.132 0.015 0.051 
2000 0.020 0.075 0.008 0.026 0.044 0.126 0.015 0.049 
2003 0.024 0.082 0.009 0.029 0.043 0.123 0.015 0.049 
Middle East North Africa Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
1970 0.085 0.235 0.030 0.094 0.016 0.044 0.006 0.017 
1975 0.069 0.205 0.024 0.080 0.010 0.032 0.003 0.012 
1980 0.039 0.141 0.012 0.049 0.012 0.035 0.004 0.014 
1985 0.040 0.132 0.015 0.049 0.008 0.027 0.002 0.009 
1990 0.035 0.116 0.013 0.043 0.003 0.017 0.001 0.005 
1995 0.047 0.113 0.021 0.050 0.006 0.033 0.001 0.009 
2000 0.032 0.097 0.012 0.038 0.002 0.016 0.000 0.004 
2003 0.051 0.113 0.024 0.052 0.001 0.012 0.000 0.003 
South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa 
1970 0.138 0.487 0.036 0.175 0.367 0.609 0.169 0.335 
1975 0.199 0.518 0.063 0.214 0.352 0.590 0.161 0.321 
1980 0.115 0.417 0.030 0.147 0.377 0.610 0.178 0.342 
1985 0.074 0.333 0.018 0.108 0.391 0.626 0.186 0.354 
1990 0.042 0.236 0.009 0.070 0.396 0.620 0.196 0.359 
1995 0.049 0.231 0.012 0.073 0.401 0.639 0.195 0.364 
2000 0.035 0.177 0.009 0.054 0.364 0.616 0.173 0.338 
2003 0.026 0.141 0.006 0.041 0.347 0.598 0.162 0.323 
poor, we take a closer look at semi-decade specific growth incidence curves which allows for a 
very detailed analysis. 
For the first half of the 1970s the top and bottom percentiles of the global income distribution 
experienced the highest growth rate. If one considers the $1 per day poverty line, these years 
experienced relative pro-poor growth. However, this is not the case, if one applies the $2 per day 
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Solid line: L970, dashed line: 1980, dottc>d line 1990, dashc>d-dotted : 2003 
line, since the bottom-middle of the income distribution experienced only modest growth rates 
compared to the mean. The second half of the 1970s is characterised by the strongest global 
growth performance of 2.2 percent per annum in mean income and can be considered relatively 
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Table 2.3: Global and Regional Population and Absolute Number of $1 and $2 per day Poor 
Population Poor Poor Population Poor Poor 
People People People People 
($1} ($2} ($1} ($2} 
World OECD Countries 
1970 3,693,695 784,540 1,570,698 701,854 33 721 
1975 4,070,666 779,835 1,691,192 730,625 8 235 
1980 4,437,900 609,085 1,577,463 755,245 2 94 
1985 4,832,425 399,595 1,313,699 777,772 2 61 
1990 5,255,923 370,810 1,097,183 802,713 1 32 
1995 5,660,651 385,708 1,006,770 829,867 3 81 
2000 6,052,688 359,184 894,835 854,570 1 27 
2003 6,275,048 365,006 893,394 869,918 1 31 
East Asia Pacific Latin America Caribbean 
1970 1,167,975 530,322 913,422 282,977 20,595 53,936 
1975 1,307,614 452,382 946,337 321,049 21,521 54,661 
1980 1,419,429 332,907 869,163 360,466 9,450 33,328 
1985 1,534,017 125,390 601,954 400,724 12,795 41,643 
1990 1,662,816 94,202 414,950 442,008 17,500 53,657 
1995 1,776,351 53,042 229,147 482,773 21,805 63,503 
2000 1,877,921 38,277 140,236 522,037 23,046 65,913 
2003 1,929,034 45,379 158,974 544,279 23,602 67,207 
Middle East North Africa Eastern Europe Central Asia 
1970 137,202 11,594 32,309 387,557 6,034 16,875 
1975 157,584 10,927 32,308 408,977 4,255 13,057 
1980 184,880 7,180 26,057 429,959 5,276 15,128 
1985 219,384 8,846 29,005 451,243 3,396 12,059 
1990 253,947 8,942 29,433 469,334 1,625 7,835 
1995 282,784 13,259 31,838 477,391 2,744 15,936 
2000 314,504 10,140 30,611 480,881 773 7,564 
2003 333,963 16,957 37,634 480,573 670 5,649 
South Asia Sub-Sahran Africa 
1970 726,192 99,960 353,579 289,938 106,307 176,593 
1975 813,860 162,234 421,552 330,957 116,482 195,182 
1980 906,662 103,946 377,792 381,259 143,776 232,441 
1985 1,009,753 75,083 335,824 439,532 171,901 275,029 
1990 1,118,609 46,775 263,634 506,494 200,578 314,139 
1995 1,231,644 60,695 285,100 579,841 232,567 370,463 
2000 1,346,805 47,109 238,323 655,972 238,775 404,047 
2003 1,416,242 36,126 199,439 701,039 242,947 419,153 
pro-poor under the $1 and the $2 per day poverty definition. It is apparent that the bottom half 
of the distribution had higher growth rates than the average percentile growth rate and thus the 
bottom-middle of the global income distribution gained the most. 
The first half of the 1980s can be considered the most pro-poor over the given time period 
as the bottom half of the distribution experienced very high growth rates compared to the top 
percentiles. The mean income grew by only 0.8 percent per annum, but the rate of pro-poor 
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Figure 2.2: Global and Regional Distribution of Log-Income 
Log_...,...,.. 0-1ibulion OECO Counlrieti 
Solid line: 1970, dasht.-d line: 1980, dotted line 1990, d~hcd-dott1..>d: 2003 
growth was 4.6 and 4.7 per annum for the $1 and $2 per day poverty lines respectively. The 
second half of the 1980s experienced an increase in the global mean income growth rate to normal 
1.9 percent per annum and is characterised by negative pro-poor growth rates for the extreme 
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poor, at -0.9 percent per annum, and growth rates for the poor, at 1.0 percent per annum. This is 
mainly due to the fact that the very bottom percentiles experienced an income decline, whereas 
the bottom-middle part of the distribution was doing reasonably well, so the bottom-middle half 
of the income distribution did catch up further to the upper percentiles. However, it is also 
important to note that the overall poor percentiles in 1985, which are considered to be poor 
under the $1 and $2 per day definitions, have been extremely reduced from the previous very 
pro-poor growth spell. In particular, the bottom-middle percentiles grew consistently, closing the 
income gap between the developing and developed world, which can also be seen if one looks at 
the log-income distribution where the two modes start to dissolve over the course of the 1980s. 
One hypothesis might be that the onset of globalisation and an intensified export-led growth 
strategy enabled many global poor to participate in the global growth process in particular in 
China and South East Asia. 
The 1990s cannot be considered relatively pro-poor. The highest growth rates over 
the decade are achieved by the inter-quartile percentiles that experience above mean percentile 
growth rates. This implies further global income convergence over the 1990s, and at the end of 
the 1990s no hint of a second peak in the global log-income distribution remains. However, these 
percentiles are no longer considered poor. The overall growth rate of mean income follows the 
previous decade pattern with the first half being characterised by relatively slower growth rates, 
0. 7 percent per annum, followed by stronger growth rates of 2.0 percent per annum in the second 
half. For the first four years in the new millennium the growth rate of mean income has slowed 
down again to 1.3 percent per annum. The rate of pro-poor growth is below the average income 
growth rate with the bottom percentiles growing at only 0.5 percent per annum for the $1 per 
day poverty line and 0.6 percent for the $2 per day poverty line. 
2.4 Regional Distributions, Inequality, Poverty and Growth Inci-
dence Curves 
2.4.1 Regional Income and Log-Income Distributions 
In order to get a more detailed picture, we decompose the world into seven regions which are 
analysed separately: the OECD countries, East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, South Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa (cf. Table B.1 for the countries belonging to each region). 
The income and Jog-income distributions for these regions, modeled as described in Section 
2.2, are shown in Figures 2.1 - 2.3. One observes a significant increase in the income distributions 
of East Asia and the Pacific and South Asia, whereas Latin America as well as the Middle East 
and North Africa, which were at the beginning relatively rich regions in comparison to the 
OECD countries, only saw rather slow progress. Furthermore, Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia's distribution accounts for the varied experiences of the former Eastern Block countries 
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with initially increasing and than falling income, finally resulting in a stronger dispersed income 
distribution. Sub-Saharan Africa's distribution hardly shifts at all implying virtually no gains 
and a relative deterioration compared to the other regions. 
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Table 2.4: Global and Regional Semi-Decade specific Growth Rates 1970-2003. 
Year Mean Growth Rate of Rate of Mean Growth Rate of Rate of 
of Rate of PPG PPG of Rate of PPG PPG 
Growth Mean ($1) ($2) Growth Mean ($1) ($2) 
Rates Rates 
World OECD Countries 
1970-2003 2.332 1.830 2.192 2.679 2.000 2.079 2.210 2.210 
1970-1974 1.640 2.008 2.272 1.646 2.836 2.434 4.994 4.994 
1975-1979 2.421 2.195 2.280 2.789 2.636 2.729 3.493 3.493 
1980-1984 2.347 0.838 4.560 4.684 1.230 1.273 2.061 2.061 
1985-1989 1.850 1.867 -0.881 0.965 2.356 2.439 1.719 1.719 
1990-1994 1.169 0.739 -0.005 0.817 0.750 0.936 -0.894 -0.894 
1995-1999 2.397 2.009 1.285 1.697 2.061 2.106 2.580 2.580 
2000-2003 1.561 1.318 0.536 0.556 0.461 0.553 -0.096 -0.096 
East Asia Pacific Latin America Caribbean 
1970-2003 5.475 5.646 4.919 5.376 1.048 1.123 0.876 0.946 
1970-1974 3.135 3.549 3.421 3.001 2.170 3.152 -0.382 0.576 
1975-1979 3.607 4.630 2.165 3.084 4.198 2.217 8.298 7.212 
1980-1984 6.562 4.578 9.257 8.151 -1.538 -1.557 -2.026 -1.764 
1985-1989 4.024 5.299 -0.693 1.606 -0.892 0.630 -3.741 -3.131 
1990-1994 6.122 6.193 4.083 5.157 0.251 1.359 -1.700 -1.501 
1995-1999 4.342 4.048 2.059 3.247 0.840 1.132 0.099 0.262 
2000-2003 2.520 4.068 -0.049 -1.363 0.015 -0.414 0.071 0.261 
Middle East North Africa Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
1970-2003 1.384 1.222 0.375 1.175 1.274 1.536 2.905 2.230 
1970-1974 2.771 3.127 2.196 2.230 4.240 4.144 4.563 3.946 
1975-1979 3.177 1.591 6.417 5.490 2.618 2.737 -0.440 -0.321 
1980-1984 0.299 0.136 -1.538 -0.121 1.793 2.003 3.065 2.635 
1985-1989 -0.053 -0.676 1.592 1.094 1.431 1.586 5.790 4.881 
1990-1994 1.397 1.669 -4.718 -1.196 -7.764 -5.340 -2.685 -4.197 
1995-1999 2.177 2.475 8.851 5.049 1.399 0.584 7.102 5.930 
2000-2003 -0.591 0.379 -13.745 -8.323 4.150 4.401 0.762 1.976 
South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa 
1970-2003 2.397 2.654 1.856 2.106 0.045 0.264 -0.051 0.023 
1970-1974 -0.316 -0.277 -0.221 -0.329 1.374 1.292 1.127 1.202 
1975-1979 2.873 1.706 5.304 4.137 -0.820 0.020 -1.307 -1.160 
1980-1984 2.429 2.300 3.054 2.675 -0.588 -0.385 -0.263 -0.445 
1985-1989 3.048 2.914 3.065 3.207 -0.567 0.248 -1.566 -1.039 
1990-1994 0.281 0.958 -1.808 -1.031 -0.610 -1.463 0.409 0.164 
1995-1999 3.058 3.594 1.721 2.198 1.295 1.136 1.552 1.488 
2000-2003 2.884 2.887 2.654 2.854 1.367 0.964 1.665 1.502 
2.4.2 Regional Poverty and Inequality Measures 
Poverty and inequality measures for these seven regions, which reflect the overall picture above, 
are reported in Tables 2.2 - 2.1. Indeed, the region with the highest poverty headcount in 
1970, namely East Asia and the Pacific, experienced the most breathtaking poverty decline 
from 78 percent in 1970 to 8 percent in 2003 combined with a strong decline in inequality 
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between countries in this region. Moreover, the absolute number of poor decreased, despite 
strong population growth, from about half a billion or one billion to about 45 and 160 million for 
the $1 and $2 poverty definition respectively. Furthermore, Latin America and the Caribbean, 
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as well as the Middle East and North Africa saw their poverty headcounts decline by almost 
half. However, their absolute number of poor increased slightly under both definitions due to 
population growth. Moreover, South Asia also experienced a remarkable poverty decline even 
though less spectacularly and from a lower initial level than East Asia, causing the absolute 
number of poor to fall from about 100 or 350 million to about 36 and 200 million for the $1 
and $2 poverty lines respectively. This experience was combined with rising inequality from an 
initially very low level driven by within country inequality. Furthermore, the often lamented case 
of Sub-Saharan Africa is confirmed by our numbers, as it is the only region which experiences 
virtually no improvement in any of the measures. This stagnation of Sub-Saharan Africa and 
relative decline in comparison to all other regions becomes even more apparent if we take a look 
at the regional decomposition of the absolute number of poor as part of the global population. 
While the poverty rates remained more or less constant over the years, the absolute number of 
people living in poverty more than doubled due to population growth from about 100 and 180 
million to about 240 and 420 million for the $1 and $2 poverty Jines respectively. Moreover, 
inequality measures even saw an increase from initially already very high levels, both for within 
and between country inequality. This implies that Sub-Saharan Africa is nowadays by far the 
most unequal and poorest region of the world in relative and absolute terms overall. However, 
as far as within country inequality is concerned Latin America still has to be considered the 
most unequal region, as seen by the within Theil inequality measure. Furthermore, Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia contributes little to the global poor if one considers the $1 and $2 
per day poverty lines and thus is characterised by very low and slightly declining poverty rates 
and absolute number of poor combined with strongly increasing within country inequality after 
the breakdown of the Iron Curtain from initially rather low levels. Finally, for the sake of 
completeness, a quick glance at the OECD countries shows that it basically contributes nothing 
to the global poverty dynamics under the applied definitions. 12 However, the region experienced 
a marked increase in inequality due to an increase in within country inequality. 
2.4.3 Regional Semi-Decade Specific Growth Rates, Rates of Pro-poor Growth 
and Growth Incidence Curves 
The poverty and inequality dynamics described above become even more apparent if one takes 
a closer look at the regional growth incidence curves and results over the entire period as shown 
in Figure 2.5. Moreover, a closer look at the semi-decade specific results conveys an even more 
detailed picture of the regions' growth experience during shorter time periods. 13 
The OECD Countries. The results for the OECD countries show that even though the 
average growth rate v-.i.ried between better semi-decades, such as the late 1990s or late 1970s, 
12 
13 
Clearly neither the $1 nor the $2 poverty line is a very suitable poverty measure for rich countries in general. 
Due to the large amount of semi-decade specific regional incidence curves we only report a few examples for 
a selected time period here. However, the results in Table 2.4 give a good idea about the semi-decade specific 
regional growth experience and all graphs are available in Appendix ??. 
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Figure 2.5: Global and Regional Growth Incidence Curves 1970-2003 
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and less strong growth periods, such as the early 1990s and the early 1980s, the overall intra-
distributional growth pattern is very stable. During all semi-decades, except for the start of 
the new millennium, the growth incidence curves show higher growth rates for the richest per-
Julian Weisbrod - 978-3-631-75361-3
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:55:15AM
via free access
46 GLOBAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION DYNAMICS AND PPG 
Figure 2.6: Growth Incidence Curves of Various Years 
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Solid line: Growth Incident Curve, solid vertical line: $2 per day Poverty Line, solid horizontal line: 
Mean of Growth Rates, dashed line: Growth Rate in Mean, dotted line: Pro-poor Growth Rate 
centiles. Thus, the higher the population percentile the higher the income growth rate, with the 
logic consequence of increasing inequality over time. 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Eastern Europe and Central Asia is telling a more 
interesting story as it is much less homogeneous. It is clear from the growth incidence curves that 
during the first half of the 1990s the bottom half of the regional income distribution saw their 
income decline drastically. These high negative growth rates, directly after the Soviet Regime's 
collapse, are causing a slight increase in the poverty rate by 1995. The other semi-decades can 
be characterised as more pro-poor, except for the very bottom percentiles, accounting for the 
slightly declining inequality up to 1990 after which inequality increases rather rapidly, before it 
improves again. 
East Asia and the Pacific. The fact that East Asia is by far the most dynamic region 
and accounts for most of the dramatic global poverty reduction is apparent from a closer look at 
the regional growth incidence curves. Except for the start of the new millennium, which displays 
a slow down in the mean of growth rates to about 2.5 percent per annum, and the early 1970s 
which had around 3 percent, all semi-decades are characterised by a high mean of growth rates 
of about 4 percent per annum. Furthermore, the early 1980s and 1990s saw most remarkable 
mean percentile growth rates of more than 6 percent per annum, combined with rates of pro-poor 
growth of 9.2 and 8.1 percent per annum for the early 1980s respectively (see Figure 2.6); no 
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other region has such a consistently high growth record. From the 1970s onward, the poverty 
headcount index is steadily declining mainly due to good growth records in the bottom middle 
of the regional income distribution. In the early 1980s it is in particular the bottom percentiles 
which grew most rapidly. Moreover, the growth spurt of China, as the region's most populous 
country, accounts mostly for these very high growth rates, and thus accounts for a major share 
of the dramatic poverty headcount reduction from 61 percent to 39 percent over a 5 year period. 
For the bottom half of the distribution the 1990s were rather successful, lowering poverty rates 
even further from 25 to 8 percent. Moreover, the region is displaying a clear lead concerning the 
overall growth rate in mean, and is therefore the main driving force behind the convergence of 
the global income distribution. 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Latin America saw the second lowest growth rate 
in mean, which was almost distribution neutral, and is characterised by the third and second 
lowest rates of pro-poor growth (for the $1 and $2 lines, respectively). Consequently, the poverty 
headcount dropped only slightly from 19 percent in 1970 to 12 percent in 2003 with inequal-
ity remaining high. Hence, Latin America was relatively outperformed in terms of growth and 
poverty reduction by all other regions except for Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the overall rather 
stagnant picture there are some marked semi-decade specific variations. Most pro-poor were the 
late 1970s, however, the promising high growth rates were not maintained. Thus, the relative 
deterioration with respect to the other regions is mainly due to the 1980s, which are charac-
terised by negative growth rates except for the very rich percentiles and are thus known as the 
lost decade in Latin America (compare Figure 2.6). The 1990s again display low positive growth 
rates in mean, however, the rate of pro-poor growth remains negative in the first half of the 
decade. Overall, Latin America's growth record is disappointing as poverty reduction could have 
been much more rapid and a further divergence from the richer regions is apparent. 
Middle East and North Africa. Overall, the Middle East and North Africa display a 
similarly disappointing growth rate as Latin America with equally bad rates of pro-poor growth. 
In particular, the very low pro-poor growth rate at $1 per day is almost as low as in Sub-Saharan 
Africa; however, the proportion of the population living below $1 per day is clearly much lower. 
Over the 34 year time-period the region managed to lower its poverty headcount rate from 23 to 
11 percent while reducing regional inequality slightly. Taking a closer look at the overall growth 
incidence curve, one can see that the very poor of the region experienced by far the lowest or even 
negative income growth. However, from about the 10th percentile the growth incidence curves 
look relatively pro-poor explaining the slight drop in the Gini coefficient and Theil's inequality 
measure. 
Given this overall 34 year development a closer look at the semi-decade specific pro-poor 
growth rates for the Middle East and North Africa shows a particularly strong fluctuation of the 
pro-poor growth rates ranging from -13.7 to 8.8 percent per annum and -8.3 to 5.5 percent per 
annum for the $1 and $2 poverty lines respectively. While the 1970s saw positive and strong 
growth rates of the poor, the first half of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s are characterised by a 
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growth collapse of the poor. The results are driven mostly by the growth rates of Iraq, in par-
ticular during the Gulf Wars. 14 In contrast, the second half of these decades saw compensatory 
pro-poor growth rates, such that overall the region saw a poverty decline and a lower Gini coef-
ficient at the end of the observational period. However, like Latin America the region has been 
outperformed in terms of growth and poverty reduction by South and East Asia. 
South Asia. South Asia is the second most dynamic and populous region of the world over 
the given time period. Even though growth has not been relatively pro-poor, the overall growth 
record was sufficiently strong to lower the headcount at $2 per day from half the population to 
14 percent, while regional inequality saw an increase from initially very low levels due to an in-
crease in within country inequality. In particular, India's growth record accounts for much of the 
regional dynamics as it is by far the largest country. Even though the early 1970s were charac-
terised by negative growth rates the second half saw very high rates of relative pro-poor growth, 
initiating a constant poverty decline. The entire 1980s display relative pro-poor growth rates. In 
particular, during the 1980s the very poorest experienced growth rates of about 3 percent per 
annum. Average growth rates for the percentiles below the $2 per day poverty line increased 
from 2. 7 to 3.2 percent per annum from the first to the second half of the 1980s respectively. 
The early 1990s are characterised by a general growth slow down with negative pro-poor growth 
rates, before growth resurges in the second half of the 1990s and during the first years of the new 
millennium, however, with only modest gains for the very bottom percentiles (see Figure 2.6). In 
general, the region's pro-poor and overall growth record is the second major driving force behind 
global income convergence with India accounting for a large proportion of this income catch-up. 
Sub-Saharan Africa. As mentioned above, Sub-Saharan Africa is by far the most trouble-
some region as it remains virtually stagnant with constantly high rates of poverty and inequality. 
This is mainly due to the non-existent growth record of the region as a whole and is combined 
with a worsening of regional inequality at a very high level both within and between countries. 
This leaves Sub-Saharan Africa in 2003 as the most distinctively poor region in relative and 
absolute terms, as well as most unequal region in the world. The overall growth rate in mean 
over the 34 year period is 0.3 percent per annum, with even lower rates of pro-poor growth for 
both poverty lines with the very bottom of the distribution experiencing even a negative growth 
record. 
Indeed, the semi-decade specific analysis shows a relatively successful early 1970s followed 
by a devastating picture for the late 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, all of which are characterised 
by a negative average growth rate and negative or only slightly positive growth rates in mean. 
Results for pro-poor growth are similar, even though the early 1990s saw the first positive pro-
poor growth rates after 15 years. The late 1990s and the start of the new millennium indicate a 
more encouraging picture. Despite remaining low growth rates at least some slow progress has 
14 We would expect that the early 1980s would be characterised by even lower growth records, if we could 
include data from Iran. However, reliable comparable data is hardly available so that one of the most 
populous countries of the region cannot be included in our analysis. 
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been made in particular for the poor, which still account for almost 60 percent of the region's 
population and experienced positive and for the region unparalleled rates of pro-poor growth. 
However, over the entire period the region has been virtually stagnant. While it was "only" the 
second poorest region in the world in 1970, it is by far the poorest region in the world in the new 
millennium and experienced high relative income deterioration. In fact, about two thirds of the 
world's extreme poor and about half of the world's poor live in Sub-Saharan Africa nowadays 
(compare Table 2.3). Hence, it is clear that any serious attempt to further reduce global poverty 
will fail, if it fails to reach Sub-Saharan Africa. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In contrast to studies analysing the polarisation of the cross-national average income per capita 
distribution, this study of the global income distribution as a whole shows strong global income 
convergence among all the world's citizens. We use a simple parametric mixture approach, with 
log-normal national income distributions and weights determined by the country's population, 
which appears to be adequate for the data available in the WIDER database. Our results show 
that the past 34 years witnessed a strong global income convergence accompanied by a drastic 
decline of global inequality and poverty no matter what conceivable monetary poverty line is 
applied. Noticeably, overall inequality declined because of declining inequality between coun-
tries, while inequality within countries increased. Furthermore, the analysis of growth incidence 
curves shows that the bottom-middle part of the income distribution experienced above average 
percentile growth rates, which explains the occurring global income convergence. In particular, 
the late 1970s and early 1980s are characterised by high global rates of pro-poor growth, initiat-
ing the rapid decline of global poverty rates. 
A regional decomposition of our data reveals that in particular the extraordinary growth 
record of East Asia and South Asia, which includes the two population heavy weights China 
and India, accounts mostly for the global income convergence and rapidly declining poverty 
rates. Latin America and the Middle East and North Africa showed slower but steady progress 
in poverty reduction. However, their more modest growth experience implies a relative income 
deterioration vis-a-vis the richer regions and also East and South Asia, and thus, can be seen 
as a remaining diverging factor in the global income distribution. Lastly, Sub-Saharan Africa 
has remained virtually stagnant and has become the poorest region in relative and absolute 
terms, implying a steady divergence and disconnection from the global growth process. Never-
theless, from a global perspective, the observational period is characterised by an unparalleled 
improvement of income per capita and an unprecedented poverty reduction. This in itself can 
be considered a great success and is in particular due to the fact that the bottom-middle global 
income percentiles managed to catch up to higher levels of income, thus reducing the dispersion 
of income from a global perspective. On the other hand, the remaining very lowest percentiles 
also experienced the lowest percentile growth rates, such that the remaining extreme poor might 
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be particularly hard to reach. Given the high share of global extreme poor and high poverty 
headcounts in Sub-Saharan Africa it is clear from our analysis that any further massive extreme 
poverty reduction can be only achieved by pro-poor, or at least distributional neutral, growth in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The remaining poor seem to be, if Chen and Ravallion's (2007) rural-urban 
poverty decomposition is any indication, mostly to be found in rural areas. Thus, any attempt to 
reduce global poverty even further must focus mainly on fostering growth in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and on remaining, in particular rural, national pockets of poverty. 
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Chapter 3 
Ethnic Fractionalisation, Migration and 
Growth 
3.1 Introduction 
A wide range of studies have found robust evidence for the negative effect of high ethnic frac-
tionalisation on long-term growth in a cross section of countries. This growth diminishing effect 
of ethnic fractionalisation has been found to be operating through an adverse policy environ-
ment and the suboptimal provision of public goods (Easterly and Levine (1997), Easterly (2001), 
Alesina et al. (2003)). However, the channels through which ethnic fractionalisation has an 
impact on growth have only been partially analysed by these studies. Furthermore, the impact 
of ethnic fractionalisation on economic progress might be far more complex than the existing 
empirical studies would suggest. For this reason this paper intends to extend the existing anal-
yses. 
First of all, it seems reasonable and desirable to update the data set used by Alesina et 
al.(2003) into the 1990s to analyse the robustness of their results in a wider time range. Inter-
estingly, we find a prevailing negative direct effect of ethnic fractionalisation on growth after the 
inclusion of the 1990s, despite the inclusion of policy control variables. Hence, we apply decade 
and region specific regressions, as well as a region specific ethnic fractionalisation interaction 
term, in order to identify whether this result is driven by decade or regional specific effects. 
We find that the growth-hampering impact of ethnic fractionalisation remains only in the 1990s 
and in Sub-Saharan Africa once the policy framework of Alesina et al. (2003) is controlled for. 
Moreover, we show that this 1990s effect vanishes if we implement the Kaufman-Kraay-Zoido-
Lobaton-Indicator of governance in the existing model framework of Alesina et al .. The specific 
Sub-Saharan effect of fractionalisation instead shows an indirect effect via investment on growth, 
and not via governance. In line with recent research on violent conflict (Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol, 2005), we cannot confirm the hypothesis that the remaining negative impact of ethnic 
based on joint work with Dana Schiiler 
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fractionalisation is due to violent conflicts. Thus, our results indicate that the original model 
specification of Alesina et al. is incomplete as it fails to fully account for the recent 1990s and 
Sub-Saharan growth experience. 
In addition, it might be the case that the alleged negative effect of ethnic fractionalisation 
on growth, described above, is possibly mitigated by positive effects prevailing in multi-ethnic 
societies. In particular, there is a large body of literature which suggests that the existence of 
co-ethnic networks has a large positive impact on trade and thus on growth. The theoretical 
argument is, that immigrants have an informational and trust advantage in arranging trade with 
their home countries over their local counterparts (Epstein and Gang (2004), Casella and Rauch 
(1997), Rauch (2001)). Co-ethnic networks are also found to promote foreign direct investment 
(Tong, 2005). Hence, we empirically investigate, whether ethnic fractionalisation might be a 
positive factor in a nation which is ethnically diverse according to our indicator, partially due 
to past immigration. We find some indication that countries which are ethnically diverse due to 
past immigration can mitigate the negative impact of ethnic fractionalisation on growth. We are 
the first, to our knowledge, to distinguish between these two different kinds of ethnic fractionali-
sation in order to determine whether the result empirically in-:licates this multidimensionality of 
ethnic diversity. We find the positive effect but we cannot confirm the trade and foreign direct 
investment hypothesis. 
This paper is structured as follows: in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of this chapter we will focus on 
the existing theoretical consideration and empirical research which has been produced so far. 
This is followed by a brief discussion of our data and methodology in Section 3.4. Then we shall 
present and discuss our results in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6 we identify potentially interesting 
future research questions and conclude. 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
There are two different strands of literature, one of which suggests that ethnic diversity is harm-
ful to growth and another which suggests the opposite. The first strand is based on economic 
growth theory and subsequent cross-country growth regressions, while the strand which argues 
that high ethnic diversity is good for growth is normally a case country study using micro data 
to evaluate the impact of co-ethnic trading networks on trade and growth. 
Zak and Knack (2001), for instance, argue that high ethnic diversity increases the social dis-
tance between groups, which in turn reduces the amount of trust in a society. Due to the signifi-
cant information and enforcement problems in many (particularly risky) economic transactions, 
lack of trust will reduce the amount of beneficial economic transactions, increase transaction 
costs on monitoring and enforcement and will make some contracts impossible. A related insight 
emerges from the literature on 'social capital' which measures the number and intensity of so-
cial interactions and linkages between members of a society and has found that social capital is 
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potentially conducive to economic development because it favours cooperation and reduces prob-
lems due to asymmetric information. The theoretical argument is that social capital is harder 
to establish between divided ethnic groups in a society. 1 
Furthermore, some authors argue that ethnic diversity increases the likelihood of conflict. 
Collier and Hoeffler (1998) model the likelihood of a civil war as a cost-benefit calculation of 
potential rebels. While ethnic diversity is likely to increase the incentive to incite rebellion due 
to grievances (perceived and actual) experienced by individual ethnic groups, having very large 
numbers of ethnic groups might make the coordination of a successful rebellion difficult. Thus, 
Collier and Hoeffler argue that civil wars are particularly likely in ethnically polarised societies, 
where a few ethnic groups vie for political control. 
However, not only violent, but also political conflict has been hypothesised as a channel 
through which high ethnic diversity negatively influences economic growth. Alesina and Drazen 
(1991) suggest that groups may attempt to shift the burden of economic stabilisation and reform 
onto other groups when stabilisation has significant distributional implications. Even though it 
is agreed that stabilisation requires cuts in public expenditure to eliminate the budget deficit, 
the distribution of the allocation of the costs is not agreed upon. The process leading to stabili-
sation can therefore often be described as a war of attrition, which delays stabilisation and only 
ends when certain groups allow the others to decide on the allocation of the burden of the fiscal 
adjustment. More politically polarised countries will experience longer periods of instability. In 
the case that different ethnic groups are also strongly politically polarised then the model also 
applies in the context of ethnic diversity. Similar arguments are made by Easterly and Levine 
(1997), who argue that high ethnic diversity leads to poor policy choices. Governments either 
find it difficult to agree on painful economic reforms, attempt to shift the burden to other groups, 
or simply try to enrich themselves as they fear that their tenure might be limited due to the 
strong resistance of other ethnic groups. Svensson ( 1998) develops a game-theoretic, rent-seeking 
model in which groups compete for common-pool resources. Even in a repeated interaction game 
co-operation might not be enforceable and the groups sustain their costly appropriation efforts. 
In general, political regimes in ethnically diverse countries are often found to be more engaged 
in inefficient "identity politics" than in more efficient "performance politics". In the former sit-
uation, a political regime or party is supported not for its performance in terms of furthering 
prosperity, but for being led by people from the same group, while in the latter situation eco-
nomic and political performance is rewarded. As most ethnically diverse countries are diverse 
at the national level and relatively homogeneous at the regional level, "identity politics" persist 
at the national level. With these politics people are reminded of differences and therefore an 
environment of low trust and cooperation is built and maintained. Collier (1998) argues that 
loyalty to ethnically-based parties is often maintained irrespective of economic performance and 
However, the theoretical literature on social capital also suggest that social capital slows down the transition 
process of development between one stage and the next and is therefore bad for economic growth. See 
Banerjee and Newman (1998), Arnott and Stiglitz (1991). 
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the government delivers patronage to the loyalists rather than services to the median voter. A 
further disadvantage of high ethnic diversity is that it is believed to reduce the provision of pub-
lic goods. Alesina, Baquir and Easterly (1999) formulate a model which links the heterogeneity 
of preferences across ethnic groups in a city to the amount and type of public goods the city 
supplies. A jurisdiction with two or more polarised groups (in the sense that these groups have 
preferences very far away from the median) would prefer to keep ta,ces low and deduct resources 
from the public good to private consumption. This results in a suboptimal provision of the 
public good which is then to the detriment of all. 2 These theories may all lead to vicious cycles 
of high ethnic diversity, poor economic performance, and greater ethnic identification as a result 
since marginalised groups will build up even stronger identities in the face of poor economic 
performance and their social exclusion (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). 
On the positive side, ethnic or linguistic diversity which is due to immigration may improve 
trade opportunities for a country. Immigrants form ethnic networks between their home and 
host country (Casella and Rauch, 1997). Girma and Yu (2000) provide evidence that the trade-
immigration linkage is driven by the new information brought by immigrants about their home 
country and not so much by existing business connections and personal contacts with their home 
country. This would mean that ethnic networks enhance trade between dissimilar countries. 
Gould (1994) describes the positive effect of co-ethnic networks as immigrants having links to 
their home country, which is like a human-capital externality that enhances trade opportunities 
(most likely between developed and developing countries). Trade is enhanced by a decrease in 
transaction costs to trade. Furthermore, bilateral trade flows are positively affected by the pref-
erence of immigrants for home country products. Gould (1994) finds that the trade enhancing 
effect is the strongest in the export sector and only a relatively small community of immigrants 
is needed to exhaust this effect. A relatively large community, however, is needed to exhaust the 
positive trade effect in the import sector. 
Similarly, ethnic diversity of a country increases the attractiveness of that country to immi-
grants who often migrate to countries with existing networks of immigrants of the same origin. 
This increases the efficiency and adaptability of the labor market to economic change, and to 
the extent that the skills of the immigrants complement the home country population, is likely 
to improve the growth performance of that country. Lastly, ethnic diversity might be seen as 
beneficial because it increases the variety of products on offer in a country. As much of trade 
between rich countries is driven by such a taste for variety, there would logically be considerable 
benefit if such variety could be provided within one's own borders. 
This paper aims to investigate the respective merits of the two theories on ethnic diversity 
and co-ethnic networks in an empirical analysis to complete the picture. We will investigate 
whether ethnic diversity has a growth enhancing effect in "immigration countries" which works 
against the negative effect of high ethnic diversity due to battles over scarce resources. 
It should be noted that other forms of social distance, such as high income inequality or a geographical 
segregation of groups that could be unrelated to ethnic diversity, could also deliver such a result. 
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3.3 Existing Empirical Investigations 
The pioneering paper by Easterly and Levine (1997), as well as a follow-up study by Alesina et 
al. (2003), argue that ethnic conflicts in the political sphere reduce economic growth by leading 
governments to adopt inefficient economic policies and low public good provision. Using cross-
country seemingly unrelated regressions the authors show that the negative impact of ethnic 
fractionalisation operates via certain policy variables on growth. This link between ethnic di-
versity and the individual policy variable is further analysed by separate regressions which link 
ethnic fractionalisation significantly to the quality of policy and institutions. These identified 
channels have hurt Sub-Saharan Africa particularly, which had the highest measured fractionali-
sation and in turn had the lowest economic growth in the period of 1960-1990. For instance, the 
negative co-efficient of the ethnic variable of -0.0193 implies that Uganda has 1.77 percentage 
points lower annual growth in per capita income in the base line specification than South Korea 
which is merely due to different degrees of ethnic fractionalisation - 0.002 in South Korea versus 
0.93 in Uganda. 
As noted in the last section, other forms of social distance, especially income inequality could 
also lead to polarisation of interests between groups and therefore have identical implications for 
the economic performance in a country. Indeed, Easterly (2001) shows that societies with a low 
class and income divide grow the fastest and the channels through which high ethnic diversity 
and high inequality have an impact on growth happen to be the same. Moreover, extensions by 
Easterly (2001) show that the negative impact of high ethnic fractionalisation can be mitigated 
by strong institutions which they measure using the data from the International Country Risk 
Guide. These indicators measure the strength of the rule of law, judicial independence, bureau-
cratic quality, and protection of property rights. In countries with such strong institutions, the 
negative effect of ethnic fractionalisation on economic growth can be largely avoided (Easterly 
2001). 
No empirical study has considered the relationship between migration and ethnic fraction-
alisation so far. Several empirical studies find that immigrant links play an important role in 
determining bilateral trade flows. Gould (1994) shows that immigrants' ties to their home coun-
try play a key role in explaining bilateral trade flows of the U.S .. Girma and Yu(2000) investigate 
the link between immigration and trade using U.K. data. They find evidence that immigration 
from non-Commonwealth countries has a significant trade enhancing effect. Both studies find a 
pro-import, but most importantly pro-export effect. Frankel and Romer (1999) find that trade 
has a robust and quantitatively large impact on income when controlling for the direction of 
causality. 
Using a gravity model, Tong (2005) finds that Chinese networks, measured as the number 
of Chinese people in the country, are important correlate of bilateral foreign direct investment. 
She further investigates the mechanisms through which this co-ethnic network has an effect on 
See Table 3.2. 
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cross-border investment. She finds that community enforcement of sanctions is important in 
countries with low bureaucratic quality. Furthermore, Chinese networks provide assistance in 
overcoming informational barriers. 
3.4 Data and Methodology 
Since our first objective was to update and extend the analysis of Alesina et al. we used the same 
variables and extended the dataset where possible using the same data sources to include the 
1990s. This was possible for all variables except telephones per 1000 workers instead of which we 
introduced the variable telephones per 1000 people. 4 We decided to put the focus of our research 
on the ethnic fractionalisation variable "ethnic" only, which was constructed by Alesina et al. 
(2003). This is mainly due to the fact that we deemed it to be the most reasonable measure of 
ethnic fractionalisation available to date. 
The variable "ethnic" is measured by a one minus a Herfindahl concentration index 
N 
Fract1 = 1 - Ls;/ 
i=l 
(3.1) 
wheres is the share of group i (i = l, ... ,N) in country j. The index takes values from zero to one for 
each country. In practical terms, this index measures the probability that two randomly drawn 
individuals belong to a different ethnic group. The data to construct this index, i.e. the values 
for the group shares, are mainly taken from the Encyclopaedia Britannica (2001). A separate 
ethnic group is defined if there exist distinguishing linguistic and/or ethnic characteristics. 
Table 3.1 shows the average fractionalisation measures of the different indices for the different 
regions of the world. Note that Sub-Saharan Africa displays the highest average index for all 
measures of fractionalisation. The index "ethnic" gives a more realistic picture of fractionalisation 
in Latin America than the Ethno-Linguistic Measure (ELF) since this region is not primarily 
fractionalised linguistically but mostly due to ethnic groups. Thus, our dataset is structured as 
a four wave panel, which includes the time invariant ethnic fractionalisation variable and past 
immigration dummy. In our empirical analysis we use the common methodology of Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions (SUR), for two specific reasons. First of all, it allowed us to be comparable 
with existing findings such as Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alcsina et al. (2003). Secondly, 
and more importantly, a SUR displays a clear advantage over a OLS regression, including fixed 
and random effect panels, for this kind of growth regression analysis. In particular, this method 
allows for country random effects to be correlated across decades and thus yields more efficient 
estimators than the alternative methods mentioned above. In other words, the effects of the 
independent variables on growth are allowed to be correlated within a country specific framework 
Source: WDI 2003, this variable displays a very high correlation with the original variable telephone per 
1000 workers. See Appendix C Table C.4. 
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Table 3.1: Sample Means of Fractionalisation Indices by Region 
ELF Ethnic Language Religion 
Latin America & Carribean 0.265 0.405 0.179 0.442 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.651 0.658 0.652 0.496 
Eastern & Central Europe 0.315 0.366 0.32 0.491 
Western & Southern Europe 0.147 0.177 0.196 0.311 
Middle East 0.244 0.453 0.33 0.346 
East & South East Asia 0.306 0.353 0.457 0.462 
Source: Alesina et al. (2003). Note: ELF is Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalisation, 
constructed by Easterly and Levine (1997) using the Russian Atlas Narodov Mira 
57 
over time, which is a clear advantage over standard OLS estimates, fixed or random panel. 
Furthermore, SUR seems clearly more favourable since it allows for a more detailed picture than 
a simple OLS where effects are averaged over a 30 or 40 year horizon. SUR instead assigns a 
regression to each of the four decades, analysing the impact of a specific variable measured at 
the start of each decade on growth whereby this impact may be specified to differ between the 
decades or not. Moreover, like OLS, SUR allows for a time invariant correlation between the 
independent variable and growth, but the estimates are derived by incorporating decade specific 
correlations. 
The model takes the following form: 
N N N 
growth;t = L Ctt + L f33tXjit + L /33tZ3; + U;t (3.2) 
t=I j=I j=I 
Hence, growth is a function of a decade specific intercept alpha, a vector of variables X which 
vary across time t and countries i, a vector of variables Z whicli vary only across countries plus 
an error term. 
The second aim of this paper was to combine the two existing strands of literature con-
cerning the possibly counteracting impact of ethnic diversity on economic performance. Thus, 
we needed to define what constitutes an immigration country in order to single out the alleged 
positive impact of ethnic diversity due to immigration. There are many possible definitions of 
the variable "immigration country". However, we are interested in countries which are ethnically 
heterogeneous according to our measure and this to a large part due to migration. A country 
like Argentina, for example, has a population consisting up to 97 percent of Spanish and Italian 
descendants. We are not interested in the typical Western European immigration country as 
in those countries ethnic fractionalisation is extremely low even though positive trade linkages 
through migration prevail. Our definition therefore classifies a country as an immigration coun-
try if it was cliaracterized by settlement from a non-neighboring country, forced or free, within 
the past 300 years and the descendants of foreign settlers constitute a significant part (at least 5 
percent) of the population today. This variable is unsuspicious in regard to endogeneity. Data is 
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taken from the CIA World Factbook, where the group share of ethnic groups and there origins 
are listed. Table C.3 in the Appendix C lists the countries included in this definition.5 
To get a first idea, the methodology we used to test for different effects of ethnic diversity in 
immigration and non-immigration countries is a simple interaction term between the immigra-
tion Dummy and the variable "ethnic". The hypothesis being that, if a country is classified as 
an immigration country, we would expect a distinct positive or at least compensating impact of 
ethnic diversity on growth. We analyze the underlying mechanism of the distinct positive effect 
of the interaction term using SUR also. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Extending the Data Set 
Before we start to analyse whether ethnic diversity has a distinct effect on growth in immigra-
tion countries, we want to confirm and update the baseline analysis by including the 1990s. The 
results are noteworthy by themselves as they lend support to the original argument, namely, 
that high ethnic fractionalisation leads to an adverse policy environment, but also show some 
differences. Table 3.2 shows the results of the updated data analysis. The first two columns in 
Table 3.2 reproduce the original findings of Alesina et al. with the difference that the variable 
"log telephones per worker" has been replaced by "log telephones per people" in regression (2).6 
The adverse impact of ethnic fractionalisation on growth via the policy environment is 
shown when comparing regressions {1} and {2} of Table 3.2, as the inclusion of variables measur-
ing the quality of the policy environment and public good provision renders the negative impact 
of "ethnic" to insignificance and strongly reduces the size of the coefficient. 
If we now include data up to 1999, the following changes can be observed. First of all, if 
we concentrate on specification (3), it confirms and strengthens the original findings that ethnic 
fractionalisation has a negative impact on growth as the results remain almost unchanged in 
terms of magnitude and significance. However, the coefficient of the Dummy for Sub-Saharan 
Africa gains in magnitude and significance. This hints at the continuing diverging growth ex-
perience of this region and the problem observed first by Easterly and Levine that the model 
cannot fully explain this diverging growth trend, even though high ethnic diversity is one of the 
main characteristics of this region. 
Secondly, the variable "schooling" becomes insignificant. The significance and magnitude of 
the other coefficients show not much variation. It is interesting that schooling becomes insignifi-
cant once we include the 1990s and telephone per thousand people. One possible explanation is 
that the variation of schooling has strongly declined in the 1990s and that physical and human 
capital infrastructure is highly correlated for all decades, but particularly in the 1990s. We find 
However, we cannot prove whether co-ethnic networks exist in each of these countries. 
To see the changes due to inclusion of this different variable in comparison with the original Alesina et al. 
results see Appendix C Table C.4. 
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Table 3.2: Baseline Regression. 
Dependent Variable: Growth rate 1960-1980,1960-1999 
Inclusion of 1990s 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dummy for the 1960s -0.099 -0.166· -0.056 -0.06 -0.095 -0,038 
(-1.19) (-1.73) (-0.37) (-0.90) (-1.31) (-0,47) 
Dummy for the 1970s -0.102 -0.163• -0.059 -0.062 -0.091 -0,034 
(-1.22) (-1.71 ) (-0.89) (-0.93) (-1.25) (-0,43) 
Dummy for the 1980s -0.122 -0.179• -0.079 -0.082 -0.109 -0,051 
(-1.46) (-1.88) (-1.20) (-1.23) (-1.49) (-0 ,64) 
Dummy for the 1990s -0.071 -0.074 -0.107 -0,049 
(-1.09) (-1.12) (-1.47) (-0,61) 
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa -0.007 -0.013* .. -0.010• .. -0.011 ••· -0.014 .. -0,014*** 
(-1.53) (-2.75) (-2.50) (-2.76) (-3.22) (-3,10) 
Dummy for Latin America & Caribbean -0.018* .. -0.017*** -0.015 ... -0 .013••· -0.011 ••· -0,014*** 
(-4.85) (-4.46) (-4.61) (-3.98) (-3.29) (-3,89) 
Log of initial income 0.038• 0.067*** 0.026 0.028• 0.04** 0,031 
(1.73) (2.76) (1.60) (1.69) (2.19) (1,61) 
Log of initial income squared -0.003• -0.006*** -0.002• -0.002 .. -0.003*** -0,003*** 
(-1.93) (-3.66) (-1.94) (-2.06) (-2.77) (-2 ,70) 
Log of schooling 0.013*** 0.005 0.012••· 0.011*** 0.011 ••· 0,003 
(3.11) ( 0.96) (3. IO) (3.04) (2.80) (0,63) 
Assassinations -17.986. -31.025 ... -23.228 ... -2,196** 
(-1.95) (-3.16) (-2.56) (-2,42) 
Financial Depth 0.011•• 0.016 ... 0,012•• 
(1.99) (3.34) (2,30) 
Black Market Premium -0.015*** -0.018*** -0,016*** 
(-3.46) (-4.81) (-4,04) 
Fiscal surplus/ GDP 0.113 ... 0.102••· 0,111 ••· 
(3.64) (3.64) (3,89) 
Log of telephones per people 0.022•** 0,019* .. 
(3.64) (3,31) 
Ethnic -0.019••· -0.0040 -0.018*** -0.019••· -0.013 .. -0,009 
(-2.96) (-0.1>1>) (-3.22) (-3.22) (-2.17) (-1,l>O) 
No. Obs. 264 179 356 349 267 257 
Adj R2 0.38 0.57 0.34 0.35 0.47 0.5 
SoU:rCe:ovin Cak\118.tions. Note: t-stats in parentheses ~ •*O.OS,-••0.01 SigllificanC"e- leve1. The regressions· &hove were also 
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Table 3.3: 1990s Effect. 
Growth rate 1960-1999 
Variable 
Dummy for the 1960s -0,077 
(-0,97) 
Dummy for the 1970s -0,070 
(-0,89) 
Dummy for the 1980s -0,088 
(-1,12) 
Dummy for the 1990s -0,079 
(-1,01) 
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa -0,014*** 
(-3,20) 
Dummy for Latin America & Caribbean -0,014*** 
(-4,24) 
Log of initial income 0,041 ** 
(2,14) 
Log of initial income squared -0,004*** 
(-3,30) 




Financial Depth 0,012*** 
(2,48) 
Black Market Premium -0,016*** 
(-4,23) 
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0,117*** 
(4,21) 
Log of telephones per people 0,020*** 
(3,69) 
Ethnic 1960 0,001 
(0,12) 
Ethnic 1970 -0,007 
(-0,78) 
Ethnic 1980 -0,005 
(-0,60) 
Ethnic 1990 -0,023••· 
(-2,lili) 
No. Obs. 38;67;74;78 
Adj R2 0,1 l;0,36;0,47;0,18 
Source: Own Calculations. Note: t-stats in parentheses *0.1, **0.05, ***0.01 Significance level. 
that the difference between the minimum and maximum value of the "log of 1 + average years 
of school attainment" dropped from 2.29 in 1960 to 2.09 in 1990. In the 1960s the correlation 
co-efficient between the level of schooling and telephones per thousand people takes a value of 
0.83, for the 1990s it has increased to 0.89.7 However, the most important finding is, once we 
include data for the 1990s, that we find a remaining effect of ethnic fractionalisation on growth, 
even after the inclusion of the policy variables. The effect of ethnic fractionalisation remains 
significant at the 1 percent level, if we do not restrict the co-efficient to be the same across 
decades. This can be seen in regression (1) in Table 3.3. The effect of ethnic fractionalisation on 
growth is not mitigated by the inclusion of the policy variables. 
Pritchett (1999) analyses why education has no significant influence on growth in a cross-country setting 
and suggests three different explanations. First of all, it might be the case that indeed schooling creates 
no human capital. Secondly, the marginal returns to human capital are falling rapidly where demand for 
educated labour is stagnant. Lastly, the institutional environments in many countries have been sufficiently 
perverse that the human capital accumulated. has been applied to activities that served to reduce economic 
growth. 
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This must be due to the fact that ethnic diversity has gained a bigger impact on growth in 
the 1990s. To further validate the finding, we ran a separate regression for each decade to assess 
whether the impact of our variable "ethnic" increased between the 1960s and the 1990s. The 
results indicate that this is indeed the case as the only decade in which "ethnic" has a negative 
significant impact, even after the inclusion of the policy variables, is the 1990s. For all other 
decades the impact of "ethnic" in the extended regression is not statistically different from zero. 
The findings are shown in Table 3.4. 
Moreover, we ran a completely unrestricted version of our SUR model, which means that 
we loosened the restriction that co-efficients have to be the same across decades for all variables 
except the decade dummies. The results are shown in Table C.l in Appendix C. According 
to the adjusted R-squared, this model can explain growth variations the best. The regression 
clearly shows that policy variables have very distinct effects in different decades, that conditional 
/1-convergence can only be found in two decades, and that ethnic fractionalisation has a sizeable 
impact on growth in the 1990s besides the policy variables. Therefore, we may well conclude 
that the model proposed by Alesina et al. (2003) is incomplete. 
We tested several other models to explain the negative impact of ethnic fractionalisation on 
growth in the 1990s. One hypothesis is that the 1990s witnessed an increased importance of 
good governance on growth. When including the Kaufman-Kraay-Zoido-Lobaton-Indicator in 
our regression the variable "ethnic" becomes insignificant (see Table C.2 in Appendix C).8 Eth-
nic fractionalisation may lead to inefficient "identity" politics instead of efficient "performance" 
politics (Collier, 1998). The index measures governance in the dimensions graft, rule of law, 
voice and accountability, political instability and violence, government effectiveness, and regula-
tory burden. Governance seems to have gained importance for growth in the 1990s. This may 
partly be explained by the withdrawal of influence by the two superpowers from many regions of 
the world with the end of the Cold War. This increased importance of governance on growth is 
confirmed in Table C.2 in Appendix C which shows that governance, as measured by KKZ, has 
only a significant influence on growth in the 1990s. Moreover, if we combine this results with 
Table C.5 in Appendix C we see that high fractionalisation has a significant negative effect on 
good governance and thus an indirect effect on growth in the 1990s. 
Furthermore, if the impact of ethnic fractionalisation is differing in the four decades, it might 
also differ between regions. The sample is therefore divided into two subgroups. As we do not 
have sufficient numbers of observations to analyse the model for Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin 
America separately, we combined both to one group including 85 countries. We compare this 
with "the rest of the world" including 75 OECD, Asian and some Arabic countries. The results 
are shown in Table 3.5. Strikingly, the results differ very much between the two sub-groups. 
Considering Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, the impact of the variable measuring ethnic 
Many observations are lost when including the governance index. We therefore ran the model without the 
governance variable for the same numbers of observation. Nothing changes. Ethnic fractionaJisation remains 
significant in explaining growth. 
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Table 3.4: Decade Specific Growth Regression. 
Dependent Variable: Growth rate for noted decades 
Variable 1960 1970 1980 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dummy for the 1960s -0,3644* -0,2611 
(-1,72) (-0,93) 
Dummy for the 1970s -0,4914** -0,4296** 
(-2,76) (-1,98) 
Dummy for the 1980s -0,2014 -0,1880 
(-1,61) (-1,44) 
Dummy for the 1990s 
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa -0,0148 -0,0198* -0,0092 -0,0066 -0,0105 -0,0123 
(-1,35) (-1,68) (-1,22) (-0,88) (-1,62) (-1,77) 
Dummy for Latin America & Caribbean -0,0206*** -0,0245*** -0,0154*** -0,0155*** -0,0296*** -0,0210*** 
(-3,10) (-3,04) (-2,49) (-2,28) (-5,59) (-3,63) 
Log of initial income 0,1064* 0,0899 0,1431 *** 0,1454*** 0,0549* 0,0643 
(1,91) (1,25) (3,10) (2,70) (1,72) (1,95) 
Log of initial income squared -0,0074* -0,0070 -0,0098** -0,0119*** -0,0036* -0,0053*** 
(-2,01) (-1,50) (-3,25) (-3,40) (-1,74) (-2,43) 
Log of schooling 0,0174** 0,0127 0,0152** 0,0058 0,0118* 0,0040 
(1,96) (1,25) (2,10) (0,76) (1,74) (0,47) 
Assassinations 51,937 -17,867 -14,798 
(0,87) (-1,06) (-1,33) 
Financial Depth -0,0003 0,0054 0,0145 
(-0,03) (0,48) (1,63) 
Black Market Premium -0,0180 -0,0286*** -0,0085 
(-1,07) (-2,75) (-1,54) 
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0,0724 0,1988*** 0,1339*** 
(0,56) (2,82) (3,33) 
Log of telephones per people 0,0117 0,0395*** 0,0212** 
(0,84) (3,89) (2,05) 
Ethnic -0,0069 0,0008 -0,0256*** 0,0048 -0,0153* -0,0008 
(-0,54) (0,06) (-2,35) (0,41) (-1,66) (-0,08) 
No. Obs. 38 38 88 67 94 74 
Adj R2 0,23 0,37 0,28 0,62 0,38 0,59 
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Table 3.5: Sub-Saharan African and Latin American Results. 
Growth Rate 1960-1999 
Variable Africa and Latinam Rest of the World 
(1) (2) (3) ( 4) 
Dummy for the 1960s 0.127 -0.037 -0.249*** 0.006 
(1.2) (-0.30) (-2.58) (0.05) 
Dummy for the 1970s 0.125 -0.033 -0.249*** 0.008 
(1.17) (-0.27) (-2.58) (0.06) 
Dummy for the 1980s 0.099 -0.053 -0.262*** -0.005 
(0.93) (-0.43) (-2.72) (-0.04) 
Dummy for the 1990s 0.12 -0.054 -0.256*** 0.004 
(1.03) (-0.44) (-2.68) (0.03) 
Log of initial income -0.026 0.03 0.076*** 0.026 
(-0.93) (0.94) (3.21) (0.86) 
Log of initial income squared 0.002 -0.003 -0.005*** -0.004** 
(0.81) (-1.50) (-3.63) (-2.06) 
Log of schooling 0.011 ** -0.004 0.011 ** 0.008 
(1.98) (0.54) (2.25) (1.54) 
Assassinations -24.819*** -16.353 
(-2.57) (-0.76) 
Financial Depth 0.036*** 0.01* 
(2.33) (1.84) 
Black Market Premium -0.015*** -0.018*** 
(-2.82) (-2.87) 
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.113*** 0.083* 
(2.84) (1.95) 
Log of telephones per people 0.022*** 0.026*** 
(2.48) (3.26) 
Ethnic -0.014* -0.016* -0.019*** -0.001 
(-1.81) (-1.77) (-2.52) (-0.063) 
No. Obs. 181 105 175 114 
Adj R2 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.39 
Source: Own Calculations. Note: t-stats in parentheses *0.1, **0.05, ***0.01 Significance level. 
fractionalisation, however, remains significant only at the 10 percent level after the inclusion of 
the policy variables. Contrarily, in the "rest of the world" the hypothesis of Alesina et al. and 
Easterly and Levine seems to explain the growth differences between countries rather well. Inef-
ficient policies and low public good provision explain the diverging growth trends due to ethnic 
fractionalisation. In these regions it seems to be indeed the case that the transmission channel of 
high ethnic fractionalisation and its negative impact on growth can be explained by an adverse 
policy environment alone. Thus, the obtained results show that the negative impact of ethnic 
fractionalisation on growth above and beyond the policy control variables prevails only in the 
1990s and in the regions of Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. 
The above approach, however, faces the problem that few observations remain when restrict-
ing the sample to Sub-Saharan and Latin-American countries. In order to verify the findings 
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we included an interaction term for ethnic fractionalisation in Sub-Saharan Africa. The results 
clearly show that the remaining negative impact of ethnic fractionalisation on economic growth 
is captured in the last interaction term for ethnic fractionalisation in Sub-Saharan Africa in 
the regression presented in Table 3.6.9 The variable "ethnic" which captures the residual effect 
of ethnic fractionalisation in general, is no longer statistically significant. The overall effect of 
the interaction term is on average -0.03210 , which implies that the inclusion of the policy vari-
ables did not change the negative impact of ethnic fractionalisation on growth for Sub-Saharan 
African countries. These results confirm the hypothesis that the remaining negative impact of 
ethnic fractionalisation on growth, even after the inclusion of policy variables, is in particular a 
Sub-Saharan phenomenon. 
Given the above results, we wanted to test for the hypothesis that violent civil conflicts could 
explain this decade and region specific effect of ethnic fractionalisation as existing research found 
already robust evidence that ethnic polarisation explains civil conflict (Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol, 2005) .11 This hypothesis is conceivable as conflict incidences increased substantially 
between the 1960s and the 1990s and are concentrated in particular in countries of Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Latin America, as confirmed by the Prio Database of the International Peace Research 
Institute Oslo. 12 However, our empirical results cannot support the hypothesis above because 
the influence of the violent conflict variables on growth is not significantly different from zero and 
the variable "ethnic" does not lose significance.13 Thus, at least the variable specifications we 
used for violent civil conflicts cannot explain the remaining sizable negative effect of the ethnic 
fractionalisation variable on growth after the inclusion of policy variables in the 1990s or for Sub-
Saharan Africa and Latin America. Again the effect of ethnic fractionalisation in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is mitigated by the inclusion of governance in the restricted SUR model. The results are 





We also tested for a Latin American*Ethnic interaction term, however, there was no specific Latin American 
impact. 
Which is the coefficient of the interaction term multiplied by the average ethnic fractionalisation in SSA 
(-0.049*0.658). However, this effect should be possibly interpreted jointly with the SSA effect, which is 
now positive, but is just below the 10 percent significance level(p-value = 0.1079). Then the overall effect 
becomes -0.017 of ethnic fragmentation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Also generally interesting to note that the 
SSA dummy is almost statistically significantly positive which would imply a stronger than average growth 
in SSA once the effect of ethnic fractionalisation is accounted for. 
Even though civil conflict is better explained by ethnic polarisation than by ethnic fractionalisation those two 
concepts are sufficiently correlated to control empirically if the inclusion of a violent conflict variables renders 
the impact of the ethnic fractionalisation variable above and beyond the inclusion of the policy variables on 
growth to insignificance. 
Prio Database of the International Peace Research Institute Oslo, www.prio.no. The database reports the 
crude measure of numbers of conflicts as follows: 82 incidences of violent conflict beginning in the 1960s 
(34 of which took place in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America), 87 in the1970s (33 of which took place 
in SSA and LA), 102 in the 1980s (30 of which took place in SSA and LA), jumping to 172 incidences at 
the beginning of the 1990s in the whole world (77 of which took place in SSA and LA). Even though this 
measure holds no information concerning the intensity and duration of violent conflict it confirms the sheer 
fact that the incidences of civil conflict has increased dramatically in the 1990s and that they were mostly 
concentrated in Sub-Saharan and Latin America. 
The results are not reported here. Data is from the Prio Database. Multiple definitions of violent civil 
conflicts were tested: minor-, intermediate civil conflict, civil war (internal and internationalised internal) 
and frequency in a decade. None of this specifications produced significant results. 
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Table 3.6: 1990s and SSA Effect. 
Growth Rate 1960-1999 
Variable 
Dummy for the 1960s 0.029 
(0.38) 
Dummy for the 1970s 0.032 
(0.41) 
Dummy for the 1980s 0.015 
(0.19) 
Dummy for the 1990s 0.017 
(0.23) 
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa 0.015 
(1.61) 
Dummy for Latin America & Caribbean -0.014*** 
(-4.39) 
Log of initial income 0.015 
(0.80) 
Log of initial income squared -0.002** 
(-2.04) 




Financial Depth 0.011** 
(2.31) 
Black Market Premium -0.016*** 
(-4.30) 
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.105*** 
(3.85) 




Ethnic x SSA -0.049*** 
(-3.40) 
No. Obs. 257 
Adj R2 0.53 
Source: Own Calculations. Note: t-stats in parentheses •0.1, **0.05, ***0.01 Significance level. 
To sum up, we find a remaining direct negative effect of fractionalisation on growth in 
the 1990s and in Sub-Saharan Africa. The specific 1990s and Sub-Saharan Africa effect of frac-
tionalisation can be explained by bad governance and the consequential growth-hampering effect. 
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Table 3.7: SSA Effect including Investment and the Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton- Index. 
Growth Rate 1960-1999 
Variable 
Dummy for the 1960s -0,055 -0,124* 
(-0,83) (-0,17) 
Dummy for the 1970s -0,057 -0,124* 
(-0,86) (-1,67) 
Dummy for the 1980s -0,077 -0,140* 
(-1,16) (-1,88) 
Dummy for the 1990s -0,070 -0,126* 
(-1,05) (-1,71) 
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa 0,007 -0,004 
(0,81) (-0,28) 
Dummy for Latin America & Caribbean -0,015*** -0,016*** 
(-4,72) (-4,93) 
Log of initial income 0,026 0,048*** 
(1,53) (2,58) 
Log of initial income squared -l',002** -0,004*** 
(-1,84) (-3,15) 
Log of schooling 0,011*** 0,004 
(2,96) (0,85) 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton- Index 0,012*** 
(4,08) 
Ethnic -0,012* 0,004 
(-1,83) (0,67) 
Ethnic x SSA -0,029** -0,027 
(-2,26) (-1,31) 
No. Obs. 356 282 
Adj R2 0,36 0,40 
Source: Own Calculations. Note: t-stats in parentheses *0.1, **0.05, ***0.01 Significance level. 
3.5.2 Migration and Ethnic Fractionalisation 
The second aim of this paper is to reconcile the two theoretical arguments of the different effects 
of fractionalisation and immigration on growth presented in the first part of this paper. So far 
we have argued empirically that fractionalisation of groups is problematic as it leads to conflicts 
of a political nature, hampering growth. Now, we hypothesize that countries in which ethnic 
fractionalisation partially emerged because of settlers should also experience positive effects due 
to diversity and not only negative effects. We do not argue that in immigration countries models 
which explain inefficient policies and low public good provision due to ethnic fractionalisation 
are no longer valid. We rather investigate whether positive effects of immigration also prevail 
and which effect dominates in a cross-country setting. Before turning to our empirical analysis 
of this issue, we would like to highlight some of our constraints in testing the hypothesis. First 
of all, to draw a clear definition of what constitutes an "immigration country", is less straight-
forward for our purpose. Secondly, the theory of co-ethnic networks is only tested superficially 
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in our setting. Usually, the theory on co-ethnic networks is tested by analysing the relationship 
between the inflow of migrants and trade, using panel data. Ethnic fractionalisation, however, is 
time-invariable and the networks we look at have been in existence since a long time. Clearly, it 
would be interesting to have a measure of ethnic fractionalisation which varies over time, how-
ever, to construct such a matter is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Utilising the new dataset, we tested whether there is a distinguished effect of ethnic fraction-
alisation on economic performance in countries which are ethnically diverse partly due to foreign 
settlement. The argument being that those countries which display high ethnic diversity, partly 
due to foreign settlement, might be capable to reap the benefits of such an increased diversity 
via increased trade. Our results indicate that our hypothesis is validated to some extent (see 
Table 3.8). Countries created by foreign settlement 14 seem to exhibit positive effects of ethnic 
fractionalisation on subsequent growth. The coefficient of the interaction-term implies that the 
negative effect of ethnic diversity on long-run growth is more than mitigated. There is small pos-
itive net-effect in countries whose inhabitants are to a majority descendants of foreign settlers. 
If the policy variables which measure the quality of governmental policy are taken into account, 
the interaction-term and dummy become insignificant. 
However, we caution against over-valuing this result. This is mainly due to the fact that only 
very few countries can be considered here and therefore the result depends much on the inclusion 
of particular countries. These results leave the question of the channels through which ethnic 
fractionalisation in immigration countries has an influence on long-run growth. It might be that 
immigration countries are especially exposed to conflicts over scarce resources in the political 
sphere and therefore inefficient policies that subsequently affect long-run growth negatively. We 
ran simple regressions using all policy variables. Interestingly, the settler country dummy shows 
a different, in fact positive significant correlation, with the quality of policy as confirmed by 
other research and probably due to the fact that settlers transferred their institutions. 15 
It is of interest to investigate further whether a growth-enhancing effect of high ethnic frac-
tionalisation via a trade channel prevails in immigration countries. Trade, that is exports and 
imports as a share of GDP, increased dramatically between the 1960s and 1990s in most countries. 
Furthermore, the variation of trade between countries changed.16 We find no evidence of a pos-
itive relationship between ethnic diversity and trade in our settler countries. Ethnic diversity in 
settler countries is no significant determinant of foreign direct investments or exports. 17 To con-
clude this section, we find clear evidence that ethnic fractionalisation in "immigration countries" 





Our definition is that a country is classified as an immigration country if it was partly created by settlement 
from abroad, -forced or free, within the past 300 years and the descendants of foreign settlers constitute the 
significant part of the population today. 
This is also in line with the findings of Acemoglu et al.(2001).(The results are not reported here.) 
Both patterns of change can not be explained by the variable 'ethnic fractionalisation' as we assume it to 
be constant over the 40 year horizon. Furthermore the index would also change very slowly in response to 
migration. 
Results are not reported here, but are available on request. 
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Table 3.8: Past Settlement, Ethnic Fractionalisation and Growth. 
Growth rate 1960-1999 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Dummy for the 1960s 0,032 0,033 0,058 
(0,48) (0,49) (0,71) 
Dummy for the 1970s 0,030 0,032 0,061 
(0,45) (0,48) (0,76) 
Dummy for the 1980s 0,009 0,011 0,043 
(0,13) (0,17) (0,53) 
Dummy for the 1990s 0,016 0,018 0,045 
(0,24) (0,27) (0,55) 
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa 0,001 -0,001 -0,003 
(0,17) (-0,11) (-0,50) 
Log of initial income 0,021 0,021 0,Ql8 
( 1,28) (1,25) (0,92) 
Log of initial income squared -0,002* -0,002* -0,002 
(-1,88) (-1,87) (-2,04) 
Dependency Ratio -0,056*** -0,052*** -0,042** 
(-5,04) (-4,63) (-3,47) 
Log of schooling 0,006 0,006 0,000 
(1,57) ( 1,40) (0,00) 
Assassinations -3,421*** -2,757*** 
(-3,47) (-3,00) 
Financial Depth 0,015*** 
(2,86) 
Black Market Premium -0,016*** 
(-4,06) 
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0,101 *** 
(3,51) 
Log of telephones per people 0,014** 
(2,38) 
Ethnic -0,031 *** -0,033*** -0,022*** 
(-4,01) (-4,22) (-2,60) 
Settler Dummy -0,016*** -0,015*** -0,010 
(-2,70) (-2,44) (-1,52) 
Settler*Ethnic 0,039*** 0,040*** 0,026* 
(2,97) (3,02) (1,92) 
No. Obs. 356 349 257 
Adj R2 0,37 0,39 0,50 
Source: Own Calculations. Note: t-stats in parentheses *O. l, **0.05, ***0.01 Significance level. 
Note also that the Latinam Dummy is left out because it is highly correlated with the Settler Dummy. 
3.6 Conclusion and Future Research Questions 
In the end, it seems clear that the negative impact of ethnic fractionalisation on growth remains 
significant and robust for Sub-Saharan Africa if we include the 1990s in our empirical analysis 
following the Alesina et al model. Interestingly, the transmission channels which explained how 
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ethnic fractionalisation negatively affects growth, namely via the policy variables specified, is 
less prominent in the extended analysis, as ethnic fractionalisation remains a significant nega-
tive explanatory power in the growth regression for Sub-Saharan African countries even after 
the inclusion of the policy variables. Thus, the negative impact of ethnic fractionalisation on 
economic growth cannot fully be explained and there might be some other transmission channels 
which link high ethnic fractionalisation to poor growth performance than the ones investigated 
and specified so far. In particular, the different results of the different regions in the world sug-
gest that Sub-Saharan Africa does not only face an adverse policy environment, but that high 
ethnic fractionalisation remains an obstacle to growth, especially in the 1990s. We tried two 
different channels to explain this increased negative impact of ethnic fractionalisation on growth 
in the Sub-Saharan African setting of the 1990s, namely, a increased role of good governance as 
measured by the KKZ indicator and an increased number of violent conflicts. We managed to 
show that this increased negative impact of ethnic fractionalisation in the 1990s in Sub-Saharan 
Africa can be explained by the KKZ index which is a different measure of governance quality and 
confirms the hypothesis of growing importance of sound governance to facilitate growth. How-
ever, we could not confirm the hypothesis that an increasing number of incidences and severity 
of violent civil conflicts could explain the remaining negative impact of ethnic fractionalisation 
above and beyond the policy control variables. 
Moreover, as already mentioned above, there might be a further conceivable transmission 
channel of high ethnic fractionalisation on growth, namely income inequality and especially seg-
regation. Especially, if one considers a longer time span, very high income inequality, which might 
be a result of high ethnic fractionalisation and segregation in connection with badly designed 
institutions, might lead to a reduction in growth via the suboptimal provision and accumulation 
of factors of production, such as physical and human capital. This explanation gains validity 
especially in countries with imperfect markets. Even more interesting would be a measure for 
income inequality between ethnic groups. A further inquiry into this matter seems very much 
worthwhile, but rather difficult to facilitate due to the limitation of useable data sources. 
Concerning migration, ethnic fractionalisation and growth, this paper suggests that there is 
a mitigating positive impact in countries which are characterised as settler countries. This gives 
some empirical validation to the co-ethnic network theory in a cross-country setting. Promising 
future research in this field should focus on the network enhancing trade effect of immigration in 
a country cross-section framework, in order to strengthen the argument above and confirm the 
case studies' findings on co-ethnic network theory in a wider setting. However, given the data 
availability it might be difficult to prove the point empirically. 
In conclusion, this paper confirms and strengthens the initial assessment that ethnic fraction-
alisation is one of the key proxys for a negative policy environment and subsequent poor growth 
performance. However, it also illustrates that our understanding of the impact of ethnic fraction-
alisation on growth is far from complete, other dimensions and transmission channels of ethnic 
fractionalisation on growth, in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa, seem to be present, namely, bad 
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governance. Moreover, in settler countries ethnic fractionalisation is not necessarily a "problem", 
but possibly a growth enhancing situation via co-ethnic trade networks. Furthermore, we put 
emphasis on the findings by Easterly (2001) which show that democratic institutions and low 
inequality can resolve ethnic conflict in the political sphere. Thus, countries with high ethnic 
fractionalisation and a strong income-divide between groups face the danger, but not necessarily 
the consequences of growth retardation. Hence, the challenge ahead, in particular in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, is the full participation of all ethnic groups in the economic development process and the 
blurring of ethnic ties, which might be a way to overcome this serious obstacle in many develop-
ing countries. 
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Chapter 4 
Pathways out of Poverty in Indonesia 
4.1 Introduction 
With the development community dedicated to meeting the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), policy research has begun to focus on rigorous testing of models that explain MDG 
outcomes. Most basic, of course, is the goal to reduce poverty and hunger by half. Many "narra-
tive" pathways out of poverty exist, but there are few quantitative models that have been tested 
over significant historical periods. One reason for this shortage of empirical results is a simple 
lack of data. 
However, the number of panel data sets is growing and empirical pathways out of poverty are 
now being described. We contribute to this effort by empirically analysing the pathways out of 
poverty in Indonesia during a period of economic and political turmoil. Since most poor people 
live in rural areas, special attention is devoted to rural pathways out of poverty. The generally 
positive results, even during this difficult period, hold broader promise for achievement of the 
MDGs. 
Most of the world's poor live in rural areas and are primarily engaged in low productivity, 
mainly agricultural, activities. Thus, the main pathway out of poverty will be connected to in-
creases in the productivity of the rural poor, whether these increases are realised in farming, rural 
non-farm enterprises, by rural-urban migration or a combination of all of the afore. One strand 
of recent and past literature argues that from an empirical perspective growth originating in the 
agricultural sector has tended to be more "pro-poor" than growth originating in the industrial 
or service sectors (Mellor, 1976; Ravallion and Datt, 1996; Ravallion and Chen, 2004; Timmer, 
2002). Indeed, agricultural growth has often been an important ingredient in the formula that 
connects economic growth to the poor (Ravallion and Huppi, 1991; Ravallion and Datt, 1996; 
Ravallion and Chen, 2004; Sumarto and Suryahadi, 2003; Fan, Zhang and Zhang, 2004; Fan, 
Thorat and Rao, 2004; Timmer, 1997, 2004) and separate reviews by Thirtle, et al. (2003) 
based on joint work with Neil McCulloch and C. Peter Timmer. Conceptualised as academic background 
paper for the Indonesian Poverty Assessment during a three month stay at the World Bank Office, Jakarta, 
Indonesia, Summer 2005. 
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and by Majid (2004) confirm the strong empirical link between higher agricultural productivity 
and poverty reduction. Moreover, the current interest in this topic is well documented by the 
forthcoming World Development Report "Agriculture for Development" (2008). 
However, an equally important and connected debate is concerned with the role of rural 
non-farm activities in rural income growth and rapid poverty alleviation. This is particularly 
true, as in most developing countries rural non-farm output is now accounting for roughly half of 
rural income. Non-farm activities can be most conducive towards poverty reduction, especially 
in the absence of physical infrastructure and human capital constraints (Datt and Ravallion, 
1996, 1998a&b, 2002a). Moreover, rural non-farm enterprises are likely to be pro-poor, as they 
tend to use factors of production at their real opportunity costs to the economy, so that they 
are often labour-intensive in nature, reduce underemployment, help to smooth income seasonally 
and bid up local wages (Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 2001). 
These papers on rural poverty reduction are part of a broader literature which attempts to 
understand the nature of pro-poor growth, which inevitably must encompass the rural poor and 
their potential pathways out of poverty (Ravallion 2004, World Bank, 2004a, 2006b). Thus, 
they try to identify whether agriculture productivity is the main driver behind rural poverty 
alleviation. Moreover, do non-farm enterprises encompass predominantly low productivity, sup-
plementary and insurance activities or are they a potential source of dynamic growth and poverty 
alleviation in rural areas? Most of the above papers suggests that productivity gains in both, 
agriculture and non-farm activities, matter. Furthermore, the rural non-farm activities seem to 
fulfil both important functions, namely, supplementary insurance activity and source of rural 
productivity growth. 
However, whether the farm or the non-farm sector has been the most important pathway 
out of poverty is ultimately an empirical question, as is the relative importance of inter-sectoral 
transitions and rural-urban migration. The answer for any given country depends both on its 
factor endowments as well as on its policy and institutional history. We therefore explore the 
empirical evidence concerning the pathways out of poverty for Indonesia over the last decade. 
Indonesia provides an interesting case study for several reasons. First, between the late 1960s 
and the mid-1990s it experienced high and sustained economic growth, pulling millions of people 
out of poverty, followed by a severely felt, but rather short, financial crisis in the late 1990s 
which hit Jakarta the most and was a period of economic hardship for many. Second, Indonesia 
is large enough to display spatial and sectoral diversity, as reflected in the large-scale household 
panel dataset - the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS), which allows a detailed investigation 
of the characteristics of households that move in and out of poverty. This paper draws on this 
Indonesian experience by using the panel household survey data from IFLS to assess the impor-
tance of changes in sector and location in driving changes in individual incomes and household 
poverty over time. We find that urbanisation has been rapid, but only a small part is due to 
actual physical migration of workers and households while most of it is due to local economic 
agglomeration and subsequent re-classification of former rural areas. In rural areas, a gradual di-
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versification of economic activities is talcing place, characterised by greater reliance on non-farm 
sources of income. This process of rural diversification reflects greater opportunities for growth 
in a dynamic non-farm economy than in agriculture per se, although increases in agricultural 
productivity have remained a very important path out of poverty for the poorest. Moreover, 
rural non-farm activities can be a stepping stone out of poverty in rural areas and towards urban 
non-farm employment, which in turn, is the least vulnerable sector regarding poverty transition. 
Concerning the determinants of income and poverty change our analysis yields broad sup-
port for the idea that movement to the non-farm sector increases income growth and makes 
an exit from poverty more likely. Understandably, less support is gathered for the importance 
of migration, although local level migration does appear to boost income growth, particularly 
for the poorest, while longer range district and provincial movements are associated with an 
increased chance of exiting poverty. Furthermore, age, sex and education all have a strong pos-
itive influence on income growth, whereas certain elements of the demographic composition of 
the household, most notably the household size and the number of young children have a neg-
ative effect. Poor schooling and large household size are also key barriers to exiting poverty, 
additionally a broader range of individual and demographic characteristics contribute towards 
income vulnerability. Moreover, geographic aspects matter. The crisis hit people in urban areas 
harder than those in rural areas. As a result, our analysis shows that being in an urban area 
substantially reduces the probability of exiting poverty once controlling for other factors. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 describes the conceptual framework, the data 
and the poverty line, in addition, it reports the descriptive IFLS statistics. Moreover, Section 
4.3 provides a decomposition of income growth and poverty transition according to sector and 
location utilising transition matrices. Furthermore, Section 4.4 analyses the micro-determinants 
of income and poverty changes using the IFLS panel data and estimates our "naive" pathways 
out of poverty model, before we conclude with implications for policy in the final section. 
4.2 Conceptualisation and Methodological Issues 
4.2.1 Conceptualisation and the "Naive" Model 
Since the early works of Lewis (1954) one of the main questions in development economics has 
been the nature of the "structural transformation", that talces place as countries develop, and 
how it influences growth and poverty reduction in the long-term. More recently, a theoretical 
model by Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) models the rural economy as a three-sector economy en-
compassing agriculture, non-farm non-tradable goods and services and non-farm tradable goods. 
Income growth is realised in two main ways: either by the increase in agricultural productivity 
due to technological change or by increasing urban or world demand for manufactured goods pro-
duced in rural areas. So both sources of productivity growth, agriculture and increased non-farm 
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Figure 4.1: Pathways out of Poverty 
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activities, can raise income and alleviate poverty. Correspondingly, Figure 4.1 presents our sim-
ple conceptual framework for how structural transformation translates into poverty reduction. 1 
We use this framework for our later empirical work. There are arguably two simplified pathways 
out of poverty. Firstly, there is the move from low to high productivity farming (Pathway 1). 
This includes both intensification through raising productivity of traditional crops, as well as di-
versification into higher value crops, whether food or non-food. This pathway also includes those 
individuals who exit poverty by obtaining better paid employment on higher productivity com-
mercial farms. Thus, staying in agriculture does not necessarily mean staying as a self-employed 
farmer. Secondly, some people exit poverty because of increases in the productivity and prof-
itability of their non-farm enterprises, or by finding better-paid employment in such enterprises 
(often more formal) owned by others (Pathway 2). This pathway applies to both rural and urban 
non-farm activities. 
Complementing these two pathways, there are two "transition phases" which individuals 
may go through to reach the second route out of poverty. The first is a shift out of subsistence 
However, it is a "naive" model in the sense that it does not specify any functional interactive relationship 
between different sectors and is not corresponding to the algebraic theoretical framework of the Foster and 
Rosenzweig model. Moreover, we consider the non-farm sector to encompass all non-farm activities, not only 
the manufacturing sector. 
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agriculture towards petty trading and manufacturing, as well as local non-tradable service pro-
vision (Transition Path A). This corresponds to the long-term sectoral shift from agriculture 
to non-agricultural activities as countries develop. Similarly, rural-urban migration, which can 
come both from households currently engaged in low-productivity agriculture and those cur-
rently engaged in petty trade, manufacturing and services, corresponds to the shift in location 
of economic activity seen during the structural transformation (Transition Path B). Before we 
analysis the determinants of income and poverty change and estimate our simplified "naive" 
model, as shown in Figure 4.1 in Section 4.4, a detailed analysis of the descriptive statistics is 
highly informative. 
4.2.2 Data 
To explore the microeconomic determinants of exiting poverty requires a panel data set over a 
reasonable length of time. There are two large national household surveys in Indonesia SUSE-
N AS and IFLS. The SUSENAS data set is the official national representative Indonesian socio-
economic household dataset, which has a slightly better coverage, but lacks panel data structure. 2 
Hence, we decided to use the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS), which has a panel data struc-
ture and was first conducted in 1993 (IFLSl) and then again in 1997 (IFLS2), 1998 (IFLS2+) 
and finally in 2000 (IFLS3). For IFLSl, 7,224 households were interviewed with data collected 
on 22,000 individuals in those households. This sample is representative of about 83 percent 
of the Indonesian population in 13 provinces. In 1993, IFLS did a face-to-face interview with 
the household head, the spouse, a sample of their children and a sample of other household 
members. In 1997, 94 percent of IFLSl households were re-interviewed consisting of all 1993 
"main" respondents and all 1993 household members born before 1967.3 In 2000, IFLS managed 
to re-contact 95.3 percent of IFLSl households interviewed: all 1993 "main" respondents, all 
1993 household members born before 1967 and a sample of other 1993 household members. The 
sample size in 2000 was 10,400 households and 39,000 individuals. 
Our main aim is to understand to what extent sectoral and locational shifts determine pro-
ductivity /income change and thus movements out of poverty. For this reason, we restrict the 
panel used for our analysis to the individuals who were between the ages of 15 and 55 in 1993 
and were working in both years. For these individuals we have an estimate of their income and 
household expenditure,4 individual, household and community characteristics, as well as whether 
they shifted the sector of employment and if they moved location. Hence, we have a highly de-
Panel structure was implemented after 2004. Nevertheless, the SUSEN AS data is useful as a general cross-
reference to benchmark our findings from the IFLS and will be cited as such. 
Unfortunately, the 1997 data on sectoral employment and migration were not published - thus for our analysis 
we will use only data from 1993 and 2000. 
The IFLS collected data on individual income. This is calculated as the sum of gross profit, net profit, 
and wages. Combining these sources attributes too much income to individuals since, for some households, 
multiple members will contribute toward the profits from a household enterprise. We therefore tested for the 
possible biases which this might generate, by estimating our regressions only for individual income sources 
(wages, net profits, gross profits) to test the robustness of the results. However, the main findings were not 
altered substantially. The results are available on request. 
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tailed panel dataset with the required information for a representative sample of the working 
population in 1993. 
There are two main caveats associated with our choice of sample. First, the sample used for 
the analysis does not account for the unemployed or for newcomers to the labour market after 
1993. Thus, if a key pathway out of poverty is the entrance into the labour force of people who 
were out of the labour force in 1993, we will not capture this effect. Similarly, if individuals fall 
into poverty as a result of leaving the labour force (for example through death, illness or old 
age) this will not be observed. If the aim of our study had been to capture all poverty dynamics, 
these would have be serious omissions. However, our aim is to understand the extent to which 
changes in sector and location of existing workers drives poverty entrances and exits. Moreover, 
evidence from other developing countries suggests that, although entrances and exits from the 
labour force can be important, it is usually the changes in income status of existing working 
household members that drives most poverty entrance or exit (McCulloch and Cao, 2007). 
Second, we focus on the individual earnings of main household members. However, poverty 
is clearly a phenomenon that is experienced at the household level since, in most households, 
there is some pooling of resources. Thus, individuals were classified as poor or non-poor based 
on the per capita household expenditure of their households in the respective years. Hence, it 
is possible that the poverty transitions we observe may be due to changes in the incomes of 
household members that are not in our (or the IFLS) sample or simply change in household 
composition. However, although the IFLS sample did not interview every member of the house-
hold, the method used means that it is likely to have captured almost all the significant sources 
of income in the household. Moreover, the vast majority of individuals in our sample are the sole 
or main income earner of their household, so changes in their earnings are likely to have a much 
larger impact on poverty transitions than changes in the earnings of other household members.5 
In fact, the individual earnings used for the analysis account on average for 70 and 67 percent 
of their actual specific total household income in 1993 and 2000 respectively. The corresponding 
median is even higher at 74 and 77 percent. Thus, the individual earnings in our sample account 
on average for 70 percent of household income. With these caveats in mind, our sample seems 
adequate for exploring the questions asked. 
4.2.3 Poverty Line 
The poverty line used for all the analysis below is derived from the 2000 BPS poverty line.6 
For 1993 BPS also calculated a poverty line, but implemented a methodology which is rather 
different than that used for the calculation of the 2000 poverty line. 7 To ensure that the poverty 
Clearly, household composition and size matters if poverty is determined on a household level. However, we 
control for this effect in our regressions. 
This uses a variant of the Bidani and Ravallion {1993) methodology for calculating poverty lines. 
The BPS estimation methodology concerning the poverty line changed in 1996. 
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line in 1993 represents the same purchasing power as that in 2000, the easiest approach would 
be to take the 2000 poverty line and deflate it using the provincial consumer price index (CPI) 
published by BPS. However, the published CPI uses a set of weights for its sub-indices which 
are heavily weighted in favour of wealthy consumers in urban areas. 8 This bias in the CPI is 
particularly inappropriate for our analysis. In particular, since food prices rose more quickly 
than other prices over the period and the poor have a much higher share of their expenditure 
on food than the better off, the published CPI understates the inflation experienced by the poor 
over this period. When this downward-biased CPI is used as a deflator, it produces a poverty 
line that is too high in 1993 and implausibly high measured levels of poverty. For this reason we 
re-weighted the individual commodity group indices from the CPI published for each province 
using the expenditure shares for each commodity group of the bottom quintile in 1996. All sub-
sequently reported real figures are deflated utilising the method described above. This poverty 
line is applied to real per capita household expenditure in order to classify a household or the 
individual income earner as poor or non poor for both years respectively. 
4.3 Descriptive Analysis, Income & Poverty Transition Matrices 
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 shows some of the key variables from the panel for 1993 and 2000. For the individual 
variables, the average age of the panel obviously rose as did the years of schooling, indicating 
that some panel participants completed further schooling in the intervening years. Interesdngly, 
62 percent of individuals worked in the non-farm sector, and this share did not change over the 
period.9 The mean real individual income in the sample rose between 1993 and 2000 by 15.2 
percent. However, as is often the case with income data, the mean is distorted by high outliers-
the median income is a little more than half mean income in both years-but it also grew by a 
similar amount, 16.4 percent, over the 7 year period. Working hours remained roughly constant, 
while there was a small decline in the share of individuals who were employees. It is important to 
remember that this 7 year period experienced considerable economic and political turmoil, and 
the economy had not recovered fully from the 1998 crisis when the 2000 interviews were held. 
Concerning the household variables, a substantial increase of 8 percent occurred in the share 
of households classified as living in urban areas between the two years. In 1993, 32 percent of 
respondents lived in urban areas. In 2000, 40 percent lived in urban areas. However, this large 
change in only 7 years is partly misleading and can hardly be reconciled with the also occurring 
"reverse migration II of several million urban workers to rural areas during the economic crisis 
For example, the CPI share on food is 38 percent but the food share of the bottom quintile from SUSENAS 
is 66 percent. A detailed discussion of this general problem is to be found in Grimm and Giinther (2006). 
However, there were significant changes in sub-sectors. The share of respondents in manufacturing declined 
from 14.3 percent to 10.8 percent, whereas those working in social services rose from 13.6 percent to 19.6 
percent. These changes reflect the impact of the crisis and the growing informal service economy. 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for IFLS 1993 and 2000 
Variable Mean in 1993 Median in 1993 Mean in 2000 Median in 2000 
N=4797 
Individual Variables 
Age 37.3 37 45.2 45 
Years of Schooling 5.7 6 6.2 6 
Non-farm 0.62 1 0.62 1 
Real individual income 179,746 93,145 207,021 108,453 
Working hours per month 213.5 207.8 211.7 207.8 
Employee dummy 0.47 0 0.44 0 
Household Variables 
Urban 0.32 0 0.4 0 
Household Size 4.83 5 5.81 6 
Number of children below 5 0.7 1 0.47 0 
Number of children below 15 1.16 1 1.06 1 
Sex of household head 0.91 1 0.92 1 
Real household expenditure pc 78,956 50,276 80,944 55,673 
Expenditure Poverty 0.28 0 0.24 0 .. - ......... ~----· ---- . ---- ... . . 
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in 1998 and thus overestimates "true" rural-urban migration. One explanation for this large 
increase in the percentage of people in urban areas is the reclassification of rural villages as 
urban over the observation period, as at least 3.26 percent of individuals had been reclassified as 
urban by 2000 without moving location.10 Thus, we used the rural/urban classification in 1993 
to determine rural/urban status throughout our analysis in order to avoid the confusion between 
re-classification (possibly even due to successful non-farm development) and true rural-urban 
migration. 
Demographic changes are also clearly illustrated: the average household size increases by 
one over the period of the panel with a shift towards more adults in the typical household as 
the children grow up. Households remain overwhelmingly male-headed in both periods. The 
growth in individual incomes of the panel members is not reflected in similarly high growth in 
the per capita expenditures of the households from which they come, which is most likely due to 
increased household size. Mean real expenditure barely rose over the period, but what growth 
there was took place at the bottom end of the distribution, with the median per capita expendi-
ture rising by 10. 7 percent. This most likely implies that wealthier households were more willing 
and/or capable to incorporate another household member during times of crisis. However, as a 
result of the steepness of the distribution near the poverty line this relatively modest increase in 
the per capita expenditure of the bottom percentiles resulted in a significant fall in poverty from 
27.7 percent to 23.6 percent. 11 
4.3.2 Income Growth 
Before we take a closer look at the determinants of income change and poverty transition it is 
highly informative to take a closer look at income and poverty transition matrices. With the 
IFLS panel it is possible to calculate directly the income growth for individuals who were working 
in particular sectors or locations. Table 4.2 is a transition matrix which shows the median income 
growth for individuals according to whether they lived in rural or urban areas and whether they 
10 
11 
We compared this results with the SUSENAS data which shows a even stronger trend in urbanisation. 
However, the re-classifications of rural areas as urban is even higher with the SUSENAS data (at least 10 
percent of rural villages). This is due to the fact that the definition of "urban" used by the Central Statistic 
Bureau relates to the number of amenities available in an administrative village, the population density 
and the share of income coming from agriculture. To get a sense of the role played by "true" rural-urban 
migration rather than urbanisation, Table D.l in Appendix D shows estimates obtained from the inter-censal 
survey (Supas) in 1995. Only 2.8 percent of those individuals in rural villages in 1990 were living in urban 
villages in 1995. Moreover, the 3.6 million people who moved to urban villages between these two years were 
compensated in part by 1.8 million people who moved from urban to rural villages over the same period. 
Overall, around 5 percent of those in urban areas in 1995 had been living in rural areas five years previously. 
Hence, role of 11 true 11 rural-urban migration is certainly not trivial, but overall, "urbanisation" rather than 
rural-urban migration has been the dominant factor in changing the percentage of people considered to live 
in urban areas. 
Note that the 2000 figure is similar to the official poverty figure from BPS for 2000, but the 1993 figure is 
much higher. This is because we are comparing "like with like" by expressing both the 2000 poverty line 
and the expenditure/income figures in 1996 prices. The official figure uses a poverty line with a completely 
different methodology, as noted earlier. 
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worked in agriculture or outside of agriculture in 1993 and 2000. For example, the first row, first 
column reports 48,470 real rupiahs median income of all 1,590 individuals which were classified 
as rural agriculture workers in 1993. The following columns show how these individuals' incomes 
developed according to the sectoral and locational transition and reports the percentage change 
of median income restricted to the individuals who ended up in that sector and location in 2000. 12 
Table 4.2 tells an intriguing story of how income and income growth is associated with sectoral 
transition and rural-urban migration. First, the dramatic impact of both urban location and 
work outside of agriculture is evident if we look at the first column reporting median income in 
1993: the median agricultural worker earns about half the income of the median worker working 
outside agriculture in both rural and urban areas; similarly the rural median worker (whether 
farm or non-farm) earns little more than half the income of the corresponding median worker in 
the same sector in urban areas. 
Moreover, Table 4.2 shows that the vast majority of rural farm workers in 1993 continued to 
be rural farm workers in 2000 and saw their real median incomes decline by 11 percent. Almost 
all of those who moved out of farming in rural areas did so by moving to non-farm activities 
in rural areas; these individuals saw their real median incomes rise by almost a third. Very 
few rural agricultural workers moved to urban areas, so we do not place any confidence in the 
income growth figures for these transitions. However, we note that real median income fell by 7 
percent between 1993 and 2000 for this poorest category of workers, with only those that shifted 
out of agriculture managing to increase their median incomes significantly. Workers who were 
already working outside agriculture in rural areas in 1993 were already much better off than their 
agricultural counterparts. Around 70 percent of these workers stayed in the same sector, seeing 
their median incomes rise by 11 percent over the period. However, more than a fifth of these 
workers moved into the agricultural sector and experienced a sharp reduction of their median 
real incomes as a result. By contrast, a small number managed to obtain non-farm work in urban 
areas. In fact, thL>se workers did not fare particularly well as their median incomes fell by 9.5 
percent, but it is worth noting that those that managed to migrate to non-farm jobs in urban 
areas started out with a median income almost 60 percent higher than the median income of 
rural non-farm workers in 1993. The handful of individuals who found work in the agricultural 
sector in urban areas saw their median incomes collapse, but again we treat this result with 
caution given the very small number of individuals involved. 
Furthermore, the majority of the richest group, urban non-farm workers, stayed in this cate-
gory and experienced a 7 percent fall in their real median income, probably associated with the 
economic crisis of the late 1990s. Moreover, 5 percent of this group shifted to urban agricultural 
activities and saw their median income fall by 32 percent. A further 5 percent shifted back into 
rural areas while staying in non-agricultural activities. This group saw its median income rise 
12 In this example individuals which were both rural farm workers in 1993 and 2000 saw their median real 
income decline by 11.2 percent, where as individuals which were originally rural farm workers but moved 
into rural non-farm work saw their median real income increase by 31.1 percent. 
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by 28 percent. 13 To sum up, three major themes emerge. First, for the poorest, who are mostly 
employed in rural agriculture, getting out of agriculture was the key to increasing their incomes. 
Only a handful of these individuals were able to migrate to urban areas, but almost a fifth left 
agriculture and in doing so substantially increased their incomes. Conversely, for those that had 
already left agriculture, moving back into agriculture was a sign of distress; all shifts back into 
agriculture from non-agricultural employment were associated with major income collapses, an 
outcome consistent with the drastic impact of the economic crisis. Second, most of those who 
migrated to non-farm jobs in urban areas were already doing non-agricultural jobs in rural areas 
and tended to be among the better off non-farm rural workers. But only 6 percent of rural non-
farm workers managed to move to urban areas - while almost a quarter fell back into agriculture. 
Third, movements from urban non-farm employment to rural non-farm employment appear not 
to be associated with distress. This suggests that these better off workers may move back to 
rural areas voluntarily for the purpose of investment in their home areas. 
4.3.3 Poverty Transitions 
The income growth table shows what happened to median incomes. But median income growth 
does not necessarily translate into movements out of poverty. To evaluate these movements, 
Table 4.3 shows a detailed poverty transition matrix between 1993 and 2000, disaggregated by 
rural and urban as well as agricultural and non-agriculture. The poverty of individuals is, of 
course, determined by the level of welfare of their whole households. We therefore determine the 
poverty status of individuals who were aged between 15 and 55 in 1993 and were earning income 
by whether the per capita expenditure of their households fell above or below the poverty line. 
Although the IFLS data are not entirely representative of the Indonesian population 14 , the 
5308 individuals tracked in Table 4.3 do represent basic Indonesian poverty patterns reasonably 
faithfully. Rural poverty made up 74.9 percent of total poverty in 1993 in the unweighted IFLS 
data, compared with 74.0 percent in the 1993 SUSENAS data. Analysis of how these 5308 in-
dividuals with income fared between 1993 and 2000 should provide very useful insights into the 
dynamics of poverty in Indonesia. 
The central cells of Figure 4.2 show the net flows in employment of all the individuals in 
the sample between the eight categories or sub-samples according to three characteristics ( ru-
ral/urban, non-farm/farm, poor/non-poor). Most of the employment dynamics in the IFLS data 
comes from employment gains in agriculture, with the rural, non-farm economy actually losing 
workers. There is a modest shift towards urban employment although in net more of that gain 
is in urban agriculture than in non-agriculture, which might reflect the impact of the economic 
crisis, which was still a major factor in 2000. 
13 
1• 
A handful of others shifted hack into rural agriculture - by coincidence all of these individuals report zero 
income in 2000, but once again we interpret this result with caution given the small numbers involved. 
Representative of about 83 percent of the Indonesian population in the 13 main provinces. 
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Table 4.2: Income Growth Transitions by Rural, Urban and Sector 1993-2000 
2000 
Rural Urban Total 
1993 Income NrObs Farm NrObs Nonfarm NrObs Farm NrObs Nonfarm :\lrObs 2000 
Rural Farm 48,470 1,590 40,660 1,268 78,519 274 22,305 31 107,177 17 44,868 
-11.20% 31.10% -56.40% 116.00% -7.40% 
Nonfarm 103,792 1,415 50,006 329 121,182 984 49,788 18 150,425 84 109,966 
-37.40% 11.00% -40.00% -9.50% 5.90% 
Urban Farm 90,049 293 101,827 52 118,379 15 79,019 143 93,485 83 92,595 
-15.40% -22.20% 4.00% 8.80% 2.80% 
Nonfarm 192,893 2,220 0 24 269,483 109 90,356 111 176,623 1,976 176,623 
-100.00% 28.30% -32.00% -6.70% -8.40% 
All 95,904 5,518 1,673 1,382 303 2,160 107,875 
---
Note: Data are for individuals who were aged 15-55 in 1993 and were working in both years. Income :figlire5 a"feIDOOi"a.Dni.Oiihly income ill-RUJ)iah in 1996 prices. 
Starting income figures are for 1993; all other income figures are for 2000. Income values and percentage changes in each ce11 represent the median incomes and 
percentage change in income of those individuals who made that transition. For example, the real income of the median rural agricultural worker that moved 
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Moreover, due to the panel structure of the IFLS data we can decompose these net flows 
and track the origin and destination (in terms rural/urban, non-farm/farm, poor/non-poor) of 
each individual in each category as reported in Table 4.3. The IFLS data reveals astonishing 
mobility of individuals across cells. Figure 4.2 displays two illustrative examples of two spe-
cific categories or sub-samples. The smaller top cells show the 2000 destination of the 1993 
rural/agricultural/poor and corresponds directly to the numbers in the top row of Table 4.3. 
The mobility out of rural, agricultural poverty between 1993 and 2000 is striking. Of the 713 
workers (13.4 percent of the total sample) who started in this category, 307 (5.78 percent of the 
total sample) exited poverty by improving their agricultural productivity and 68 exited poverty 
by moving to the rural non-agricultural sector (41 remained poor after this move). Only 21 poor 
rural farmers moved to urban areas. 
Correspondingly, the small bottom cells show the original category of those 577 individuals 
(or 10.9 percent of the entire sample) which ended up in the rural/agricultural/poor category in 
2000 and corresponds to the numbers in the second 2000 rural/poor/agri column in Table 4.3. 
They show that more than half (unsurprisingly the same 307 workers or 5.2 percent of the total 
as above) started out in this sub-sample, less than a third or 162 (3.05 percent of the total sam-
ple) fell into poverty remaining in the rural/ agricultural category, almost a quarter came from 
the rural non-farm category non-poor and poor, 69 and 61 individuals (1.15 and 1.3 percent of 
the total sample) respectively, while few came originally from the urban area. There are even 
4 individuals who were urban, non-poor and non-agricultural in 1993 who ended up as poor, 
rural and agricultural in 2000. This particular number is small, but clearly the economic crisis 
fostered great mobility in the workforce. 
Three key lessons emerge from this descriptive analysis of the IFLS data: 
Improved productivity in agriculture is still an important route out of poverty, 
as most of the rural agricultural poor in this sample who exit poverty do so while staying in rural 
agriculture. Over 80 percent of the poor rural farmers in the sample were still working in rural 
agriculture in 2000, but more than half of the households from which they come still managed 
to exit from poverty. Most of the rest moved into non-agricultural activities in rural areas and, 
more often than not, out of poverty too. Few moved to urban areas, thus, raising agricultural 
productivity seems to be an effective way of reaching these households. 15 
Rural non-agricultural activities can be a stepping stone out of poverty in rural 
areas, as individuals from poor rural households who worked off-farm in 1993 were more mo-
u We compared this results to the aggregate SUSENAS data as a benchmark exercise. However, it important to 
keep in mind that the IFLS sample is restricted and does not necessarily correspond exactly to the SUSENAS 
data as it does not include new labour force entries, is based on a slightly different sampling base and, most 
importantly, displays partly diverging methodology and variable definitions. Thus, if we compare these 
numbers reporting net employment flows between sectors, location and poverty status to similar, but not 
strictly comparable, aggregate numbers based on the SUSENAS data (reported in Appendix D Table D.2 and 
Figure D. l) we find that the IFLS dataset reports a lower percentage in the rural non-farm sector and displays 
a slight increase in the agricultural workforce compared to a decrease in the SUSENAS data. Unfortunately, 
the full reason for the diverging numbers is not entirely clear and must remain partly speculative and subject 
to future research. 
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Table 4.3: Poverty Transition Matrix, 1993 to 2000 
2000 
Poor Non-Poor 
Rural Urban Rural Urban 
1993 Individuals Agri Non Agri Agri Non Agri Agri Non Agri Agri Non Agri 
Poor Rural Agri 713 276 41 4 3 307 68 8 6 
Non Agri 375 69 68 7 10 51 151 1 18 
Urban Agri 69 2 0 25 9 3 4 14 12 
Non Agri 296 0 2 16 132 0 4 8 134 
Non Poor Rural Agri 1,053 162 38 3 0 648 174 19 9 
Non Agri 1,389 61 117 0 23 238 864 17 69 
Urban Agri 112 3 0 13 7 23 6 33 27 
Non Agri 1,301 4 4 9 148 16 69 42 1009 
Total 5,308 577 270 77 332 1,286 1,340 142 1,284 
Note: Data from IFLS pane] (raw numbers of individuals, not weighted) are numbers of individuals in the category in 1993 who end up in the 2000 category. 
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Figure 4.2: Poverty Transition Matrix, 1993 to 2000, IFLS Panel Data, Unweighted. 
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T he central tab les show the percent of the total IFLS workers who were tracked bctwc.-cn 1993 and 2000 (5:.108 ir1 number) . 
In each ce ll , the first number is the percent in that cell in 1993, with the arrow pointing to the number in that cell in 2000. 
T he bottom number is then the net difference between 1993 and 2000, Additionally to these rict fiO\\'S the numbers of the 
poverty transition matrix in Table 4.3 permits the identification of which workers made up different net flow and thus their 
original or destination category. This is shown in the smaller top and bottom cell s for the destination and original categories 
of ru nt.I, agricultural , poor in 1993 and 2000 respectively. 
bile than those working in agriculture. Less than a fifth stayed poor in rural non-agricultural 
activities-but overall they were equally likely to stay poor, as a similar number shifted back to 
agriculture while remaining poor. More than half of them escaped poverty while staying in rural 
areas-a similar rate to those who started poor in agriculture. Urban migration played a more 
important role for this group, but still a minor one • less than 10 percent of this group moved 
Julian Weisbrod - 978-3-631-75361-3
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:55:15AM
via free access
86 PATHWAYS OUT OF POVEITTY IN INDONESIA 
to urban areas, and only half of those that did so exited poverty. 16 Still, this migration rate 
-almost 10 percent of poor, rural non-farm workers migrated to urban areas in just 7 years- is 
more than three times the rural-to-urban migration rate of poor farm workers (only 2.9 percent 
of poor farm workers moved to urban areas, and one third of those remained in poverty). During 
the same period, 15.4 percent of poor, rural farmers moved to rural non-agricultural jobs and 
almost two thirds of these exited poverty in the process. The potential for the non-farm rural 
economy to be a stepping stone out of poverty is clear. 
Non-agricultural activities in urban areas appear to be somewhat more stable, 
as Table 4.3 shows, 77.6 percent of the non-poor in this category remained non-poor, non-
agricultural and in urban areas. At the same time, 44.6 percent of the urban, non-agricultural 
poor remained in that category. Both rates of "stability" are the highest of the four categories. 
This stability may arise because earnings are much higher in urban areas, so the poor prefer to 
stay in the hope of a good job; or it may be difficult for poor urban workers to move or return 
to rural areas. The distinction should not be overdrawn, however, as 61.5 percent of the rural, 
agricultural non-poor remained in this category and 62.2 percent of the rural, non-agricultural 
non-poor experienced similar stability. Indeed, when agricultural and non-agricultural activities 
are combined, a common occurrence for households in rural areas, 78.0 percent of rural agri-
cultural households and 79.3 percent of rural non-agricultural households (in 1993) remained 
stable out of poverty. Importantly, only the panel results can bring a clear picture of how much 
"churning" there is near the poverty line. Clearly, there is a small but significant probability of 
falling below that line for rural workers, whether farm or non-farm. 
In summary, urbanisation has been rapid, but only a small part is due to actual physical mi-
gration of workers and households. In rural areas, there is a gradual diversification of economic 
activities taking place, characterised by greater reliance on non-farm sources of income. This 
process of rural diversification reflects greater opportunities for growth in a dynamic non-farm 
economy than in agriculture per se, although increases in agricultural productivity have remained 
a very important path out of poverty. These highly detailed descriptive transition matrices give 
us great details regarding the pathways out of poverty as conceptualised in Section 4.2.1. How-
ever, many of the transition paths described above arc strongly influenced by the individual 
characteristics of workers, which have not been considered so far. The following section explores 
the importance of these determinants (including family characteristics) on income growth and 
movements out of poverty. 
16 As mentioned above in section 4.3.1, all the rural-urban movements displayed involve actual physical move-
ment of the person. This adds weight to the evidence that urbaniration rather than rural-urban migration 
is the principle form of rural-urban transition, This is confirmed if one looks at the results from a sample 
which does not take reclassification into account, as it will display higher percentages who "migrated" into 
urban areas, even though their home location was simply reclassified. 
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4.4 Micro Determinants of Income and Poverty Transitions 
4.4.1 The Determinants of Income and Poverty Levels 
Before we analyse the dynamics of the IFLS panel, a brief glimpse at the level regressions is 
informative. We follow the common methodology of a mincer type OLS regression for 1993 and 
2000. Furthermore, we also run a Logit regression of the probability of being poor using the same 
explanatory variables as the OLS regression. The results are displayed in Appendix D (Table 
D.3 for the OLS results and Table D.4 for the logit results both for 1993 and 2000) which show 
much of the expected correlations between certain determinants and income level and poverty 
status. The main results are briefly summarised below. 
Several variables are strongly associated with log real income. Real income increases with age 
but at a declining rate. A person who was one year older in 1993 received on average 9 percent 
more income and 10 percent in 2000 (due to the aging of the panel). Male income is 44 percent 
higher than female income in 1993, even when age and education are taken into account. This 
gap widens as the panel ages-younger women marry and have children, reducing their individual 
income and are consequently on average characterised by a more marginal attachment to the 
labour force. Years of schooling, as expected, have a strong effect with each additional year of 
schooling raising the level of real income by 8. 7 percent in 1993. 
Moreover, workers who were part of a household gain on average 7.3 percent more income in 
1993 for each additional family member .17 However, this coefficient has to be interpreted jointly 
with the coefficients of number of children, as having a larger number of children below the age 
of 5 seems to lower real income. The "number of children" effect cancels out the positive effect of 
household size, suggesting that any advantage of having a larger household is lost once one takes 
small children into account. Interestingly, the number of men in a household affects average real 
income negatively. Having more male adults living in the same household may be an indication 
of poverty (reflected in low individual income) even if their presence boosts household income. 
Geographical variables have an extremely strong impact on income. Individuals in urban 
areas in 1993 earned on average 25 percent more than similar workers in rural areas, 18 but this 
differential had fallen to 5.5 percent by 2000. This is consistent with rural income growth being 
much faster than urban income growth over this period because of the economic crisis. There 
are also wide variations between incomes in different provinces. Relative to Jakarta, incomes 
are lower in all provinces, all other things being equal, with the most pronounced income gaps 
in 1993 occurring in Yogyakarta, South Sulawesi, Lampung, Central Java, and East Java. This 
changed dramatically in 2000 as Jakarta was badly hit by the crisis, reducing the income dis-
parity between it and the other provinces. Furthermore, deriving income predominantly from 
wages does appear to raise income slightly, but the effect turns negative and is not statistically 
17 
18 
This result is anomalous since usually larger households are associated with lower per capita incomes. It may 
result from the attribution of all profit income earned by family labour to the main earner in the household. 
This difference is likely to be overstated since nominal income is deflated by provincial CPI, which is based 
on prices in the province's main city. 
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significant in 2000. Working more hours also increases income, but the effect is rather small. 
By contrast there are large sectoral differences in income. Working primarily in the non-farm 
sector boosts real income in 1993 by 56.2 percent relative to agricultural activities, although this 
advantage declined to 26.4 percent in 2000. For specific sectors of employment there are large 
disparities relative to agriculture: Finance (81 percent), Mining and Quarrying (83 percent), 
and Social Services (70 percent) display particularly large differentials. These differences were 
substantially reduced between 1993 and 2000 due to the poor performance (and partial decline) 
of many of these sectors relative to agriculture over this period. 
The results of the Logit poverty regressions confirm and strengthen the OLS regression results. 
Even though we determine the poverty status of the individual by the per capita expenditure of 
the household rather than by their individual incomes, these two concepts are sufficiently linked, 
particularly when the sample is restricted to income earners. Hence, as expected, being older 
and more educated reduces the chance of being poor. Larger households increase the probability 
of being poor as does the number of children below the age of five. The number of men in 
the household increases the probability of being poor in our sample. This may be because the 
females in our sample are income earners and households in which the woman is also earning an 
income are likely to be better off than those in which only the male is earning. Interestingly, this 
positive probability disappeared in 2000, suggesting either that males managed to increase their 
earning situation considerably or that women lost out relatively more during the crisis. 
Surprisingly, living in an urban area increases the probability of being poor, and this effect 
increases over time. Similarly, the probability of being poor is generally higher outside Jakarta, 
although this effect is reduced in 2000 due to the improving relative position of the provinces 
with respect to Jakarta. Employment outside of agriculture reduces the probability of being 
poor, particularly in the 1993 sample. 
The level regressions above confirm many of the links expected from the literature between 
personal, household, sectoral and regional characteristics and level of income and poverty. How-
ever, they do not tell us much about the dynamics of income and poverty. For this we need to 
utilise the panel nature of the dataset to identify the determinants of income and poverty changes. 
4.4.2 The Determinants of Income Change 
To identify the determinants of income change we estimate a difference regression on both initial 
characteristics and changes in those characteristics. In other words we estimate: 
where IND is a vector of individual characteristics, HH is a set of household characteristics, GEO 
is a set of geographical variables, and SEC is a set of sectoral variables; e is an error term and 
the prefix d indicates changes. In particular, we are interested in observing the size and sign of 
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the dummies for changing sector to see to what extent a change from the farm to the non-farm 
sector has an important impact upon income growth. The results are shown in Table D.5. 
As is commonly found in the micro growth regression literature, the log of real initial income 
has a negative coefficient, implying conditional income convergence. In fact, the data also show 
strong absolute convergence (Table D.6) of income implying declining income inequality. 19 In-
dividuals who were older in 1993 tended to have higher growth rates, although the size of this 
effect declines with age. Male workers also experienced much higher income growth than female 
workers, but those whose income came from wages experienced slower growth consistent with the 
impact of the crisis on formal wages. People with higher working hours in 1993 also experienced 
slightly lower income growth and the expansion of working hours is also associated with slower 
growth implying that it indicates stress rather than success. 
Furthermore, individuals who were better educated in 1993 tended to have higher subsequent 
income growth (around 6 percent higher growth per extra year of schooling). Households which 
were initially larger had faster income growth and growing households are also associated with 
higher income growth (although, of course, the causality here may run in the opposite direction). 
Having a large number of younger children is not only associated with lower income, but also 
with slower growth, although, as would be expected, increases in the number of young children 
are positively (but not statistically significantly) associated with growth. Having a larger num-
ber of men in the households is also associated with slower growth, although the effect is not 
statistically significant. 
Moreover, the geographical variables are not as important in explaining changes as they were 
in explaining levels. Individuals in regions outside Jakarta show slower income growth, but the 
effect is only statistically significant in a few locations. Furthermore, the coefficients on the 
regional dummies only display regional-specific effects after controlling for all other variables, 
in particular initial income. Hence, they are in some sense a measure of our ignorance, as they 
display the regional variation unexplained by other elements in the model specification. This 
can clearly be seen in Table D.6, which shows income growth regressed against only initial in-
come and the regional dummies. When growth is regressed against the regional dummies alone, 
it is clear that individuals living outside Jakarta generally experienced higher income growth 
than their counterparts in Jakarta. However, once we control for the initial level of income, all 
the coefficients on the regional dummies turn negative and many lose their significance as the 
income convergence is now captured in the negative and statistically significant initial income 
coefficient which implies that the initially poorer regions grew subsequently faster. TableD.5 
also explores the implications of moving location (province, district, or sub-district) on income 
19 This is also consistent with the results obtained by Fields et al (2003) showing declining inequality for 
Indonesia between 1993 and 1997, as well as results reported in the World Bank's Poverty Assessment for 
Indonesia {2006b). Theoretically, the negative initial income term could also be due to measurement error 
and or endogeneity issues. For an excellent general discussion of this topic see Klasen and Woolard (2005), 
however, they could find no evidence that the initial income term was biased in such a way in their South 
African household panel dataset. 
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growth through the inclusion of movement variables. The variables Moved Province, Moved 
Kabupaten, and Moved Kecamatan take the value one if the individual migrated to a different 
province, kabupaten or kecamatan over the given time period.20 The coefficients on these dum-
mies are statistically insignificant in specifications (1) and (3). However, when we interact initial 
income with the migration dummies in specifications (2) and (4) we find that people who move 
relatively small distances (sub-district) tend to have stronger income growth, but only if they 
were initially less well off. This supports the view that local level migration can support income 
mobility particularly for the poor. 
In order to analyse the impact of sectoral occupation on subsequent income change, a set 
of dummy variables was constructed to indicate whether an individual stayed in non-farm em-
ployment, moved to agriculture for those originally earning income in the non-farm sector in 
1993, or moved into the non-farm sector, for those who where engaged in agriculture in 1993. 
The omitted variable was those individuals remaining in agriculture. Those who where engaged 
in non-farm activities in 1993 and stayed in the non-farm sector experienced higher than aver-
age income growth compared to individuals who remained in agriculture; their income growth 
was also significantly higher than that of individuals who moved to the farming sector, which 
is clearly associated with income decline. Interestingly, individuals who moved from agriculture 
to the non-farm sector seem to have experienced higher income growth than those remaining in 
agriculture, although the effect is not statistically significant. However, it is important to keep 
in mind that individuals who moved into the non-farm sector had a median of 5 years of school-
ing as compared to 3 years for those remaining in agriculture. Hence, much of the associated 
beneficial effect of moving into the non-farm sector might be captured in the education variable. 
4.4.3 Poverty Dynamics 
The regression above tells us something about the determinants of income growth, but it tells 
us nothing specific about the dynamics of poverty. In order to determine what factors increase 
the likelihood of exiting or falling into poverty we run two Logit regressions: first we restrict the 
sample to people from poor households in 1993 (1186 Individuals) and estimate the determinants 
of leaving poverty; second we restrict the sample to people from households whose per capita 
expenditure was above the poverty line in 1993 (3690 Individuals) and look at the determinants 
of falling into poverty.21 Before turning to a more detailed model, Table 4.4 shows a simple 
Logit model which focuses on the transition paths described above in our "naive" model in Fig-
ure 4.1 Section 4.2.1, i.e. we examine the effect of movement between rural and urban areas 
and movement in and out of agriculture on poverty entry and exit. Both regressions control for 
initial income. Unsurprisingly, higher initial income increases the chances of exit and reduces the 
20 
21 
Note: these migration dummies are not mutually exclusive. Thus, a person who moved province also moved 
Kabupaten and Kecamatan so that total effect of provincial migration is the joint effect of all associated 
migration variables. 
Of course this analysis can also be done simultaneously using a multinomial logit model, but the results 
would be almost identical. We therefore prefer the more intuitive presentation of the two Logit models. 
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chances of falling into poverty. However, staying in an urban area reduces the chances of exit 
and increases the chances of entering poverty, another indication of the predominantly urban 
impact of the crisis. Neither transition to rural nor urban areas is statistically significant. 
On the other hand, moving into the non-farm sector, or simply staying there, is significantly 
associated with exiting poverty and reduces the chances of entering poverty too, relative to those 
who stayed in agriculture. Thus, the simple model gives support to the importance of sectoral 
transitions in movements out of poverty. 
Moreover, Table D.7 shows how this assessment changes when the impact of individual, 
household and geographical characteristics on poverty exit and entry are taken into account. 
Some of the determinants of income growth are not strongly associated with exiting poverty. 
For example, neither age, nor sex, nor working hours are significantly associated with exit from 
poverty. The strongest effects come from education, which strongly increases the chances of 
exit and reduces those of entry, and from household size-large households are less likely to exit 
poverty and more likely to enter. The demographic composition of the household also matters 
for poverty entry, with higher numbers of small children and men making falling into poverty 
more likely. It is not clear why having more males in the household should be associated with 
a higher chance of entering poverty. In most of the literature having more males is associated 
with higher rather than lower incomes, but several male adults in the household in this sample 
may reflect the impact of the crisis, as many urban construction workers returned to their village 
households, at least temporarily. Furthermore, the economic characteristics of the individual 
also play a role. Wage earners have a higher probability of entering poverty, probably as a ,;onse-
quence of formerly non-poor employees falling into poverty as a result of the crisis. By contrast 
the initial level of working hours in 1993 has no significant influence on exit or entry. 
As always, geography is important, with people living outside of Jakarta often more likely to 
enter poverty or less likely to exit it (although the latter effect is always statistically insignificant). 
Individuals from certain provinces (all of Java except central Java, South and West Sumatra, 
West Nusa Tcnggara and South Kalimantan) appear to have been particularly vulnerable to 
poverty relative to those in Jakarta. The same was true of workers in urban households who, 
ceteris paribus, were less likely to exit poverty than their rural counterparts and more likely to 
enter. Moreover, moving either province or kabupaten appears to be positively associated with 
exiting poverty. Such movements arc not associated with entering poverty, suggesting that geo-
graphical movements are associated with things getting better for the initially poor rather than 
with distress movement as a result of a shock. 
Finally, looking at the sectoral characteristics, it is interesting to note that moving to or 
staying in non-farm employment, which was strongly and significantly associated with poverty 
exit in T:i.ble 4.4, is no longer statistically significant. Clearly, moving to and staying in the non-
farm sector is correlated with other characteristics, as for example education, which themselves 
support exit from poverty. By contrast, moving back into agriculture clearly and significantly 
reduces the chances of exiting poverty relative to those who stay in agriculture. 
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Table 4.4: Simple Logit Regression of Poverty Exit and Entry (1993-2000) 
exit entry 
(1) (2) 
Log real income 1993 0.119 -0.352 
(1.61) (7.01)** 
Stay Urban -0.768 0.317 
(4.11)** (2.28)* 
Move to Rural 0.760 -0.333 
(1.44) (0.80) 
Move to Urban -0.280 0.395 
(0.57) (1.00) 
Stay Non-farm 0.537 -0.385 
(2.86)** (2.46)* 
Move to Non-farm 0.601 -0.336 
(2.46)* ( 1.47) 
Move to farm -0.513 0.079 
(1.90) (0.37) 
Constant -0.536 0.619 
( 1.34) (2.11)* 
Observations 1186 3690 
Initially poor Initially non-poor 
Robust z statistics in parentheses • significant at 5%; ** significant at 1 % 
4.5 Conclusion 
This paper started with a simple question: What were the pathways out of poverty in Indonesia 
between 1993 and 2000? Two stylised pathways were put forward: improved productivity in 
agriculture and the growth of non-farm productivity; and two transitions to reach these paths 
were hypothesised: a sectoral transition from farm to non-farm, and a geographical transition 
from rural to urban. 
The results presented above suggest that there is no single or simple answer to this question. 
There are many factors which affect movements out of poverty. The IFLS panel data set allows 
us to explore precisely these transitions between 1993 and 2000. Among the poorest individuals 
who were aged 15+ and working in 1993, getting out of agriculture appears to be an important 
factor in increasing incomes. Almost a fifth of these individuals left agriculture and in doing so 
substantially increased their incomes. This said, getting out of agriculture is not the only route 
out of poverty. Indeed over 80 percent of the individuals from poor households working in rural 
agriculture in 1993 were still working in rural agriculture seven years later, but more than half of 
the households from which they came managed to exit from poverty. Thus boosting agricultural 
productivity is also an important pathway out of poverty. 
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Rural-urban migration, by contrast, would appear to play a relatively small role, although 
this period in Indonesia's modern economic history, from 1993 to 2000, was a particularly diffi-
cult one for successful rural to urban migration. Only a handful of those idividuals working in 
rural agriculture in 1993 were able to migrate to urban areas. Most of those who migrated to 
non-farm jobs in urban areas were already doing non-agricultural jobs in rural areas and tended 
to be among the better off non-farm rural workers. Thus, it may be that the rural non-farm 
sector acts as a stepping stone between rural agricultural work and more productive non-farm 
employment in urban areas. Even if the individual, household and geographical determinants 
of income and poverty are taken into account, our analysis yields broad support for the idea 
that movement to the non-farm sector increases income growth and makes exit from poverty 
more likely. Understandably, somewhat less support is gathered for the importance of migration, 
although local level migration does appear to boost income growth, particularly for the poorest, 
while longer range district and provincial movements are associated with an increased chance of 
exiting poverty. 
However, it is clear that some key characteristics have a very significant influence on move-
ments out of poverty. Age, sex and education all have a strong influence on income growth, as, 
negatively, do certain elements of the demographic composition of the household, most notably 
the household size and the number of young children. Poor schooling and large household size 
are also key barriers to exiting poverty, whereas a broader range of individual and demographic 
characteristics contribute to vulnerability. Moreover, geography matters. The crisis hit people 
in urban areas harder than those in rural areas. As a result, our analysis shows that being in 
an urban area substantially reduces the probability of exiting poverty once controlling for other 
factors. Similarly, once income convergence is taken into account, individuals outside Jakarta 
experienced slower income growth and a lower chance of exiting poverty than those in the capital. 
However, our analysis suffers from one important drawback. Because we are specifically inter-
ested in whether changes in the sector of employment are an important pathway out of poverty, 
we have had to restrict our panel to individuals who were aged 15 or over and working in 1993. 
This, by definition, excludes the young and the unemployed. It also excludes from our analysis 
new entrants into the panel in 2000. Nonetheless, although this restriction will certainly impart 
a bias on the calculated levels of income and poverty relative to the full sample, our sample still 
provides a representative picture of the impact of sectoral and geographical changes on income 
growth and poverty transitions. 
What are the policy implications of these findings and are there any wider lessons to be 
learned which might also hold true for other countries? We suggest four. First, notwithstanding 
the growing importance of the non-farm sector, it is still clear that the majority of the poor 
will remain in rural agricultural activities for some time to come. Our results suggest that 
boosting agricultural productivity is their principle pathway out of poverty. It would therefore 
seem appropriate for the government to shift resources towards actions which boost agricultural 
productivity. These might include increased spending on agricultural research, improving the 
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extension service, reducing costs by improving rural roads, and facilitating access to and use of 
more modern technology. 
Second, our results also highlight the key role played by the rural non-farm sector. This is an 
area which has been relatively neglected by policy. Improving the investment climate for the ru-
ral non-farm sector will be key to broadening access to this stepping stone out of poverty (World 
Bank, 2006a). Our results show that, all other things being equal, the provinces still display a 
growth disadvantage relative to Jakarta, suggesting the need for better market integration and 
infrastructure investment outside the capital. Similarly, broadening access to commercial credit 
for small businesses and improving access to marketing and technology will support the growth 
of this sector. Also, more controversially, the government may wish to reconsider the current 
strong policy bias against the conversion of agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes, as 
well as the price supports that discourage exit from agriculti.:.re. These policies may be slowing 
down movement along a key pathway out of poverty. 
Third, our results point to a rather modest role of migration in poverty reduction, although 
this was not a typical period for testing this hypothesis. There can be no doubt that urbanisation 
is proceeding rapidly, particularly on Java, with the result that many formerly rural areas are 
now considered to be parts of urban economic space. This process goes hand in hand with the 
shift towards a greater emphasis on non-farm activities. Again, the role of policy here should be 
to support and facilitate this change by ensuring that newly urbanised areas have access to the 
economic and social services needed to reduce urban poverty. 
Finally, our analysis reiterates the importance of education for exiting poverty. While sectoral 
change and migration have a role to play, improved education is still one of the most effective 
routes out of poverty, for two reasons. First, better education enables people to participate in 
higher productivity activities. Second, better education raises the probability of being able to 
make the sectoral and locational changes that give access to the other pathways out of poverty. 
Ensuring that the poor have access to education, including post-primary education, should there-
fore be a cornerstone of the government's anti-poverty strategy. 
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Table A.1: Results Posterior Estimation 
Definitions for Columns Below 
Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 
China 1 115 2 60 1 1 to 2 
Korea Republic of 1.999 60 2.984 27 0.985 2 to 3 
Taiwan 2.041 47 2.994 25 0.953 2 to 3 
Sri Lanka 1.087 87 1.996 66 0.909 1 to 2 
India 1.014 97 1.891 76 0.877 1 to 2 
Equatorial Guinea 1.787 72 2.639 36 0.852 2 to 3 
Cyprus 2.195 42 2.997 22 0.802 2 to 3 
Malaysia 2.018 55 2.723 34 0.705 2 to 3 
Indonesia 1.291 81 1.994 69 0.703 1 to 2 
Pakistan 1.035 90 1.673 79 0.638 1 to 2 
Mauritius 2.339 39 2.972 29 0.633 2 to 3 
Chile 2.117 43 2.724 33 0.607 2 to 3 
Egypt 1.462 79 2 60 0.538 1 to 2 
Botswana 1.603 74 2.077 44 0.474 2 
Thailand 1.598 75 2.034 47 0.436 2 
Cameroon 1.428 80 1.761 78 0.333 1 to 2 
Bangladesh 1.024 93 1.255 82 0.231 1 
Hungary 2.645 32 2.825 32 0.18 3 
Portugal 2.832 30 2.981 28 0.149 3 
Lesotho 1.001 112 1.148 85 0.147 1 
Ireland 2.87 28 3 1 0.13 3 
Swaziland 2.051 46 2.167 39 0.116 2 
Hong Kong 2.906 26 3 1 0.094 3 
Morocco 1.903 70 1.992 70 0.089 2 
Singapore 2.918 24 3 1 0.082 3 
Puerto Rico 2.917 25 2.998 19 0.081 3 
Panama 2.036 48 2.091 43 0.055 2 
Tunisia 2.003 59 2.048 46 0.045 2 
Cuba 1.974 65 2.01 52 0.036 2 
Dominican Republic 1.988 64 2.022 49 0.034 2 
Trinidad + Tobago 2.961 21 2.989 26 0.028 3 
Guinea 1.825 71 1.853 77 0.028 2 
Philippines 1.951 68 1.977 73 0.026 2 
Spain 2.977 19 2.996 23 0.019 3 
Japan 2.991 18 2.999 11 0.008 3 
Paraguay 1.993 62 2.001 59 0.008 2 
Finland 2.992 15 2.999 11 0.007 3 
Italy 2.992 15 2.998 19 0.006 3 
Nepal 1.001 112 1.007 89 0.006 1 
Korea Dem. Rep. 1 115 1.006 92 0.006 1 
United Kingdom 2.995 14 2.999 11 0.004 3 
Israel 2.992 15 2.996 23 0.004 3 
Laos 1.002 111 1.006 92 0.004 1 
Austria 2.997 8 3 1 0.003 3 
Australia 2.997 8 3 1 0.003 3 
Belgium 2.996 13 2.999 11 0.003 3 
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Mongolia 1.016 95 1.019 87 0.003 1 
Norway 2.998 5 3 0.002 3 
Canada 2.998 5 3 0.002 3 
Germany 2.997 8 2.999 11 0.002 3 
France 2.997 8 2.999 11 0.002 3 
United States 2.999 2 3 0.001 3 
Denmark 2.999 2 3 0.001 3 
Netherlands 2.998 5 2.999 11 0.001 3 
New Zealand 2.997 8 2.998 19 0.001 3 
Ghana 1.006 105 1.007 89 0.001 1 
Mali 1 115 1.001 100 0.001 1 
Switzerland 3 3 0 3 
Sweden 2.999 2 2.999 11 0 3 
Tanzania 115 105 0 1 
Malawi 115 105 0 
Cambodia 115 1 105 0 
Guinea-Bissau 1 115 1 105 0 
Ethiopia 115 105 0 
Bhutan 115 1 105 0 1 
Burkina Faso 115 1 105 0 1 
Oman 2.97 20 2.969 30 -0.001 3 
Greece 2.961 21 2.96 31 -0.001 3 
Burundi 1.001 112 1 105 -0.001 
Rwanda 1.006 105 1.003 97 -0.003 
Uganda 1.004 107 1.001 100 -0.003 
Chad 1.003 109 1 105 -0.003 
Gambia 1.003 109 1 105 -0.003 1 
Turkey 2.008 58 2.004 57 -0.004 2 
Mozambique 1.012 101 1.008 88 -0.004 
Central African Rep. 1.004 107 1 105 -0.004 
Guatemala 1.993 62 1.988 71 -0.005 2 
Jordan 1.994 61 1.986 72 -0.008 2 
Benin 1.013 98 1.004 96 -0.009 
Kenya 1.01 103 1.001 100 -0.009 
Niger 1.009 104 1 105 -0.009 
Madagascar 1.011 102 105 -0.011 
Sudan 1.013 98 1.001 100 -0.012 
Somalia 1.013 98 1 105 -0.013 
Congo Dem Rep. 1.015 96 1 105 -0.015 
Papua New Guinea 2.015 57 1.999 64 -0.016 2 
Fiji 2.017 56 2 60 -0.017 2 
Nigeria 1.018 94 1.001 100 -0.017 1 
Colombia 2.027 54 2.008 54 -0.019 2 
Sierra Leone 1.027 92 1 105 -0.027 1 
Algeria 2.035 50 2.007 55 -0.028 2 
Romania 2.033 52 2.005 56 -0.028 2 
Togo 1.03 91 1 105 -0.03 
El Salv-d.dor 2.031 53 2 60 -0.031 2 
Jamaica 2.036 48 1.999 64 -0.037 2 
Ecuador 2.035 50 1.995 67 -0.04 2 
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Syria 1.193 83 1.153 84 -0.04 1 
Bolivia 1.959 67 1.895 75 -0.064 2 
Zambia 1.064 89 1 105 -0.064 
Mauritania 1.077 88 1.007 89 -0.07 
Namibia 2.089 45 2.004 57 -0.085 2 
Senegal 1.1 86 1.006 92 -0.094 
Congo Republic of 1.113 85 1.006 92 -0.107 
Peru 2.114 44 1.995 67 -0.119 2 
Honduras 1.503 78 1.384 81 -0.119 2 to 1 
Poland 2.387 37 2.205 38 -0.182 2 
Liberia 1.184 84 1 105 -0.184 1 
Russia 2.861 29 2.672 35 -0.189 3 
Mexico 2.298 40 2.068 45 -0.23 2 
Brazil 2.274 41 2.031 48 -0.243 2 
Costa Rica 2.376 38 2.124 42 -0.252 2 
Comoros 1.283 82 1.002 98 -0.281 
South Africa 2.525 35 2.153 41 -0.372 3 to 2 
Uruguay 2.534 34 2.155 40 -0.379 3 to 2 
Zimbabwe 1.968 66 1.532 80 -0.436 2 
Cote d'Ivoire 1.598 75 1.155 83 -0.443 2 tol 
Solomon Islands 1.549 77 1.036 86 -0.513 2 to 1 
Nicaragua 2.523 36 1.965 74 -0.558 3 to 2 
Argentina 2.937 23 2.371 37 -0.566 3 to 2 
Ukraine 2.645 32 2.012 50 -0.633 3 to 2 
Afghanistan 1.651 73 1 105 -0.651 2 tol 
Iran 2.8 31 2.012 50 -0.788 3 to 2 
Venezuela 2.891 27 2.01 52 -0.881 3 to 2 
Iraq 1.912 69 1.002 98 -0.91 2 to 1 
Note: Column 1: Posterior Mean 1976; Column 2: Rank 1976; Column 3: Posterior Mean 2003; 
Column 4: Rank 2003 Column 5: Change Posterior Mean; Column 6:Group 1976 and 2003 
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Table B.l: Regions and Associated Countries 
OECD Countries 
Australia , Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland , France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 1ew Zealand, or-
way, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States 
East As ia and the Pacific 
Cambodia, China, Fiji , Hong Kong, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Laos, 
Malaysia, Mongolia, Papua ew Guinea, P hilippines, Singapore, Taiwan, 
T hailand 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Ja-
maica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru , Puerto Rico, Suriname, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela 
Middle East and North Africa 
Algeria, Egypt , Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine 
South Asia 
Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi , Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi , Mali , MauritaDia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibi a, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tan-
zani , Ugand a, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
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Figure B.l: Semi-Decade specific Growth Incidence Curves, OECD Countries 
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Figure B.2: Semi-Decade specific Growth Incidence Curves, East Asia and the Pacific 
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Figure B.3: Semi-Decade specific Growth Incidence Curves, Latin America and the Caribbean 
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Figure B.4: Semi-Decade specific Growth Incidence Curves, Middle East and North Africa 
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Figure B.5: Semi-Decade specific Growth Incidence Curves, Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
~L--,-~-~--~--~--~ ----r-' 




,. ., .. ., •oo 






~ 1\-t,----=,..s=-- ----= 
1 




~ '--.'~--,. ---.,,---.,,---., --~,,.,..., 
Solid line: Growth Incident Curve, solid vertical line: $2 per day Poverty Line, solid horizontal line: Mean of Growth 
Rates, dashed line: Growth Rate in Mean, dotted line: Pro-poor Growth Rate 
Julian Weisbrod - 978-3-631-75361-3
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:55:15AM
via free access
APPENDIX 8 
Figure B.6: Semi-Decade specific Growth Incidence Curves, South Asia 
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Figure B.7: Semi-Decade specific Growth Incidence Curves, Sub-Saharan Africa 
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Table C.1: Unrestricted SUR Model. 
Growth Rate 1960-1999 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
Dummy for the 1960s -0.267 -1.15 
Dummy for the 1970s -0.396** -2.14** 
Dummy for the 1980s -0.167 -1.45 
Dummy for the 1990s 0.103 -0.65 
1960s 
Africa -0.019** -1.94** 
Latin America -0.024* -3.68* 
Log of initial income 0.091 1.54 
Log of initial income squared -0.007 -1.83 
Log of schooling 0.013 1.50 
Assassinations 46.595 0.94 
Financial Depth 0.0001 0.01 
Black Market Premium -0.0187 -1.34 
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.084 0.78 
Log of telephones per people 0.011 0.99 
Ethnic 0.000 0.05 
Adj R2 0.29 
Observations 38 
1970s 
Africa -0.005 -0.80 
Latin America -0.014** -2.23** 
Log of initial income 0.138* 2.92* 
Log of initial income squared -0.011* -3.65* 
Log of schooling 0.002 0.34 
Assassinations -22.564 -1.52 
Financial Depth 0.009 0.92 
Black Market Premium -0.028* -3.06* 
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.197* 3.19* 
Log of telephones per people 0.038* 4.25* 
Ethnic 0.002 0.21 
Adj R2 0.51 
Observations 67 
1980s 
Africa -0.012** -1.98** 
Latin America -0.019* -3.76* 
Log of initial income 0.061 ** 2.09** 
Log of initial income squared -0.005* -2.75* 
Log of schooling 0.004 0.61 
Assassinations -21.280** -2.19** 
Financial Depth 0.016** 2.02** 
Black Market Premium -0.009*** -1.82*** 
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.121 * 3.46* 
Log of telephones per people 0.024* 2.63* 
Ethnic -0.002 -0.22 
Adj R2 0.48 
Observations 74 
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1990s 
Africa -0.01 * -2.63* 
Latin America -0.008 -1.34 
Log of initial income -0.005 -0.13 
Log of initial income squared -0.001 -0.42 
Log of schooling 0.005 0.58 
Assassinations -72.156** -1.99** 
Financial Depth 0.008 0.94 
Black Market Premium -0.020** -2.28** 
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.165* 2.58* 
Log of telephones per people 0.015 1.25 
Ethnic -0.018** -1.93** 
Adj R2 0.24 
Observ-ations 78 
No. Obs. 1 251 
Source: Own Calculations. •0.1, ••o.os, ***0.01 Significance level 
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Table C.2: Unrestricted SUR Model including Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton Index. 
Growth Rate 1960-1999 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
Dummy for the 1960s -0.325 -1.44 
Dummy for the 1970s -0.437** -2.45** 
Dummy for the 1980s -0.277** -2.37** 
Dummy for the 1990s 0.135 -0.71 
1960s 
Africa -0.018*** -1.88*** 
Latin America -0.015** -2.17** 
Log of initial income 0.116** 2.01 ** 
Log of initial income squared -0.010* -2.59* 
Log of schooling 0.011 1.40 
Assassinations 56.408 1.27 
Financial Depth 0.026** 2.13** 
Black Market Premium -0.016 -0.92 
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.009 0.08 
Log of telephones per people 0.021 *** 1.81*** 
Ethnic 0.006 0.58 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton- Index 0.007 1.34 
Adj R2 0.38 
Observations 36 
1970s 
Africa -0.011 -1.44 
Latin America -0.016* -2.81 * 
Log of initial income 0.143* 3.14* 
Log of initial income squared -0.011* -3.73* 
Log of schooling 0.004 0.61 
Assassinations -18.421 -1.46 
Financial Depth 0.003 0.31 
Black Market Premium -0.035* -3.95* 
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.174* 3.04* 
Log of telephones per people 0.031* 3.67* 
Ethnic 0.009 0.84 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton- Index -0.002 -0.30 
Adj R2 0.52 
Observations 57 
1980s 
Africa -0.019* -2.92* 
Latin America -0.028* -5.30* 
Log of initial income 0.088* 2.94* 
Log of initial income squared -0.006* -3.32* 
Log of schooling -0.004 -0.51 
Assassinations -19.084** -2.32** 
Financial Depth 0.007 1.013 
Black Market Premium -0.008*** -1.68*** 
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.099* 2.90* 
Log of telephones per people 0.017** 2.02** 
Ethnic -0.008 -0.84 
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Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton- Index 0.004 0.77 
Adj R2 0.56 
Observations 63 
1990s 
Africa -0.017** -1.99** 
Latin America -0.010 -1.34 
Log of initial income 0.054 1.18 
Log of initial income squared -0.004*** -1.68*** 
Log of schooling 0.013 1.24 
Assassinations -52.058 -1.42 
Financial Depth 0.002 0.28 
Black Market Premium -0.018 -1.34 
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.120*** 1.68*** 
Log of telephones per people 0.004 0.30 
Ethnic -0.016 -1.40 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton- Index 0.011 *** 1.73*** 
Adj R2 0.22 
Observations 65 
I No. Obs. 1 251 
Source: Own Calculations. *0.1 1 **0.05, ***0.01 Significance level 
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Table C.4: Comparison Alesina et al. with our Results 
Growth Rate 1960-1989 
Variable 1 2 
Dummy for the 1960s -0.233*** -0.166* 
(-2.34) (-1.73) 
Dummy for the 1970s -0.227*** -0.163* 
(-2.28) (-1.70) 
Dummy for the 1980s -0.243*** -0.179* 
(-2.45) (-1.88) 
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa -0.017*** -0.013*** 
(-3.11) (-2.75) 
Dummy for Latin America & Caribbean -0.015*** -0.017*** 
(-4.14) (-4.46) 
Log of initial income 0.081*** 0.067*** 
(3.23) (2.76) 
Log of initial income squared -0.007*** -0.006*** 
(-3.98) (-3.66) 
Log of schooling 0.009* 0.005 
(1.85) (0.96) 
Assassinations -23.705*** -17.985* 
(-2.58) (-1.95) 
Financial Depth 0.013** 0.011 ** 
(2.12) (1.99) 
Black Market Premium -0.018*** -0.015*** 
(-4.10) (-3.45) 
Fiscal surplus/GDP 0.165*** 0.11 *** 
( 4.45) (3.64) 
Log of telephones per worker 0.006*** 
(2.41) 
Log of telephones per people 0.022*** 
(3.64) 
Ethnic -0.005 -0.004 
(-0.75) (-0.54) 
No. Obs. 175 179 
Adj R2 0,56 0,57 
Source: Own Calculations. Note: t-stats in parentheses *0.1, **0.05, ***0.01 Significance level. 
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Table C.5: Indirect Effect of Fractionalisation on Good Governance. 
Dependent Variable: KKZ- Index 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
Dummy for the 1960s -1,153*** -3,60 
Dummy for the 1970s -1,292*** -3,95 
Dummy for the 1980s -1,467*** -4,44 
Dummy for the 1990s -1,673*** -4,89 
Africa 0,147 1,18 
Latin America -0,323*** -3,34 
Log of initial income 0,242*** 6,70 
Log of schooling 0,279*** 4,19 
Dependency Ratio -0,309* -1,92 
1960s 
Ethnic -1,071 ••• -5,58 
Adj R2 0,63 
0 bservations 69 
1970s 
Ethnic -1,028*** -5,65 
Adj R2 0,67 
Observations 71 
1980s 
Ethnic -0,929*** -5,07 
Adj R2 0,66 
0 bservations 72 
1990s 
Ethnic -0,802*** -4,06 
Adj R2 0,63 
Observations 74 
No. Obs. I 286 
Source: Own Calculations. •0.1, 0 0.05, ***0.01 Significance level 
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Table D.1: True Rural-Urban Migration, 1990-1995 
1995 
Rural Urban Total 
1990 Rural 122,037,729 3,570,511 125,608,240 
97.16 2.84 100 
98.53 5.13 64.91 
rban 1,823 ,701 66,089,601 67,913 ,302 
2.69 97.31 100 
1.47 94.87 35.09 
Total 123 ,861 ,430 69,660,112 193,521 ,542 
64 36 100 
100 100 100 
Source: Supas (1995) 
Table D.2: Employment in Agriculture and Non Agriculture. 
1982 1993 2002 
N (000) Percent N (000) Percent N (000) Percent 
Agriculture 30.487 54.24 39.137 49.88 39.035 44.92 
Non Agriculture 25. 724 45.76 39.329 50 .12 47.874 55.08 
Rural 15.939 28.36 18.992 24.2 16.785 19.31 
Urban 9.785 17.41 20.337 25.92 31.088 35.77 
All sector 56.211 100 78.466 100 86.909 100 
Source: Susenas, 1982, 1993, 2002 Note: Excludes Aceh, Maluku, North Maluku and Papua. Employment is defined as 
self employed without help, self employed with help of householders/temporary workers, self employed with help of regular 
workers, employees and family workers with age 10 years and over (definition until 1997). Definition of employment since 
1998 is the same as above, but persons 15 years and above, rural classification status of 1993 used throughout. 
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Note: The size of each rectangle is about proportionate to the numbers of workers employed in each category in 1993. There 
were 78.5 million workers employed in 1993 and 86.9 million in 2002. Source: Susenas 1993 and 2002. 
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Table D.3: The Determinants of Log Real Income in 1993 and 2000 
1993 2000 
Age 0.096 0.092 0.l03 0.098 
(5.78) .. (5.44)** (5.58)** (5.28)** 
Age squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(5.47) .. (5.22)** (5.85)** (5.61)** 
Sex 0.433 0.44 0.596 0.607 
(11.14)** (l0.83)** (15.58) .. (15.22)** 
Working hours per month 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
(12.21)'* (12.16)'* (6.70)*' (6.87)'* 
Wage income dummy 0.145 0.137 -0.024 -0.05 
(4.13)** (3.50)** (0.67) (1.29) 
Years of schooling 0.087 0.082 0.l03 0.097 
(20.27)*' (17.64)" (25.71)'* (22.13)** 
Household size 0.073 0.074 0.058 0.057 
(4.86)" (4.94)** (4.52)*' (4.50)" 
Number of Children below 5 -0.094 -0.094 -0.064 -0.063 
(3.70)** (3.71)*' (2.25)* (2.20)* 
Number of Children below 15 -0.049 -0.048 -0.037 -0.036 
(2.66)** (2.59)" (2.09)* (2.01)* 
Number of Men in hh -0.043 -0.045 -0.038 -0.036 
(2.29)* (2.39)' (2.09)* (1.99)* 
Urban Dummy 0.248 0.251 0.055 0.068 
(7.02)" (7.14)** (1.49) (1.82) 
North Sumatra -0.204 -0.198 -0.124 -0.l02 
(2.79)** (2.69)" (1.67) (1.36) 
West Sumatra -0.236 -0.24 -0.26 -0.259 
(3.05)** (3.05)" (2.69)** (2.67)*' 
South Sumatra -0.401 -0.414 -0.189 -0.184 
(5.00)*' (5.11)** (2.18)' (2.09)* 
Lampung -0.542 -0.538 -0.305 -0.297 
(6.20)** (6.12)** (3.33)" (3.24)'* 
West Java -0.307 -0.288 -0.06 -0.054 
(5.17)'* (4.78)'* (0.96) (0.85) 
Central Java -0.593 -0.578 -0.304 -0.276 
(9.58)** (9.19)** (4.79)*' (4.31)'' 
Di Yogyakarta -0.7 -0.69 -0.472 -0.456 
(9.83)** (9.78)** (6.21)** (6.01)** 
East Java -0.565 -0.554 -0.26 -0.244 
(9.37)" (9.12)** (4.12)** (3.83)'* 
Bali -0.196 -0.208 -0.149 -0.162 
(2.83)'* (2.98)" (1.91) (2.05)* 
West Nusa.Tenggara -0.462 -0.462 -0.228 -0.22 
(5.36)" (5.32)** (3.02)*' (2.91)*' 
South Kalimantan 0.012 -0.006 -0.115 -0.126 
(0.16) (0.08) (1.32) (1.44) 
South Sulawesi -0.563 -0.56 -0.368 -0.371 
(6.61)** (6.55)*' (3.59)*' (3.62)** 
Non-farm dummy 0.562 0.264 
(12.84)** (5.78)** 
Mining Quarry 0.83 0.535 
(7.49)*' (3.64)** 
Manufacturing 0.416 0.l04 
(7.03)" (1.59) 
Electricity 0.592 0.345 
(4.80)*' (1.26) 
Construction 0.524 0.247 
(7.77)** (3.98)** 
Wholesale 0.6 0.269 
(11.06)** (4.93)*' 
Transport 0.545 0.l09 
(8.57)'* (1.54) 
Finance 0.813 0.607 
(5.63)" (4.58)'* 
Social services 0.704 0.417 
(11.80)'* (7.23)** 
Constant 8.071 8.178 8.096 8.235 
(25.51)** (25.46)** (20.20)** (20.43)** 
Observations 5059 5059 4521 4521 
R-squared 0.39 0.4 0.32 0.32 
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Table D.4: Cross Sectional Poverty Logit Regression in 1993 and 2000 
1993 I 2000 
Poor (based on household expenditure per capita) 
Age -0.080 -0.077 -0.127 -0.126 
(1.72) {1.67) (2.90)** (2.84)** 
Age squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(1.81) (i.78) (3.04)** (2.99)** 
Sex 0.316 0.318 0.042 -0.114 
(2.99)** (2.87)** (0.44) (1.13) 
Working hours per month -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
(3.89)** (3.67)** (2.84)** (3.10)** 
Wage income dummy 0.220 0.183 0.262 0.181 
(2.39)* (1.73) (2.92)** (1.83) 
Years of schooling -0.170 -0.169 -0.190 -0.180 
{12.64)'* {12.09)** (17.19)'' (15.52)'* 
Household size 0.202 0.201 0.248 0.254 
(4.68)'* (4.69)** (8.40)'* (8.60)*' 
Number of Children below 5 0.380 0.383 0.220 0.211 
(5.73)** (5.76)** (3.33)** (3.18)** 
Number of Children below 15 0.000 -0.002 0.045 0.038 
(0.01) (0.04) (0.99) (0.84) 
Number of Men in hh -0.037 -0.035 0.001 -0.002 
(0.78) (0.73) (0.03) (0.05) 
Urban Dummy 0.289 0.288 0.580 0.596 
(2.74)** (2.73)** (5.72)** (5.82)*' 
North Sumatra 0.948 0.928 0.236 0.155 
(3.25)** (3.18)** (0.94) (0.62) 
West Sumatra -0.021 -0.047 0.768 0.674 
(0.06) (0.14) (2.94)** (2.57)* 
South Sumatra 1.512 1.514 1.061 1.001 
(5.07)** (5.04)** (4.17)** (3.93)** 
Lampung 1.736 1.702 1.010 0.954 
(5.78)** (5.66)** (3.81)** (3.62)*' 
West Java 0.914 0.866 0.883 0.835 
(3.34)** (3.17)** (4.13)*' (3.91)** 
Central Java 1.731 1.683 0.692 0.617 
(6.45)** (6.27)** (3.18)** (2.83)*' 
Di Yogyaka.rta 2.063 2.021 1.256 1.147 
(7.19)** (7.02)** (5.31)** (4.81)'* 
East Java 2.133 2.111 1.003 0.949 
(7.94)*' (7.85)** (4.61)** (4.39)*' 
Bali 0.828 0.812 0.786 0.760 
(2.80)** (2.74)** (3.24)** (3.12)*' 
West NusaTenggara 1.359 1.328 0.971 0.935 
(4.61)** (4.50)** (4.10)** (3.96)** 
South Kalimantan 0.553 0.555 0.549 0.498 
(1.75) (1.75) (2.06)* (1.87) 
South Sulawesi 1.034 0.992 0.526 0.451 
(3.36)** (3.22)** (1.99)* (1.70) 
Non-farm dummy -0.641 -0.480 
(6.28)** (4.84)** 
Mining Quarry -1.660 0.160 
(2.91)** (0.42) 
Manufacturing -0.392 -0.345 
(2.63)** (2.28)* 
Electricity -0.774 -1.431 
(1.51) (1.40) 
Construction -0.416 0.061 
(2.00)* (0.32) 
Wholesale -0.740 -0.779 
(5.50)** (5.92)** 




Social Services -0.723 -0.805 
(3.55)** (5.27)** 
Constant -1.020 -1.085 0.201 0.330 
(1.09) (J.17) (0.20) (0.33) 
Observations 5227 5227 5010 4980 
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Table D.5: Income Difference Regression 1993-2000 
Dependent variable: Change in log real income 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log Real Income 1993 -0.623 -0.570 -0.632 -0.581 
(23.32)** (17.92)** (23.64)** (18.19)** 
Age 0.043 0.043 0.040 0.040 
(2.50)* (2.48)* (2.38)* (2.37)* 
Age Squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(2.96)** (2.94)** (2.91)** (2.90)** 
Sex 0.446 0.443 0.481 0.478 
(9.85)** (9.82)** (10.19)** (10.17)** 
Working hours per month -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
(7.44)** (7.37)** (7.31)** (7.24)** 
Change in Working hours per month -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(5.98)** (6.11)** (6.08)** (6.21)** 
Wage Income Dummy -0.032 -0.028 -0.036 -0.032 
(0.78) (0.71) (0.76) (0.69) 
Years of schooling 0.064 0.064 0.057 0.057 
(I 1.90)** (11.87)** (10.00)** (9.99)** 
Household size 0.048 0.046 0.046 0.045 
(3.22)** (3.12)** (3.13)** (3.04)** 
Change in household size 0.036 0.039 0.033 0.036 
(1.46) (1.59) (1.34) (1.47) 
Number of Children below 5 -0.090 -0.088 -0.081 -0.079 
(2.20)* (2.16)* (2.00)* (1.96) 
Change in the number of children below 5 0.051 0.049 0.042 0.040 
(1.49) (1.45) (1.25) (1.20) 
Number of Men in hh -0.036 -0.035 -0.036 -0.036 
(1.64) (1.60) (1.69) (i.65) 
Change in Number of Men in hh -0.030 -0.033 -0.028 -0.031 
(0.91) (1.02) (0.86) (0.98) 
Urban Dummy -0.052 -0.049 -0.043 -0.039 
(1.30) (1.20) (1.06) (0.97) 
North Sumatra -0.167 -0.237 -0.157 -0.224 
(1.87) (2.58)** (1.76) (2.44)* 
West Sumatra -0.185 -0.245 -0.195 -0.253 
(1.59) (2.09)* (1.68) (2.16)* 
South Sumatra -0.062 -0.088 -0.042 -0.067 
(0.65) (0.91) (0.42) (0.68) 
Lampung -0.189 -0.285 -0.185 -0.275 
(1.83) (2.57)* (1.80) (2.49)* 
West Java -0.001 -0.043 0.022 -0.019 
(0.01) (0.63) (0.34) (0.29) 
Central Java -0.053 -0.090 -0.045 -0.081 
(0.74) (1.21) (0.62) (1.09) 
Di Yogyakarta -0.239 -0.285 -0.225 -0.269 
(2.69)*• (3.14)** (2.52)* (2.96)** 
East Java -0.092 -0.136 -0.078 -0.120 
(1.27) (1.83) (1.08) (J.63) 
Bali -0.004 -0.060 -0.ot5 -0.069 
(0.05) (0.69) (0.18) (0.79) 
West Nusa.Tenggara -0.062 -0.097 -0.077 -0.110 
(0.68) (1.04) (0.84) (1.20) 
South Kalimantan -0.1 II -0.146 -0.120 -0.153 
(1.34) (1.14) (1.43) (1.80) 
South Sulawesi 0.036 -0.010 0.022 -0.023 
(0.33) (0.09) (0.20) (0.20) 
Moved Province -0.243 0.929 -0.263 0.869 
(1.84) (1.29) (2.05)* (1.22) 
Moved Kabupaten/Kota 0.136 0.100 0.133 0.062 
(1.82) (0.24) (1.80) (0.15) 
Moved Kecamatan 0.033 0.637 0.037 0.620 
(0.75) (2.36)* (0.83) (2.31)* 
Moved Prov x Initial Income -0.181 -0.175 
(1.69) (1.64) 
Moved Kah x Initial Income 0.010 0.ot5 
(0.16) (0.25) 
Moved Kee x Initial Income -0.097 -0.094 
(2.31)* (2.25)* 
Non-farm in 1993 0.362 0.373 
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(1.99)* (2.18)* 
Stayed Non-farm -0.269 -0.282 -0.143 -0.155 
(1.56) (1.75) (0.72) (0.80) 
Moved to non-farm 0.082 0.077 0.082 0.077 
(0.92) (0.87) (0.93) (0.88) 
Moved to farm -0.474 -0.499 -0.329 -0.352 
(2.49)* (2.76)** (1.55) (1.69) 
Mining Quarry -0.082 -0.067 
(0.22) (0.18) 
Manufacturing 0.132 0.143 
(0.65) (0.72) 
Electricity 0.126 0.144 
(0.52) (0.59) 
Construction 0.052 0.059 
(0.25) (0.29) 
Wholesale 0.292 0.302 
(1.42) {1.50) 
Transport 0.218 0.225 
{1.04) (1.10) 
Finance 0.535 0.527 
(2.21)* (2.20)* 
Social Services 0.450 0.455 
(2.16)* (2.21)* 
Constant 3.104 2.826 3.218 2.950 
(8.71)** (7.63)** (9.07)** (7.94)** 
Observations 4225 4225 4225 4225 
R-squared 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.34 
Robust t statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; •• significant at 1 % 
Note: All variables which are not difference variables are from the IFLS 1993. 
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Table D.6: Geographic and Absolute Convergence 
(1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable Change in log real income 
North Sumatra 0.276 -0.037 
(3.01)** (0.46) 
West Sumatra 0.147 -0.102 
(1.22) (0.92) 
South Sumatra 0.467 0.019 
(4.05)** (0.19) 
Lampung 0.585 -0.046 
(5.08)** (0.45) 
West Java 0.308 -0.031 
(4.09)** (0.47) 
Central J av-.1 0.467 -0.044 
(6.40)** (0.63) 
Di Yogyakarta 0.274 -0.178 
(3.13)** (2.05)* 
East Java 0.408 -0.053 
(5.36)** (0.71) 
Bali 0.360 0.027 
(4.38)** (0.35) 
West NusaTenggara 0.436 -0.066 
(4.29)** (0.74) 
South Kalimantan 0.108 -0.149 
(1.17) (1.78) 
South Sulawesi 0.649 0.111 
(5.92)** (1.08) 
Log Real Income 1993 -0.423 -0.422 
(18.63)** (19.87)** 
Constant -0.225 2.824 2.782 
(4.26)** (16.70)** (20.34)** 
Observations 4229 4229 4229 
R-squared 0.01 0.18 0.18 
Robust t statistics in parentheses • significant at 5%; ** significant at 1 % 
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Table D.7: Full Logit Regression of Poverty Exit and Entry (1993-2000) 
(1) (2) 
exit entry 
Log real income 1993 0.155 -0.295 
(1.88) (4.75)** 
Age 0.098 -0.128 
(1.38) (2.45)* 
Age squared -0.001 0.002 
(1.61) (2.68)** 
Sex -0.056 0.088 
(0.31) (0.64) 
Working hours per month 0.001 -0.001 
(0.81) (0.79) 
Wage income dummy -0.153 0.299 
(0.95) (2.30)* 
Years of schooling 0.132 -0.136 
(5.03)** (7.84)** 
Household size -0.180 0.118 
(3.03)** (2.30)* 
Number of Children < 5 -0.004 0.196 
(0.04) (2.23)* 
Number of Men 0.044 0.191 
(0.57) (2.67)** 
Urban Dummy -0.777 0.535 
(4.13)** (3.53)** 
North Sumatra -0.938 -0.128 
(1.29) (0.34) 
West Sumatra 0.019 1.315 
(0.02) (3.68)** 
South Sumatra -0.418 0.913 
(o.58) (2.63)** 
Lampung -0.954 0.471 
(1.27) (1.18) 
West Java -0.322 0.818 
(Q.50) (2.78)** 
Central Java 0.128 0.227 
(0.20) (0.70) 
Di Yogyakarta -0.166 0.686 
(0.24) (l.94) 
East Java 0.428 0.850 
(0.67) (2.67)** 
Bali 0.158 0.672 
(0.23) (J.94) 
West NusaTenggara 0.277 1.311 
(0.41) (3.74)** 
South Kalimantan -0.071 0.679 
(0.10) (J.98)* 
South Sulawesi 0.721 -0.028 
(1.03) (0.07) 
Moved Province 3.830 0,018 
(3.40)** (0.03) 
Moved Kabupaten 0.938 -0.203 
(2.62)** (0.94) 
Moved Kecamatan -0.105 -0.024 
(o.58) (0.16) 
Stayed Non-farm 0.262 -0.203 
(1.29) (1.19) 
Moved to non-farm 0.510 -0.331 
(J.87) (1.36) 
Moved to farm -0.620 -0.054 
(2.20)* (0.24) 
(1.21) (1.07) 
Observations 1185 3687 
Initially poor Initially non-poor 
Robust z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%i ** significant at 1 % 
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